30. Telegram From the Secretary of State to Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, at Geneva1
569. Your 520 and 537.2 We do not yet have full text proposal referred to your 520. Superficially paragraph 1 seems to represent some advance. Indeed if word “immediately” were inserted before “further adopt” and if word “promptly” were inserted before “exercise” we would believe it might be acceptable. We would however want it clearly understood that “promptly” meant that a beginning would be made at once and completion effected within some such period as two or three months and that unless this in fact developed we would not consider they were acting in good faith and that further talks might then be broken off. However this understanding need not be made public unless it were breached.
As talks have developed it seems to us that Chinese Communists are frustrating agreed first purpose of resumed ambassadorial level talks. That agreed first purpose was “to aid in settling the matter of repatriation of civilians who desire to return to their respective countries”. Also we again recall Chou En-lai’s statement that purpose forthcoming talks at ambassadorial level was “first of all” to reach a reasonable settlement of this matter.
As we read your cables, Wang’s proposal would leave situation in precisely same unsettled state it was when new negotiations were agreed to. It seems to us that until Wang is prepared agree that Americans in China who want to return can promptly do so, we have no alternative but to stand pat constantly repeating that the agreed first purpose of talks is to “settle” these cases and what settlement does he propose.
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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1855. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Dulles; cleared by McConaughy; and approved for transmission by Sebald. McConaughy’s letter No. 6 to Johnson, August 19, commented on this telegram as follows:
“The Secretary’s telegram 569 of last night gives you as much negotiating leeway as is possible under present circumstances without compromising the essential principle. This telegram gives the Chinese Communists an easy way out if they are willing to take it, for it means in effect that we would accept their promise as to Americans who would not be released immediately and the understanding on the remaining Americans would not have to be publicized at present. This is going a pretty long way. If we went any further to meet their demands, we would not even have a Communist promise in exchange for U.S. performance. We would indeed be ‘buying a pig in a poke’.” (Ibid., Geneva Talks Files: Lot 72 D 415, Geneva—Correspondence Re US–PRC, 1955–1956)
↩ - Documents 27 and 28.↩