Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

216. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹

Washington, 30 November 1956.

SUBJECT

• Report by the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain Aid Programs²

1. Reference is made to your memorandum, subject as above, dated 7 November 1956,³ in which you requested the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the minimum level of indigenous forces which in the best interests of the United States should be maintained in Pakistan, Turkey, Taiwan, and Iran over the next two years.

2. By memorandum dated 16 November 1956, subject: “Minimum Level of Indigenous Forces to be Maintained in Pakistan”,⁴ the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided you with recommendations regarding Pakistan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the following discussion of force levels is applicable to Pakistan and Iraqi forces.

3. Although a capability for the maintenance of internal security must continue to have first priority in the development of the indigenous forces of the countries with which the United States has bilateral aid agreements, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that U.S. programs for development and support of these forces must be oriented toward the military situation most likely to be faced in event of external aggression and toward the mission which they can best perform.

4. A realistic appraisal must recognize that direct U.S. military intervention will probably be necessary in the event of external attack, particularly by the Chinese Communists or the USSR, if the area attacked is not to be lost. Based on the recognition that U.S. intervention may be necessary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a concept based on cooperative effort involving the pre-planning for the use of combined forces (U.S. and indigenous) in which each member contributes that which it can do most effectively, must be adhered to. While we should not specify in detail the forces which we would make available in the event of war, we should conduct joint planning with each of the nations involved and give a broad indication of a strategic plan whereby the United States would come to their assistance.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the force levels recommended herein represent the best estimates of minimum force levels that can be made based on the present guidance regarding the intentions of the United States to intervene in the event of external aggression against the countries involved.

6. The following comments on levels of indigenous forces to be maintained in Turkey, Iran, Taiwan, and Iraq over the next two years concern those levels in the current FY 58 MDA Programming Guidance.

[Here follow comments on indigenous force levels in Turkey and Iran]

c. Taiwan

(1) A major objective of the United States with respect to Taiwan is the development of the military potential of the GRC in order to contribute to the collective non-Communist strength in the Far East. The Chinese Nationalists currently have in being an army of 21 active divisions. This force poses a constant and substantial threat to the Chinese Communists. So long as this threat remains, it will require that large numbers of Communist troops be committed to the defense of the Chinese mainland against possible attack. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, from a military point of view, any reduction of GRC forces would reduce the over-all capability of the United States to counter Communist Chinese threat.

(2) It is considered that the Chinese Communists have the capability to seize the Quemoy and Matsu groups, assuming that these islands were defended by Nationalist forces alone. Conversely, with U.S. assistance these islands could be held.

(3) The Chinese Communists have the capability to launch and support an initial assault against Taiwan and/or Penghu utilizing a maximum of 75–100,000 fully equipped troops. The assault could be supported by Fresco and Beagle aircraft using newly constructed fields in East China. Such an assault would probably succeed in reaching Taiwan if it were attempted against Nationalist naval and air forces only. However, it is considered that the United States, utilizing U.S. forces presently deployed to the Western Pacific, would prevent a successful Communist assault against Taiwan and Penghu.

(4) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the substantial build-up in Communist air and naval forces and the improved logistical support capability in eastern Communist China during the past year would require tremendous increases in naval and air units to build up the GRC armed forces to a capability to withstand an all-out Communist effort to seize the Nationalist-held islands without U.S. naval and air support. Even if it were feasible, from a U.S. point of view, to increase the GRC armed forces, the technical capabilities of the Nationalist Chinese personnel and the industrial capacity of Taiwan limit the major force objectives of the Navy and Air Force to approximately the present levels.

(5) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the minimum levels of indigenous forces which, in the best interests of the United States, should be maintained in Taiwan for the next two years are:

(a) Army	21 Infantry Divisions
	9 Reserve Infantry Divisions
(b) Navy	85 Combatant Ships
	1 Marine Division
	2 Landing Vehicle Tracked Battalions
(c) Air Force	24 Squadrons
	29 AAA Battalions

[Here follow comments on indigenous force levels in Iraq.]

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arthur Radford
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5610 Series. Top Secret. Transmitted to the NSC under a covering memorandum from Gleason, December 5.
2. See Document 191.
3. Not found.
4. Transmitted by Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Report by the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain U.S. Aid Programs”, dated November 21, 1956. [Footnote in the source text. The memorandum of November 21, enclosing JCS minimum force levels for Pakistan, is in Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5610 Series.]