Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

185. Telegram From Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson to the Department of State¹

Geneva, June 8, 1956—4 p.m.

2013. 1. Two and half hours this morning, two hours of which were on implementation.

2. Wang opened with brief statement on renunciation asking for “concrete and constructive opinion” on their May 11 draft and then directly moved to long statement on implementation. Pleased we had informed Indians no obstruction would be offered to accompanied children, and had given Indians list names those imprisoned. Noted we still had failed give list all Chinese U.S. and although list given Indians was called “list all known alien Chinese prisoners” covered only 30 or 40 persons. This was far smaller than number imprisoned according their information, “cannot agree” attempt “screening” few selected Chinese so as “cover up obstruction offered return large numbers Chinese in U.S.”² With respect Chinese in prison US should take steps similarly taken by PRC with regard Americans. First release them from prison and then refrain from obstructing departure if they desire return. U.S. also thus far failed account for names given me here, and gave me list additional five names also Taiwan entry permit question [sic].

3. Throughout subsequent long give and take I focused on fol weaknesses his position: (a) he in effect objected to US going beyond terms agreed announcement (b) he objected to measure he had previously demanded (c) questioning reliability verification by third party of his choice (d) false implication that had already freed all Americans (e) his attempt dictate U.S. should free all alien Chinese prisoners regardless whether they desire return PRC—this entirely beyond terms of reference talks.

4. In his replies he generally side-stepped my attacks attempting to switch subject by rehashing charges on name lists, Taiwan entry permits, etc. However, when pressed, position he took in essence appeared to be that out of many Chinese in U.S. prisons, 30 or 40 special cases had been selected who did not desire return, these would be subject to sham screening process by Indians and results would be used by U.S. to cover up continued violation agreed announcement. Also made determined effort to get me to acknowledge that we had first to “review cases” as PRC had done before releasing. I, of course, avoided this.

5. Toward end give and take I gave categorical negative replies to his renewed questions on list of Chinese in U.S., revocation requirements temporary visitors desiring prolong stay present evidence ability enter another country, release all alien Chinese prisoners without regard their desire proceed PRC, basing these upon being entirely outside terms ref our talks and provisions agreed announcement. With regard name list given me I said that all free return if they desire do so.³

6. After repeated and strong attempts by him to cut-off further discussion implementation, I made statement on renunciation again characterizing May 11 draft as intensification threat to use force rather than renunciation of force, as retrogression from Dec 1 draft on which agreement already reached, setting time limit not only implies threat but places arbitrary time limit on these talks, U.S. does not feel time limitation should be placed either upon period which country will not resort to war nor upon period during which peaceful settlement of disputes will be sought, April 19 draft was attempt to move forward preserving areas agreement already established, and still desired move forward if he would cooperate [sic].

7. In reply he made brief statement expressing disappointment, renewing charges U.S. threatening PRC in Taiwan area, PRC “will not allow problem to last forever without arriving at settlement”, and will not agree to U.S. attempt to freeze status quo. [sic] PRC felt obligation make public statement.

8. I regretted decision make public statement but willing let world judge relative merits.

9. I proposed meeting Saturday, June 16 in reply to which he asked for next meeting Thursday, June 21 “for administrative reasons”.

10. If and when they issue public statement I will have promptly issued here statement here along lines recited mytel 1937⁴ without mention any further statement from Washington. As their statement also includes implementation, I would propose not make any mention thereof my statement here but leave it to Dept make any statement this regard it would consider necessary or desirable. In general believe we should, if possible, avoid any statement on implementation at this time.

[Johnson]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6–856. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.
2. In his expanded comments on the meeting in telegram 2022 from Geneva, June 8, Johnson stated: “Believe extreme position Wang took indicates propaganda line they anticipate having to take if and when matter becomes public issue. Keeping in mind propaganda defeat they suffered with Korean POWs they of course see plot on our part demonstrate world that Chinese prefer American prisons (or perhaps Taiwan) to Communist China.” (Ibid.)
3. Johnson was authorized, in guidance telegram 2100 to Geneva, June 6, to “refrain from taking any other initiative regarding implementation at this meeting or from linking our action with action expected of Communists on American prisoners”. (Ibid., 611.93/6–656)
4. In telegram 1937 from Geneva, May 25, Johnson recommended that the Department should be prepared for the possibility that the Chinese might make a public statement concerning the Geneva talks. In this event, Johnson proposed that he be authorized to release the texts of the April 19 and May 11 drafts along with a statement explaining the inadequacies of the Chinese draft and the logic of the U.S. draft. (Ibid., 611.93/5–2656) On June 12, Wang Ping-nan issued the expected statement, which quoted from the draft announcements of April 19 and May 11, and reiterated the Chinese call for a Foreign Ministers meeting within 2 months. The Department responded the same day with a press release which explained and justified the U.S. draft of April 19. The Chinese statement is summarized in the New York Times, June 13, 1956; the text of the statement released by the Department is printed in Department of State Bulletin, June 25, 1956, pp. 1070–1071.