201. Telegram From Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson to the Department of State1
129. 1. Two hour twenty minute meeting today. Wang opened with statement that ten months have been spent on discussion renunciation of force suggested by US and in spite three PRC drafts submitted US still “stubbornly clinging unacceptable demands.” While I had indicated willingness hear PRC views on trade, my statements had indicated I did not intend to carry on businesslike discussion and settle this matter. This was “unfair and unequal” and hoped this was not my intent. Therefore formally proposed we agree discuss question embargo seek practical settlement.
2. In reply I made long statement reiterating renunciation as first essential step in seeking peaceful settlement disputes, therefore could not agree we abandon efforts reach agreement on this subject. Reviewed history negotiations on this stressing retrogression May 11 draft, PRC attempt confuse with other issues and establish preconditions for renunciation. Also reasserted inseparable relationship between renunciation and trade but reminded him I had previously agreed inclusion subject trade our discussions therefore willing to hear his views. Also reiterated invitation amplify aspects they had in mind in accordance questions asked my Nov 3 statement as well as [Page 419] reiterated statement made last meeting that no advantage to US in trade where goods received can be used support use of force.
3. In reply he agreed renunciation force declaration “is at the heart of the disputes between us” as attested by their patience ten months negotiations on this and three successive drafts. I still failed put forward any views which eliminate obstacles to agreement and no progress could be made by repeating old arguments. He then made statement we should strive step by step to resolve disputes, embargo was against interest both countries, violated accepted international principles trade, prejudiced interests other countries and provoked extreme dissatisfaction people other countries, lifting would be first step in improvement of relations as well as in interest American people, etc, etc. Wanted to hear my views with regard to first steps for lifting embargo. Should not entangle with other subjects or establish preconditions.
4. I replied with statement charging they seeking unilateral advantage from talks as demonstrated by their position with respect renunciation and trade and then led directly into implementation pointing out contrast between advantages resulting agreed announcement to PRC and US. With respect Americans in prison retrogression not only in rate of release as compared with situation prior agreed announcement but PRC pattern now apparently requiring remaining Americans serve full terms as shown cases Phillips, Clifford and Pinger whereas prior agreed announcement at least some Americans being released before completion unjust sentences. Also half remaining Americans have not communicated with UK Chargé evidence they being prevented obtained from Phillips and Clifford. Contrasted our offer permit Indians visit all prisoners.2 Then referred to Dept’s Aug 7 press statement,3 giving him copy and particularly calling attention to last sentence.
5. He replied rejecting argument abolishment trade embargo solely in interest PRC stating even among US authorities “some people recognize necessity abolishing.” They were continually receiving applications from American journalists for permission visit China and they had now agreed in order correct false stories and let them see construction of new and industrialized China. Also to refute slanders about iron curtain or bamboo curtain. Pointing out PRC had approved [Page 420] applications without asking reciprocity, he wondered if US would have been able give reciprocity. Charged US was actually iron curtain country and was absurd for US to attempt exploit their approval these applications for “blackmail” and demands extraneous preconditions. World and even American press would blame US. As far as Chinese in US concerned many who had returned told of efforts by INS persuade them go to Taiwan or not return and when insisted on returning such unreasonable time limits imposed as prevent them bringing personal belongings. This violates spirit agreed announcement and at variance my statements freedom Chinese to depart.
6. I refuted his charges with usual arguments not single case obstruction brought attention Indian Embassy, etc., and pointed out only action by his government could remove impediments if they desired Americans visit PRC. In view their record with respect Americans in China my government would be delinquent its responsibility protection American citizens if it took any other attitude.4
7. He proposed, I agreed next meeting Tuesday Aug 21.5 Departing Prague Friday morning.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–956. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.↩
- In letter No. 52 to Johnson, August 3, McConaughy indicated that the Indian Government had confirmed its earlier refusal to participate in the process of interviewing Chinese prisoners in American prisons. On August 1 Assistant Secretary Robertson had approached Ellsworth Bunker, President of the American Red Cross, with the proposition that the Red Cross should substitute for the Indian Embassy in conducting the interviews. Bunker agreed that the Red Cross should play the necessary neutral role. (Ibid., Geneva Talks Files: Lot 72 D 415, Geneva—Correspondence Re US–PRC, 1955–1956)↩
- See footnote 2, supra.↩
- The Department’s attitude, as outlined in guidance telegram 124 to Geneva, August 6, was that, in view of recent Chinese invitations to American students and journalists to visit China, “we consider it timely to remind Communists again how strongly we feel about their continued detention our citizens”. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–656) Johnson noted, in letter No. 42 to McConaughy, August 9, that he had carefully avoided saying anything about “forbidding” American correspondents to accept the invitation to visit China. He had in mind the legal questions involved in the situation, and anticipated that the problem might lead to requests from some of the relatives of American prisoners in China to travel to the mainland. (Ibid., Geneva Talks Files: Lot 72 D 415, Geneva—Correspondence Re US–PRC, 1955–1956)↩
- In expanded comments on the meeting in telegram 134 from Geneva, August 9, Johnson stated that Wang’s attitude at the meeting, “and proposals at this and recent meetings on timing subsequent meetings also appears indicate they intend continue ‘marking time’ operation for next two months or so”. (Ibid., Central Files, 611.93/8–956)↩