Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

237. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, February 18, 1957¹

Washington, February 18, 1957

PARTICIPANTS

• State Department
• The Secretary
• Mr. Robertson
• Mr. McCardle
• Mr. Howe
• Press Representatives
• Mr. Robert Hurleigh, President, American Association of Radio & Television Correspondents
• Mr. William Dwight, President of the Newspaper Publishers Association
• Mr. Jenkin Jones, President of the American Society of Newspaper Editors
• Mr. Henry Luce, Editor, Time–Life–Fortune (selected by agreement amongst the weeklies)

SUBJECT

• Policy Concerning Travel of Americans to Communist China

The Secretary welcomed the group saying that he was appreciative of the opportunity of discussing frankly with them our policy on travel of Americans in Communist China. He recognized that we had perhaps not put forward as convincing a case as we should, in part because not all of it could be made public, and in part perhaps because we may not have considered all of the elements ourselves. In this latter respect he looked for the meeting to be helpful, and he hoped the meeting might come to some accord.

The Secretary then developed the factors underlying our policy and notably the fact that we were in a state of semi-warfare with Communist China resulting from the Korean hostilities and technically at warfare in the sense of the still-existing orders and regulations. He touched upon the continuing threat of warfare and the violation of the armistice by the Chinese Communists.

The Secretary then said that over and above the argumentation that the gentlemen had undoubtedly heard often, there were two factors which he wanted to impress upon them which they might not have considered as thoroughly:

(a) First was the effect upon third countries, notably the anti-Communist countries of the Pacific and Southeast Asia, of any policy of permitting U.S. citizens to go to Communist China apparently with the U.S. Government’s blessing. He described the difficulty which the maintenance of the morale of these countries presented to the U.S. and contrasted it with the European countries a few years back when Communism threatened, pointing out the lack of “depth” in resistance of these Far Eastern countries and their constant vulnerability to Communist pressure and to neutralism. Any indication of softening on the part of the U.S. would have extremely serious repercussions—tending to discourage those who oppose Communism and to encourage those ready to make an accommodation with the Communist Chinese. The Secretary developed the point that, as with Western Europe at one time, Communism was thought to be the “wave of the future” whereas now in Europe this has been changed and freedom is the “wave of the future.” In the satellites there is evidence that freedom is surviving. In contrast there is no comparable feeling of resistance to the wave of the future attitude in the Pacific and Southeast Asia and it is therefore necessary to uphold the neighboring countries and this poses a difficult task.

(b) The cultural exchanges and traveling of Americans into Communist China is of such importance because the Chinese Communists, even as the Russians, seek this more than anything else in order to give themselves a sense of respectability that they do not have when they are on the U.S. forbidden list. Even more important, if they achieve cultural exchange with the U.S. then they can use it most effectively with the less strong neighboring countries. We can presumably trust the Americans who would participate in a cultural exchange, particularly the reporters, but the representatives of the weaker countries are far more vulnerable. Thus, the Secretary said, if we change our position and treat the Chinese Communists as respectable members of the international community, even though they have done nothing to earn it, the net effect in his view would be to weaken our overall anti-Communist position.

The Secretary then pointed out that he did not believe any policy revision could be limited to newspapermen; the admission of newspapermen would soon lead to missionaries, educators, businessmen and others in the area of cultural exchange.

Addressing the relationship of this problem to the prisoners held by the Chinese, the Secretary reviewed briefly the history of the prisoner problem. He mentioned the assertion by the Communist press after the failure to achieve a Dulles–Chou En-lai meeting that they, the Communists, would be more lenient when the U.S. attitude on cultural exchanges was revised. The clear implication, the Secretary said, was that if we let newspapermen into Communist China, and perhaps others, it would constitute a revision sufficient to warrant the release of the prisoners. The Secretary quoted (and Mr. Jones asked for a specific citation) of the 14th of February 1957 statement² by the Chinese in the Geneva talks that it was not even necessary for the Communists to make reply to the Secretary’s statements on February 5 since “the American press had already done the job for them.” The Secretary said that it made his blood boil to observe such bargaining and that he was not ready to permit the Chinese Communists to make it seem profitable to use captive Americans in this way. In this connection he reminded the group that it was the Chinese Communists who connected the issue of the prisoners with the correspondents in the U.S.

The Secretary told the group that the President feels strongly on this issue even though a contrary impression seems to prevail that the policy is Walter Robertson’s or his. He related that only a few evenings ago the President, following a discussion with some of his hunting associates at Thomasville, got sufficiently steamed up on the issue to call him and point out emphatically that he does not want to change his policy with the circumstances as they presently are.³

The Secretary touched upon the troubles which arose from a slow erosion of our policy and in this connection cited Senator Green’s announcement today that the Chinese Communists should be recognized sooner or later.⁴

Also to show the effect of erosion, the Secretary described the difficulties which the Government had experienced on CHINCOM with the pressures exerted by other governments for a relaxation of the trade controls. After full and careful thought, the US had decided not to agree to liberalization even though bootlegging activity would thus be increased, simply because of the political impact of U.S. participation in such liberalization on the important anti-communist countries close to Communist China. The Secretary feared, along the same lines of erosion, that with the inevitable passing of the elder, strong anti-Communists, such as Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek, leaders motivated by less deep conviction might permit a weakening which could lead to a loss of the countries without fighting.

The Secretary concluded by citing the allegory from St. Paul that it is not a question of one’s own ability to take the strong meat and drink but whether one’s taking of it “may be a stumbling block to them that are weak.”

Mr. Robertson, at the Secretary’s invitation, enlarged upon the Secretary’s presentation. He pointed out particularly that we are not afraid of the reporting which will be forthcoming if U.S. correspondents go into China. He also said the Chinese Communists know full well the U.S. position and know that no Congressman has heretofore been able to see his way to come out for recognition; but the Chinese Communists are playing for Asia. He similarly emphasized the point that this was a policy for Americans generally, not just newspapermen.

Mr. Robertson then presented a chronology of Chinese Communist actions starting from the repudiation of all commitments on coming to power, the Korean invasion, the support on Viet Minh and undermining of Indo China, the negotiations for the release of the fliers, including the “play” for the travel of the mothers, the Geneva Conference and the subsequent Geneva meetings of Johnson and Wang. He reemphasized the Secretary’s point that the Chinese Communists through all this were desperately seeking respectability and were seeking to attack us by subverting Asia first.

In response to a question from Mr. Jones, the Secretary reminded the group that it was the Chinese Communists who had related the problem of prisoners to the travel of correspondents and that this had made it considerably more difficult to lift the ban on travel.

Mr. Jones stated that he did not believe that the removal of the prohibition on the travel of newspapermen would mean it had to be removed for others. He pointed out that reporters do go everywhere when they are permitted (e.g., foxholes in wartime) and reporters now resent being made an instrument of foreign policy. Mr. Jones also took issue with the comparison with the European analogy made by the Secretary and said that the continued presence of reporters in the USSR when the rest of Europe was weak did not hurt our effort to strengthen anti-Communist forces and indeed probably helped it.

Mr. Jones said that he strongly disagreed with those who said that the Department should be defied and travel should be undertaken by correspondents despite the ban. He also said that there should be a passport control. The trouble was that the control in this instance was not right and appropriate.

There was an inconclusive exchange of comments on whether the presence of our embassies in satellite countries which we recognize did assist our people and the Oatis case was cited.⁶ The Secretary pointed out that Oatis was gotten out without submitting to blackmail. It was generally agreed, however, that there was no real danger to be feared for the safety of reporters if they went to China.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that the case with Russia was different in that we were not at war with Russia nor were the Russians holding U.S. prisoners and using them as hostages. He also reminded Mr. Jones that newspapermen do not go anywhere; the particular right of the newspapermen was to publish—and the Department strongly upheld this principle—not the right to go anywhere.

Mr. Dwight made reference to the ANPA resolution⁷ which he said had not been taken lightly and was motivated by the feeling that we would be the stronger through more knowledge. He would, however, agree with the Secretary that it would be difficult to limit the travel to reporters; this was, however, a calculated risk from which he thought we would get a net gain. The Secretary felt that Mr. Dwight should give more thought to the impact upon the anti-Communist neighbor countries, to which argument the Secretary had alluded earlier.

The discussion then turned to the question of reporters from other countries in Communist China. The Secretary pointed out that from the political standpoint the action of the U.S. in permitting admission was the only one that really mattered to the anti-Communist neighbor countries; these countries looked to us and were wholly dependent upon the U.S. determination not to recognize and not to make deals which would give respectability to the Chinese Communists. These countries had demonstrated an indifference to UK and French actions with respect to trade controls and a complete respect and dependence upon the U.S. position.

Mr. Dwight reemphasized his view that an informed U.S. public is the strongest weapon against Communist China and that the American public only has real confidence in American reporters.

Mr. Luce asked when the last time the President or the Secretary had given a forceful public presentation of the Chinese Communist crimes comparable to Mr. Robertson’s eloquent presentation. He said that although Mr. Robertson had frequently spoken publicly on this subject, he thought there was a need for the President or the Secretary to speak more often on it even though there still existed in the U.S. an overwhelmingly strong sentiment against Communist China. Mr. Luce said he put this forward as a related element because of his fear that the dangerous situation would “unravel” even by such weakening moves as Senator Green’s suggestion on recognition.

Mr. Jones reverted to the comparison of the European situation and pointed out that even at the time of the Berlin blockade, which was a very real violation of agreements and a serious threat to the U.S. and the West, there was no talk of pulling out the correspondents. He also quoted from an official State Department press statement of a few years back concerning a revision in the travel authority granted for Americans going into the satellites in which travel was specifically not forbidden, but travelers were requested to consult with the Department. This he thought would be appropriate for the Chinese Communist situation.

The Secretary tried to explain the dilemma in which the Department found itself when addressing the problem of the anxiety of the USSR and Communist China to gain approval and respect through recognition and cultural exchange. He cited the example of the Summit. The actual evaluation of gain or loss he would leave to historians but it was undeniable that the Communists had gained tremendously and exploited the gain by being able to show all over the Communist world pictures of the President of the United States with Bulganin. In weighing the gains and losses inherent in this situation, the Secretary said that he was convinced there was a very great gain for us in maintaining our position and in not giving respectability to the Communist Chinese in the fashion they wished through admission of the correspondents and other travelers.

Mr. Luce raised the point that the admission of correspondents to Communist China represents a change on their part also since correspondents were banned from China in 1949. In this same connection, Mr. Jones cited an October 1949 press statement from the Department that said the effect of the Chinese ban on correspondents from Communist China was to blot out the free press in order to force recognition; thus there seems to be a reversal of the positions. Mr. Robertson pointed out that this was, however, prior to the Korean War and the circumstances were considerably different now.

Mr. Jones noted that we did not withdraw correspondents or take comparable steps at the time of the Russian atrocity in Hungary. The Secretary pointed out that we had sharply curbed our cultural exchanges and to do otherwise would have been unthinkable.

Mr. Hurleigh pointed out that he had been unable to get an expression of views on this matter from his association members so that his statement was speaking personally but he believed very strongly that the Department’s and the Secretary’s position was entirely correct and that at least his network would, following this meeting, try even more to clarify the position to the American people. He saw American newsmen simply as Americans in this proposition.

Mr. Luce indicated that he had not taken any definite position for himself or for the people whom he “more or less represented” but that he was inclined to follow the position of the two newspaper associations.

The Secretary emphasized once more his inability to let down the barriers for certain newspaper people and then draw the line against the travel of other Americans. Instead he saw that any weakening of the position would be a breakdown in our whole policy and therefore an achievement by the Chinese Communists of cultural exchanges which they so much desire and would view as a complete victory. The Secretary again expressed his regret that the more compelling parts of this argument could not be made public, notably the extremely difficult morale problem related to the neighboring anti-Communist countries who face the all-pervasive power and culture of a Communist China in the area. He was convinced that a change in our policy would make our whole problem in the area very much more difficult.

Mr. Luce left the meeting stating that he would like to concert with Messrs. Jones and Dwight and possibly respond to the Secretary in a report, which probably should be one to be held in confidence.

In response to an inquiry from Mr. Jones, Mr. Robertson explained that of the 10 prisoners 8 were missionaries and 2 were civilian employees of the Defense Department who had been in a downed airplane flying, as he recalled it, from Formosa to Japan. However, he pointed out that the “innocence” of these men was not at issue since the Chinese Communists had, after full examination and discussion of the individuals, agreed that all would be released.

The Secretary expressed appreciation for the opportunity to discuss this critically important and difficult situation with these people and to have been able to tell them of our reasoning and thinking. He hoped that they would think over the whole situation, including especially those facets of the problem which he had pointed out were an essential element in the formulation of the policy but which were not as well known as the equally important elements involving the press coverage. He wanted the group to think carefully over the matter before expressing to him any further views.

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Official Use Only; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Howe.
2. See telegram 787, supra.

3. As recorded by the Secretary’s Personal Assistant, Phyllis D. Bernau, the President and the Secretary had the following telephone conversation on February 13 on the question of permitting newspapermen to travel to China:

   “The Pres asked if we have any change from the Chinese on those 10? No. The Pres mentioned allowing newspaper people in. The Sec referred to the mtg yesterday and Monday etc. We have word from Johnson at Geneva that this business is weakening our position there. We can’t maintain our position if we can’t persuade the newspaper people of the lightness of our position. The Pres said then we close our eyes to it. The Sec said Herter is doing it. The Pres said it is too bad. The Sec thinks we would get them out except they think they can get the newspaper people in and will hold them for something else don’t know what.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations)

4. New York Times, February 19, 1957.
6. William N. Oatis was the Associated Press correspondent in Prague, Czechoslovakia when he was arrested on espionage charges in April 1951. He was convicted and sentenced to 10 years in prison. After vigorous American protests, he was released in May 1953. For documentation relating to the Oatis case, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. iv, Part 2, pp. 1338 ff.
7. See footnote 5, Document 233.