Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

284. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Republic of Korea (Dowling) to the Department of State¹

Seoul, September 16, 1957—5 p.m.

245. Herter–Richards trip.² From Herter. Left Taipei for Okinawa 16 hours ahead of schedule because typhoon in vicinity and moving toward Taipei. However Ambassador Richards remained behind and will probably be rejoining us in Tokyo.

Excellent briefing by military staff produced unanimous conclusion from Admiral Doyle other military leaders, namely, that situation Taiwan could not remain stationary and that unless moves were made soon situation would inevitably deteriorate. Specific moves were not discussed although military opinions coincided very closely with briefing given by Admiral Stump in Hawaii. Second definite conclusion by staff was that our own policy to differentiate with respect protection Formosa and off-shore islands no longer valid. Government of Taiwan completely committed to protecting off-shore islands up to point where every available man and ship would be mobilized to protect islands leaving Taiwan completely unprotected in event attack on these islands. Accordingly defense of islands would be essential to defense of Taiwan.

Had dinner with President and Mme. Chiang which while most cordial without substantive matter. However at President’s request visited him at his office before leaving hurriedly and am recording conversation which took place in detail. Foreign Minister Yeh acted as interpreter and Ambassador Rankin and Mme. Chiang were likewise present. Regret length this cable but believe conversation should be reported as accurately as possible at this time for sake of record. Following taken from detailed summary complete version of which will be forwarded by despatch.³

“The President explained that he had requested the interview because he hoped that the Under Secretary would carry with him to Secretary Dulles and to President Eisenhower the general outline of his views of the current situation in China and of what the GRC and the US should do about it. It was his intention to leave discussion of details to subsequent conversations with Ambassador Rankin but he hoped briefly to present a general summary.

“The President noted that since May of this year there had been a decided turn of events on the China mainland. He thought these developments were very significant and it was important that we take due note of them.

“President Chiang recalled that last December after President Eisenhower’s re-election he, Chiang, had sent a personal letter⁴ to Mr. Eisenhower, expressing the hope that the President, on the threshold of his second term, would be able to pay particular attention to the problem of liberation of the “captive peoples” of the world and that President Eisenhower would prove to be a “Lincoln” to the captive peoples of Asia. He had pointed out the deteriorating situation on the mainland. He had said it was his view that a “Hungary situation” might well develop on the mainland but would be on a much larger scale than in Hungary.

“He had later received a personal reply⁵ from President Eisenhower, in which the President had taken note of the changes taking place inside the Soviet and the Communist world in general which indicated a tendency toward uprisings against Communist regimes. President Eisenhower had noted that once these movements gained a foothold it would be difficult for the Communist world. President Eisenhower had said that he thought military measures were not appropriate at that time but had suggested that other means of pressure should be brought by the free world on the Communist world.

“Since last autumn, President Chiang continued, anti-Communist movements have developed in Sinkiang, Tibet, and Mongolia. The GRC had kept vigilant watch over these developments but the rest of the world had paid little attention. Now, since May, these anti-Communist movements had become almost faits accomplis and had forced the Communists to take drastic action.

“The ‘100 flowers’ and the ‘rectification’ programs were results of these developments. The US should now reappraise its China policy and should take account particularly of the psychological aspect, since these captive peoples look upon the US as the leader of the free world and as their ultimate liberator. He hoped the US realized the opportunities which now present themselves, however challenging they may be, and appreciated the serious repercussions for the GRC and the US if we let this movement die down.

“The Under Secretary remarked that he was not quite clear whether the President thought the degree of discontent and unrest has now reached a peak from which it was likely to recede in the future.

“President Chiang replied that there was no question that the opposition to the Communist regime on the mainland was very widespread. In fact, it was ubiquitous and was not confined to the schools and the intellectuals but had spread to the farm cooperatives, the labor unions and even inside the Communist party itself. It was difficult to say whether a peak had been reached but it was certain that if no demonstration came from the countries outside the Communist world and if no assistance were given by them, then the movement would die out. However, if the people were given to understand that the free world stands by them, it would be an entirely different matter. The President remarked that he was convinced the Communist press was reflecting only a small portion of the actual unrest.

“The President said he was fully aware that the GRC and the US have a mutual defense treaty supplemented by an exchange of notes regarding the use of force. The GRC did not want to do anything to violate the understandings which had been reached between the two governments and would not undertake large-scale military action without consulting the US. Obviously, the GRC would need the full backing of the US if it were to undertake such action. However, it is vital that the GRC maintain its standing with regard to the captive peoples. The people behind the Communist curtain understand that the GRC cannot mount a large invasion, but if the GRC does nothing by other means to take advantage of the present state of affairs, then the people behind the bamboo curtain, the overseas Chinese, and the world in general would lose confidence in the GRC and respect for it. President Chiang stressed that unless the GRC were to give some help, some ‘ultra mural’ assistance then the position of the GRC, and of the US as well, would be threatened, since the peoples on both sides of the curtain would lose confidence in them.

“President Chiang said he had never been fooled by Communist propaganda. By far the great majority of the people on the mainland are still friendly toward the US, more friendly indeed than to any other Western country. They regard the US as the only country which can ‘bail them out’ and can help them. But if the US takes no action (he said he had in mind ‘indirect’ action), then he feared that the overseas Chinese and the 10 million Chinese on Taiwan, as well as those behind the curtain, would inevitably lose confidence in the US.

“In reply to a question by Ambassador Richards, President Chiang summed up his view as follows: The US and the GRC should take a more aggressive attitude toward the mainland, even if this were short of actual invasion.

“The President remarked that while he did not wish at the moment to go into details, he nevertheless had some specific ideas. In fact, toward the end of last year the GRC had handed the US a plan involving paratroopers,⁶ a plan which would cost only 1/10 of last year’s military aid to the GRC. The President noted that even as early as last year he had been predicting the present unrest on the China mainland and had worked out a plan of action.

“President Chiang hoped very much that the US would agree in principle to study the GRC’s plans, and to support them, for organizing guerrilla action on the mainland and for means which would tend to organize the resistance there. The Under Secretary asked whether the President, in expressing this hope, was speaking of the paratrooper plan or of a more general course of action.

“President Chiang replied that the paratrooper plan, which he had discussed with Admiral Stump and Ambassador Rankin, was a preliminary step in the direction he intended. That plan was essential but was only a start.

“President Chiang commented that he knew the US Government has worldwide commitments and that its attention was, thus, diffused. He therefore thought that perhaps the present situation on the mainland was not fully appreciated in Washington. It was for this reason that he took the present opportunity to have this message carried personally to President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles. He hoped that Under Secretary Herter would feel, in carrying the message to Washington, that he was performing an act of humanity on behalf of the millions of captive peoples.

“The Under Secretary assured the President on behalf of himself and Ambassador Rankin that the message would be fully conveyed.

“President Chiang said that as a first step in implementing his policy he had produced the plan of last December and still hoped that consideration could be given the plan, which was not ambitious and was within the capabilities of the US and the manpower resources of the GRC. The President remarked that he realized that in the normal administrative handling of affairs of state, Secretary Dulles and President Eisenhower would probably not have an opportunity to read his plan. He was therefore calling Under Secretary Herter’s attention to it and hoped that speedy consideration could be given it and that the details could be discussed between the experts of the two nations.

“Madam Chiang pointed out that the plan, while modest, provides an essential beginning.

“Ambassador Richards commented that he thought President Chiang was too modest and that he felt certain the plan would receive the personal attention of President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles.

“President Chiang expressed his regrets that typhoons necessitated an earlier departure from Taipei than the Under Secretary’s party had originally expected. The Under Secretary expressed great appreciation for the President’s time and courtesy. He said he would be in touch with Ambassador Rankin and that President Chiang’s plan would be given prompt consideration.”

Will wire reactions Okinawa soon. Best.

[Dowling]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.12–HE/9–1657. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.
2. The Herter–Richards party arrived in Taipei the afternoon of September 12. The conversation with President Chiang, summarized in this telegram, took place in the President’s office on September 14. Ambassador Richards remained in Taipei until September 17.
3. Despatch 195 from Seoul, September 16, transmitted to the Department a full record of the conversation as prepared by Rufus Smith of FE who was traveling with the party. In despatch 178 from Taipei, September 24, Ambassador Rankin sent to the Department a copy of a memorandum of the conversation which had been prepared by President Chiang’s Secretary, James Shen, and edited by Madame Chiang and Foreign Minister Yeh. (Despatches 195 and 178 are in Department of State, Central Files, 110.12–HE/9–1657 and ibid., Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 902, respectively.)
4. Document 219.
5. See Document 227.
6. See footnote 3, Document 198.