Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

47. Telegram From Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson to the Department of State¹

Geneva, August 31, 1955—6 p.m.

659. Comments today’s meeting.²

Wang was relaxed, made no serious effort press to any showdown, and showed no great sense of urgency. He quickly reached decisions at table on language draft and while immediately noting I had gone back on language our August 16 draft particularly on introductory para did not press his advantage this regard. Degree to which he conceded disputed points in draft also indicated they may not have been attaching same value thereto as we had assumed. While I succeeded in avoiding expressly committing myself to draft in face his willingness reach immediate agreement on text I will have to have very cogent reasons for introducing any further changes.³

Thus only remaining issue appears be Wang’s refusal set any definite time for release remaining Americans. Both of us repeatedly and categorically stated our positions on this issue and there seems little left to say.

In considering our future course of action believe must recognize that we have cut back representation arrangement to point it is much less attractive to ChiComs than something along lines their original proposal. Therefore its bargaining value is correspondingly reduced. Thus their desire to get to item two is probably principal lever which would move them towards accepting our position. Effectiveness lever difficult estimate and Wang may be doing good job dissimulation. However I have feeling their desire get to item two still far from strong enough to overcome their very strong reluctance give up their position to degree that would be required to give advance commitment on time limit for release remaining Americans. Believe it would be mistake to interpret Wang’s flexibility on wording “agreed announcement” as any indication softening their position on substantive issue remaining Americans.

While at moment risk may not seem great I continue be concerned that there could at any time be development which would further delay release those Americans whose release can now be obtained.⁴

[Johnson]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–3155. Secret; Priority.

2. Johnson transmitted his summary report of the meeting in telegram 657 from Geneva, August 31, which reads as follows:

   “Two hour and fifteen minute meeting this morning. Wang showed great flexibility on text ‘agreed announcement’ and agreed with the draft which I believe should be acceptable to US. (Text by separate telegram.) Believe I have been successful in walking back almost the entire way from our August 16 draft.

   “No progress on timing release remaining Americans but only reiteration previous positions.

   “Readily agreed to next meeting Tuesday, September 6th.” (Ibid.)

   Text of the draft, which Johnson transmitted in telegram 658 from Geneva, August 31, was identical in substance to the agreed announcement released on September 10 (see Document 53) except that in each section the word “now” appeared in the first numbered paragraph, which in the U.S. section reads as follows:

   “The US recognizes that Chinese in the USA who desire to return to the PRC are now entitled to do so and declares that it has adopted and will further adopt appropriate measures so that they can expeditiously exercise their right to return.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–3155)

3. Johnson commented in letter No. 6 to McConaughy, August 31, that he felt he had been required to “back up a long way” from the drafts sent to him in telegrams 466 (Document 18) and 492 (see footnote 2, Document 23) to Geneva, particularly with respect to the question of “nationals”. He further commented:

   “I also have a feeling that we are becoming increasingly reluctant to recognize the implications of having agreed to these talks. I am thoroughly in sympathy with doing everything possible to avoid all the apparent pitfalls but believe it hard to maintain the fiction that two Ambassadors can discuss and decide on matters without agreeing thereto.” (Department of State, Geneva Talks Files: Lot 72 D 415, Geneva—Correspondence Re US–PRC, 1955–1956)

4. Johnson further commented in his August 31 letter to McConaughy as follows:

   “One aspect that worries me is that the longer we continue in the present deadlocked position, the more hardened positions on both sides tend to become and the more difficult it becomes to shift therefrom. Looking at it solely from the standpoint of the overall welfare of the detained Americans, I find it hard to work out the equation but believe it important that we do so. We are today able to obtain the release of X number of Americans and within the next month or two Y number may well have been added to that. How large the remaining Z will be I have no way of telling, but it will certainly include the three or four ‘difficult’ cases. I am convinced that these latter cases are, under the best of circumstances, going to take a long time and doubt whether what we now have to offer under agenda item one is going to obtain their release. Of course I know that the answer is that under the present outlook neither under agenda item two are we going to be able to offer anything that would obtain their release. This may well be the case. However, should X and Y be indefinitely detained in what may be a futile effort to obtain Z?”