Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

207. Telegram From Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson to the Department of State¹

Geneva, September 7, 1956—2 p.m.

230. One hour fifty minute meeting this morning. I opened with statement along lines Paragraphs 1 and 4 Deptel 248,² handing him copy Aug 31 press release.³ He replied with statement on renunciation force and trade reiterating old points and then made fairly extensive prepared statement on plane incident during which he refused pickup Aug 31 press release, as “only PRC has right make protest this incident” and handed me copy Sept 2 PRC press release. In reply I pointed out that in my original statement I said I did not intend enter into discussion plane incident here and was giving him copy press release as matter of courtesy in order that his authorities would have full and accurate text. Noted we had already received through UK copy Sept 2 PRC release but glad take copy he had handed me. Then made fairly extensive statement on trade and renunciation force making it more explicitly clear than in opening statement that I was not willing discuss trade until they had accepted principle of renunciation force and agreement reached on text declaration. In course this statement emphasized our record flexibility on language renunciation force statement and willingness to consider and reconsider any language that preserved essential principles. Hoped he would be in position next meeting abandon May 11 draft and seriously negotiate with me on text which would preserve area of agreement shown our April 19 draft. Avoided any expressed or implied commitment we would present new draft.⁴ In reply Wang accused me merely repetition old positions and stated PRC “would have to consider making its position public”. With respect to plane incident picked-up copy August 31 press release as “informal document for their information only.” I expressed regret they intended again resort publicity and propaganda and said that if they made statement US would, of course, have to consider making reply.

I then made strong and extensive statement on implemention in reply to which he asked whether US willing to release all Chinese in prison US “so they could return.” I of course immediately reiterated our position on Chinese prisoners and pointed out PRC bears full responsibility any delay in return any who might desire do so.

I agreed his suggestion next meeting Thursday Sept 20. Returning Prague tomorrow, arriving Sunday evening.

[Johnson]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–756. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.
2. Paragraph 1 of guidance telegram 248 to Geneva, September 5, dealt with trade controls. Johnson was instructed to decline to discuss the Chinese draft agreed announcement on trade, or to discuss either the Chinese multilateral trade control system or the U.S. embargo on trade with China. The U.S. refusal to discuss trade controls was based upon: “(a) persistent Chinese Communist refusal to renounce force which makes it unthinkable on national security basis for U.S. to contribute through trade to Communist China industrial and economic build up; and (b) Chinese Communist breach of Agreed Announcement of September 10 which casts serious doubt on Chinese Communist good faith in implementation of any commitment Chinese Communist representatives may enter into”. The Department took the position that “even if Chinese Communists have made firm decision suspend talks unless we make concessions on trade, we do not intend to yield to pressure on trade issue”. In paragraph 4 of the guidance telegram, Johnson was instructed to give Wang the text of the August 31 press release dealing with the attack on a Navy patrol plane in the East China Sea, and to tell Wang that “this tragic occurrence demonstrates anew need for genuine Chinese Communist renunciation of force”. (Ibid., 611.93/9–556)
3. See Document 204.
4. In expanded comments on the meeting in telegram 231 from Geneva, September 7, Johnson noted that Wang, “more clearly than ever in past”, invited a new American draft on renunciation of force: “While we can reach decision on tactics for next meeting only after seeing their public statement, believe it probably would contribute to our objective if at next meeting I was able introduce another draft on renunciation that would give appearance of something new”. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–756)