Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

192. Memorandum of a Conversation, Taipei, July 7, 1956¹

Taipei, July 7, 1956

PARTICIPANTS

• President Chiang Kai-shek
• Madame Chiang
• Foreign Minister George K.C. Yeh
• Ambassador K.L. Rankin

SUBJECT

• Proposed Withdrawal of U.S. Military Personnel from Offshore Islands

President Chiang asked me to see him late yesterday afternoon. Madame Chiang also was present, but took no significant part in the conversation. Foreign Minister Yeh acted as interpreter. First we reviewed various preparations for the visit of Vice President Richard M. Nixon,² who is due in Taipei tonight. The President then brought up the proposal to withdraw United States military personnel from Kinmen and Matsu, which evidently was the primary reason he had sent for me.

During the subsequent conversation President Chiang repeated several times, with emphasis, his conviction that the withdrawal of United States military personnel from the offshore islands would have a most serious—perhaps disastrous—effect on Chinese morale. It would be interpreted by the Chinese military and by the civilian population as a new step in American policy directed toward the abandonment of Kinmen and Matsu. He recalled the psychological impact of the withdrawal of American Marines from Tien Tsin and Tsing Tao, which had proved far more serious than he himself had foreseen. Particularly at the present time, it was of the greatest importance that such a mistake should not be repeated.

In reply, I reviewed the points covered in my memoranda of conversations with the Acting Foreign Minister (June 22³) and the Minister of Defense (June 26⁴), omitting reference to the potentially awkward position of the American officers in question in the event of a sudden and major Communist attack. I assured him that no change of policy was involved, and that it was not proposed to withdraw the officers immediately—perhaps not before the end of the year.

In further explanation, I said that any American responsibilities toward the offshore islands now belonged more properly to the United States Taiwan Defense Command than to the Military Assistance Advisory Group, whose personnel were first stationed on Kinmen and Matsu in 1954 prior to the establishment of USTDC. Moreover, we were faced with the larger problem of reducing the numbers of official Americans in Free China from the present high level, which is having unfortunate effects on Chinese-U.S. relations. Beyond a certain point, I said, our local problems seemed to increase as the square of the number of Americans involved. Points of friction were multiplied and we tended to get our fingers into too many Chinese pies. I had noted a deterioration in relations between Chinese and Americans on Taiwan during the past year, and I thought it was due in large part to the rapid growth of our official American group here, which today exceeded 8,500 including dependents.

I said that there were also practical reasons for reducing our staffs. More than a year ago some 200 Americans had come out to train the Chinese in using 90 mm. anti-aircraft artillery. This training was now well advanced and a much smaller number should suffice. On the offshore islands, the equipment and training of the Chinese forces was substantially complete, as were the defense works. I could see no reason for continuing to maintain nearly 60 American advisers on Kinmen and Matsu. As a matter of fact we should encourage more independence among the Chinese military. It was understandable that American technical assistance might be needed when new equipment was introduced. But as an American lieutenant colonel said to me not long ago, “Who am I to be telling a Chinese general what to do?” One of our very best Air Force colonels remarked to me recently, “I came here as an adviser; now I am becoming a crutch.” Both of these officers are deeply interested in their work and sympathetic to the Chinese cause. I thought their remarks established conclusively that it was time to reduce our staffs, although I did not propose to do anything hastily or without due regard for psychological reactions.

Not being a military expert, I remarked that I would not attempt to say how many American personnel were required to carry out various responsibilities, but there was rather general agreement among Americans here that a gradual reduction in staffs over the next year would be in order.⁵

The President replied that he would not object to a reduction on Taiwan, but that for the psychological reasons he had already mentioned it was essential not to do so on the offshore islands.

K. L. Rankin

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/7–756. Secret. Drafted by Rankin.
2. Vice President Nixon visited Taipei on July 7 and 8 as part of a brief tour of Asian countries which included stops in Saigon, Bangkok, Karachi, and Ankara. For a summary of the discussion in Taipei between the Vice President and President Chiang, see the memorandum, infra. Additional information on the Nixon trip is in Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100–NI.
3. On June 22, Rankin met with Acting Foreign Minister Shen Chang-huan to discuss the proposed withdrawal of U.S. military advisers from the offshore islands to Taiwan. Rankin cited the problems experienced during the previous year by the American officers stationed on Tachen as evidence of the dangers involved in the present situation. He noted that MAAG advisers stationed on Taiwan would make frequent trips to the offshore islands, and the United States would continue logistic support for the islands. Rankin concluded that the advisers stationed on Taiwan might increase their effectiveness, while avoiding the risk of confusion and embarrassment in an emergency. (Memorandum of conversation by Rankin, June 22; ibid., 793.5/6–2256)
4. In a conversation with Minister of Defense Yu Ta-Wei on June 26, Rankin made many of the same points concerning the proposed withdrawal of American advisers from the offshore islands that he had made in his conversation on June 22 with the Acting Foreign Minister. He added that the advisers might not be entirely withdrawn until the end of the year. Yu insisted that any such withdrawal would have a bad effect on Chinese morale. (Memorandum of conversation by Rankin, June 26; ibid., 793.5/6–2656)
5. In telegram 76 from Taipei, July 25, Rankin noted that the MAAG on Taiwan contemplated a gradual reduction of the American advisers on the offshore islands to be accomplished by not replacing those officers who had completed their normal tour of duty. (Ibid., 793.5/7–2556)