249. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (McConaughy) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)1
SUBJECT
- U.S. Policy Toward China.
In the attached despatch (Taipei 423 of March 28, 19572) Ambassador Rankin develops the thesis that we should attempt to supply the “missing ingredient” in our China policy—grounds for GRC confidence in the future.
Noting that we have accomplished much through military and economic support, the Ambassador states that nevertheless the GRC leaders may doubt that time is on their side. In their minds, they see the possibility of: (1) a change in U.S. policy with a consequent shifting of responsibility for Taiwan to the UN which would undermine the GRC and make a Communist take-over inevitable; (2) expanding US contacts with Peiping eventually leading to GRC disintegration; (3) a deal between Tokyo and Peiping which the US could not prevent; (4) a war of attrition in the offshore-island area not of sufficient intensity to stimulate US intervention but ending with Communist air and sea control in the area; (5) full-scale war involving the US elsewhere and thereby exposing Taiwan to Communist conquest before effective US assistance could be sent; (6) large-scale nuclear war in Asia with Taiwan and Okinawa as priority targets. The only two possibilities offering the GRC hope are: (1) internal collapse on the mainland, permitting a GRC return or (2) aggression by Peiping in Asia which would secure US support for a GRC military return to the mainland. Unfortunately for GRC morale and confidence, the disastrous possibilities are more numerous and seem more likely to happen.
Under these circumstances, the GRC lacks confidence in the future and finds itself a “pawn” of external events. Although not desperate now, the GRC could become desperate, and it is in the US interest to prevent this.
Against this background, Ambassador Rankin makes the following recommendations:
- 1.
- We should initiate confidential military talks with the GRC on measures (such as a blockade action) to be taken on short notice in the event of a serious Communist attack on the offshore islands. There should also be talks regarding possible GRC military occupation [Page 520] of parts of the mainland or possible joint operations in response to some new Communist aggression.
- 2.
- In the economic field, the Chinese should be brought into long-range planning at the earliest possible stages. The passage of US legislation making possible longer term appropriations and planning would be especially helpful in this connection.
- 3.
- Statements by US officials on the liberation of captive peoples, reunification of divided countries, and similar matters should be related specifically to China.
Ambassador Rankin believes such measures will become increasingly necessary in future months to sustain confidence on Taiwan and in other threatened countries.