Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

232. Memorandum From Robert McClintock of the Policy Planning Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Bowie)¹

Washington, February 8, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Admission of China to the United Nations; Eventual Recognition by the United States.

I am much troubled by our attitude toward mainland China, although I am prepared to agree with much of our official doctrine on the perfidy of the Chinese Communists and their general inimical attitude. A large number of our allies and practically all of the so-called uncommitted governments do not share our views. The time is inevitably coming when the government in Peking by a purely procedural vote of the General Assembly will be seated in the United Nations as being directly representative of the people of China, and when that time comes whoever is the American Secretary of State (and possibly the head of the Policy Planning Staff with him) is going to be hauled over the coals by certain powerful elements of American public opinion.

Another famous Republican Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes, once established a fairly simple doctrine on recognition. It had nothing to do with emotion. The criteria established by Secretary Hughes were that a government must be in effective control of the territory of the state concerned; that it must have, by and large, the clear support of its people; and that it must honor its obligations under international law. With the exception of the final point it could be said by this standard the government in Peking is already qualified for recognition. However, that is a matter of bilateral concern to the United States and China and I am addressing the tenor of this paper largely to what we should do given the postulate that sooner or later Red China will be admitted to the UN.

There is no doubt at all that once the Peking Government is seated in the UN it will redound greatly to the prestige of that Government. The acceptance of Peking’s credentials by the General Assembly will result in an increase of de jure recognition of the Peking regime by a number of governments who, largely through suasion by the United States, have thus far refrained from such recognition. In an Asia which still attaches great importance to “face”, the entry of mainland China to the UN will have a great impact. However, this is something which is going to happen and there is no use wringing our hands and ordering the tide to go back. King Canute got his feet wet when he tried that.

It can likewise be argued that it would be most unfortunate to have a Communist China represented in the Security Council rather than a representative of Nationalist China who on most issues can be counted on to vote our way. However, I believe the danger of having a Chinese Communist in the Security Council can easily be exaggerated since two vetoes can be no worse than one. Likewise it can be argued with considerable effectiveness that our insistence that the representative of Taiwan in fact speaks in the name of the Chinese people is a violation of the Charter, since it was the clear intent at San Francisco that the five permanent members represent what was then regarded to be the five great powers and this clearly does not describe the Security Council representative of Taiwan.

It seems to me that before the Bandung powers and certain of our own allies vote mainland China into the United Nations, we might seek to extract such diplomatic advantage from an untenable situation as can be found. At this late date the chief benefit we possibly can derive by negotiation would be to secure effective guarantees that only a peaceful solution of the Taiwan problem shall be resorted to by either side. We might likewise secure at least a public pledge possibly backed by UN guarantees (and in this India would primarily be interested), that China would not seek to change its frontier, nor would it aid limitrophe nations in changing their frontiers, by force. This would have immediate application in North Korea, North Vietnam, Burma and Laos with a more residual application in Tibet and Nepal.

Such a negotiation could at a minimum be based on assurance by the United States that it would withdraw its present adamantine opposition to the entry of Communist China into the UN, even though if for purposes of the record we might not vote in favor of such admission. If the bargaining got more sticky we might contemplate raising the ante to include recognition.²

Once Communist China is admitted to the United Nations it will be so generally recognized by other governments that we might as well follow suit, utilizing to the extent possible our readiness to recognize, to round off the rough edges of any modus vivendi we negotiate with Peking. Among the incidental advantages to reckon on from a policy planning aspect, one can cite the very important advantage of having an Embassy in Peking. Although our presence diplomatically speaking in Moscow is not going to change the Soviet way of life, certainly the judgments provided us by the Moscow Embassy are of immense value in estimating the direction Soviet policy will take. A similar benefit would be derived from an Embassy in Peking and this might prove of crucial importance if as many believe China in future years will assert a decisive influence on the trend of Russian policy.

In such a negotiation it will, of course, be essential to provide safeguards for the integrity of the new Republic of Taiwan. It should, however, be perfectly easy among the UN membership to arrange for the admission of Taiwan as a member in its own right. We would thus come to the policy of “the two Chinas,” and the continuous wrangle in Credentials Committees of various international organizations, whereby we call black white and yellow red in insisting that the Nationalist Government of Taiwan speaks for 600 million mainland Chinese, would at last be ended.

It goes without saying that in the course of accepting the Peking regime into the UN, steps would be taken to end the state of hostilities between that regime and the Governments which fought in Korea under the UN aegis. Advantage could be taken of this negotiation to secure guarantees of the neutrality of the two Koreas and the two Vietnams, and further safeguards if necessary for Taiwan. It would be helpful in this connection to enlist Japan and India as guarantor powers. Ultimately if this course of action were followed we might find it possible to reduce the present astronomical dollar contributions which the US is making to such amputated patients as South Korea, South Vietnam and Taiwan.

I realize that the foregoing is an analysis based more on pragmatism than principle. However, as Confucius did not say, “if you are going to be raped you might as well relax and enjoy it.”

RM

1. Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, China. Secret.
2. Yesterday, in conversation with Congressman Zablocki, I asked what he thought American public opinion was in respect to Red China. He said that he and several other Congressmen were startled at a meeting of American businessmen held fully two years ago at which he judged that 75% of the persons present favored increased trade with Red China, and recognition as an adjunct to facilitating such trade. He quoted Representative Mrs. Kelly, who was present at the meeting, as remarking to him, “Well, I’ll be God-damned!” [Footnote in the source text.]