246. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (McConaughy) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald)1
SUBJECT
- Summary of Embassy Taipei Despatch of Particular Interest: “Return to Mainland Thesis”
In its despatch 382 of March 5, 1957,2 Embassy Taipei notes that “return to the mainland” constitutes the ultimate aim and the raison d’être of the Chinese Government and that it is necessary to morale on Taiwan. The Embassy reports that although there have been frequent, recent utterances by GRC officials on this subject, President Chiang reassured the Ambassador in January that the GRC would not attempt a return without consulting the United States, but he stated he thought preparations should be made for a return. The Embassy believes the GRC has every intention at this time to honor its commitments to the U.S. but expresses the opinion there are certain factors which might alter the situation.
Factors which might impel early action: Internal
The leaders of the GRC are getting old and may feel that time is running out. President Chiang is in his seventieth year, and he aspires to a “place in history” which he cannot achieve except through return to the mainland. A further problem is the changing composition of the GRC army. Taiwanese recruits compose almost 30% of the army, and some GRC officials believe the attempt to return must be made before the 30% figure is reached. Thus, there are strong pressures on the GRC at high levels for doing something soon.
(The Embassy remarks parenthetically that there is the contrary possibility time may be working in favor of the GRC by preparing the conditions for revolt on the mainland.)
International factors
International factors which might impel the GRC to take a calculated risk or to make a desperate attack would be: admission of Peiping to the UN; rapprochement between Japan and Peiping; an incident in Korea which would stimulate GRC action; a real or feared shift in U.S. policy such as talks with Peiping at the highest levels; evidence of conditions on the mainland which might encourage an attempt to crack the bamboo curtain from outside.
Military factors
The GRC military forces will soon reach the point of maximum efficiency with present equipment. After that point is reached and passed, the Chinese Communists will tend to grow proportionately stronger in comparison. Their military build-up opposite Taiwan will not only make invasion of the mainland more difficult but will also pose an increasingly serious threat to the security of Taiwan. Thus, although by U.S. standards the GRC armed forces do not have sufficient power successfully to invade the mainland, they are better [Page 512] equipped and trained than ever before; and in view of military considerations, as well as the GRC hope that there would be support from mainland dissidents, the Chinese might make an invasion attempt.
Situations which might stimulate GRC military action
The Embassy lists six situations which might stimulate or involve GRC military action: (1) an attack on Taiwan or Penghu; (2) an attack on Kinmen or Matsu; (3) outbreak of hostilities in Korea or Vietnam; (4) revolt on the mainland which would invite intervention; (5) GRC bombing of mainland airfields in self-defense or retaliation; (6) a deliberate GRC “desperation” assault on the mainland.
With respect to (1), our policy is clearly defined, and although not mentioned by the Embassy, we have carefully warned the GRC against provocative or unjustifiable action under (5). The Embassy suggests we might wish to re-examine or formulate policy with respect to courses (2), (3), (4), and (6). In the event of revolt on the mainland, for example, the GRC might consult with us regarding action in support of the rebellion. Should we oppose such action, the GRC could attack independently, make peace with Peiping, or abandon hope of return to the mainland. The last can be all but excluded; unlikely though it is that the GRC could come to terms with Peiping, it is more probable than the abandonment of return hopes. The most likely GRC course would be to attack independently. The Embassy states that in the event of a mainland revolt the factors which prevented our effective intervention in Hungary are generally lacking, and notes that failure to act in the Far East would have the most serious consequences for the position of the US and the free world.
Conclusions
In conclusion the Embassy notes:
- 1.
- The GRC has never abandoned hopes for return to the mainland.
- 2.
- The U.S. has never considered such a return by the GRC alone, using force, as feasible or practicable.
- 3.
- Nevertheless, events may stimulate a GRC attempt through the occurrence of favorable opportunities. The U.S. should examine the validity of its past attitude.
- 4.
- If we consider a GRC return might be feasible under certain circumstances, we should seek to learn of GRC plans for such an eventuality, thereby enhancing our ability to exercise control and to counsel against rash actions.
- 5.
- Plans should be prepared to meet a situation on the mainland similar to that which arose in Hungary last year.
Comment
One significant conclusion which can be drawn from this despatch is that very grave risks would attend any attempt to impose a “two-Chinas” solution on the GRC, or in any other way to make the GRC accept an indefinite future on Taiwan. According to the judgments expressed in this despatch, the GRC could be expected to launch an independent attack on the mainland, or even make its peace with Peiping, in preference to abandonment of its hopes of return to the mainland.