Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

293. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Under Secretary of State (Herter)¹

Washington, November 15, 1957.

SUBJECT

• President Chiang’s Proposal for Training of Paratroops

In his conversation with you on September 14 (Tab A²) President Chiang proposed the training of 13,000 parachutists as the first phase of a plan to intensify guerrilla activities on the China mainland. He urged that the United States “reappraise its China policy” and support “every measure short of using regular Chinese forces to help disintegrate the Chinese Communist regime”.

In the discussion of our policy toward Taiwan and the GRC at the NSC on October 2,³ the consensus was favorable toward acceding to President Chiang’s request in a limited way (perhaps training 5,000 parachutists) if this could be done without any additional cost to the United States.

The Department of the Army on October 21 approved a MAAG program for the training of 3,000 GRC troops in parachute jumping and guerrilla warfare (Tab C⁴). These are in addition to the airborne regiment (2,908 men) already trained and equipped by MAAG. However, no direct response has been made to President Chiang.

A positive response to President Chiang’s proposal would give a helpful boost to morale in Taiwan and provide a trained force which would be available on short notice should it be required. However, in responding to the proposal we should make clear that no change in United States policy is implied, and that we are not adopting the strategic concept behind President Chiang’s proposal. We should also frame our response so as to avoid strengthening the tendency within the GRC to overemphasize military preparation at the cost of essential economic growth. In responding to President Chiang the following points should be made:

1. While the struggle with the Communists may call for early military action, it is also possible that we are in for a long-term struggle in which victory will fall to the side with the greatest staying power. Therefore both the United States and the GRC must limit their military programs so as not to jeopardize long-term economic and political stability.

2. Although the United States cannot accept the strategic concept behind the President’s proposal, the United States does accept the desirability, within the limits imposed by the above considerations and existing United States policy, of training additional paratroopers. The United States cannot, at this time, increase its military aid program in Taiwan for this purpose. However, it is possible to train additional paratroopers within the limits of the existing program by effecting economies elsewhere. MAAG has recently been authorized to begin the training of 3,000 troops in parachute techniques and unconventional warfare within the limits of the aid program approved for Fiscal Year 1958. The United States and the GRC should consult to see what further economies might be achieved in the aid program and in the GRC’s military budget which would permit the training of additional paratroopers beyond this 3,000.

3. It is, of course, understood that the paratroopers trained under this program are subject to the provisions of the exchange of notes pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty and other understandings between the United States and the Republic of China concerning the employment of GRC forces.

Recommendations:

1. That you approve a positive, though limited, response to President Chiang’s proposal, along the lines outlined above; provided the Department of Defense concurs; and

Approved: C.A.H.

2. That you authorize me to seek Defense concurrence with the foregoing line of action.

Approved: C.A.H.

1. Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 59 D 19, Nationalist China 1957. Secret. Drafted by Clough.
2. Not found attached. A note on the source text indicates that a memorandum of Herter’s September 14 conversation with President Chiang was attached at Tab A. The memorandum was probably one of the two memoranda of conversation discussed in footnote 3, Document 284.
3. Document 287.
4. Not found attached. Telegram 264 to Taipei, October 22, indicated that the Department of the Army informed CINCPAC on October 21 that it had approved a program for the organization and training of Republic of China special forces. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/10–2257)