Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

203. Telegram From Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson to the Department of State¹

Geneva, August 21, 1956—2 p.m.

167. One hour fifty minute meeting today. I opened with statement along lines para 1 Deptel 176.² Wang replied stating “did not deny declaration force one of central issues” failure reach agreement due US persistence “unreasonable demands” and “deliberately creating obstacles.” Merely saying should not abandon search for declaration and “not offering concrete changes” did not contribute progress. Should not entangle ourselves any longer this regard. Pleased note that I willing listen to his concrete opinions on trade and proposed draft agreed announcement (text by separate telegram³).

In reply I rebutted his statements on responsibility lack progress renunciation force and reiterated inherent relationship to subject trade avoiding any direct comment on his proposal. During considerable give and take he then tried hard tie me down to either flat refusal or commitment discuss his proposal.⁴ I avoided both. From amount conferring his assistants over my replies and other signs, gained definite impression his intent was to set stage for at least public statement if I flatly refused, or in even count obtain commitment discuss to propose so informing press [sic].

During subsequent give and take I picked up his statement that “reasonable resolution” trade problem “would contribute to resolution other disputes” as occasion for reviewing questions US had thus far presented here, that is, detained Americans, renunciation force, and missing UNC personnel, asking him whether implication his statement these problems would be resolved if US agreed with them on trade matters. He avoided trap. In reply my review concessions we had made in agreed announcement to obtain resolution problem detained Americans and our disappointment at results he replied that if US had “faithfully abided by announcement situation would be much more satisfactory.” I of course rejected this. In reply my review concessions we had made on renunciation force he said if US had accepted principle of mutual respect in May 11 draft agreement could have been reached. He rejected missing personnel as not in terms of reference. Agreed his proposal next meeting Thursday Sept 6. Returning Prague Wednesday morning.

[Johnson]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–2156. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

2. Paragraph 1 of guidance telegram 176 to Geneva, August 17, reads as follows:

   “Maintain position that you willing listen to Wang’s views on embargo but that it is unrealistic expect discuss fruitfully this collateral problem until principle renunciation of force has been accepted. So long as Chinese Communists threaten to settle disputes by force threatened party cannot be expected contribute directly or indirectly through trade to build-up of that force. Urge Communists give further consideration US April 16 revision of Wang draft as acceptable formula for mutually advantageous renunciation of force in Taiwan area.” (Ibid., 611.93/8–1756)

3. Johnson transmitted the text of the Chinese draft agreed announcement to the Department in telegram 168 from Geneva, August 21:

   “In order to bring about a gradual improvement of Sino-American relations and relaxation of international tension, Ambassador Wang Ping-nan, on behalf of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, and Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, agree to announce: the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America hold that they should adopt measures respectively on their own initiative to eliminate the existing barriers which interfere with trade between their two countries.” (Ibid., 611.93/8–2156)

4. In extended comments on the meeting in telegram 172 from Geneva, Johnson stated that he believed “Wang’s tactics today directed toward facing US with dilemma of whether to refuse any discussion trade and thereby build up their position on continuation talks along lines Chou’s Peoples Congress speech, or to agree to discussion, when any agreement our part discuss trade, however tentative or contingent, would be exploited by them to accelerate undermining our international position on trade controls”. (Ibid.) Johnson noted, in letter No. 43 to McConaughy, August 20 and 21, that he felt his position in the talks was becoming more difficult: “Of course, once I have taken a flat stand against discussion of trade until renunciation of force is resolved it would be very difficult for me to recede from it and this can well start us on the road to an actual or de facto break. On the other hand I recognize the almost insuperable difficulties of giving me any basis on which I could discuss trade in a positive sense even contingent on a satisfactory renunciation of force.” (Ibid., Geneva Talks Files: Lot 72 D 415, Geneva—Correspondence Re US–PRC, 1955–1956)