Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

184. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State¹

Taipei, June 4, 1956—7 p.m.

1080. Department’s 730² and 731³ (Geneva’s 1928⁴ and Department’s 2023⁵ not repeated to Taipei).

Upon receiving word from his Embassy in Washington of events described in reference telegrams Foreign Minister telephoned me to express grave concern and firm opposition to US action in case of 34 Chinese now in US prisons for serious crimes. He asked me to see him today.

At Foreign Office this morning Minister described shock felt by GRC at unilateral US decision to invite Indian investigation whether certain imprisoned Chinese nationals desired be sent to Red China. GRC reaction exacerbated by absence of consultation in matter affecting its interest; Chinese Embassy was simply notified of US decision 30 minutes before Indians and about same time as press. (Some indication here that AP had story before Chinese Embassy).

After our repeated statements that all Chinese in US who desired return homeland were free to do so, Foreign Minister learns for first time of 34 particular convicts (their nationals) we are holding who have not been given this option and who had been discussed with Red China earlier at Geneva (Lincoln White’s May 25 statement⁶). Yet we have repeatedly assured GRC we would not negotiate with Reds on matters affecting their rights or interests behind their backs.

Minister made important distinction between arrangement last September whereby individual Chinese in US could apply to Indian Embassy for assistance, unpalatable as that was to GRC, and present ease where persons in prison would be placed involuntarily under Indian investigation. (GRC regards Indians in this case much as US would look upon North Koreans if British should propose their investigating wishes of US prisoners in China.)

Under circumstances, Foreign Minister feels no other course open than for GRC to offer receive on Taiwan all 34 convicts. He could not agree to forcible repatriation of GRC nationals to Red China, whatever their crimes, and in Chinese eyes an Indian operation would be just that. GRC therefore offers alternative of voluntary repatriation to Taiwan, however little anxious it may be to take custody of convicts in question, on condition Indians are excluded and GRC representatives permitted to question prisoners together with US officials.

Comment: Fragmentary information available to Embassy makes comment particularly difficult but implications of case are potentially so important that I feel constrained to venture following:

1. Unclear why consultation with GRC and determination of prisoners wishes could not have preceded taking Indians, British and press into our confidence. Formula acceptable to GRC, however reluctantly, might well have been found.

2. This Embassy is on record many times re unilateral action without consultation. It is most dangerous course if we wish retain friendship confidence of Free China and maintain our ability to influence GRC policies and actions.

3. Difficult reconcile many evidences of concern over GRC morale with present action which threatens deal more serious blow at morale than anything for many months. It may be expected confirm Chinese suspicions of US dealings at Geneva and support growing assumption that basic change in US China policy is imminent.

4. Unless we are prepared to avoid further unilateral action, particularly without adequate consultation, it would be only prudent to prepare for circumstances in Free China which might bring disaster. Continuation of such actions inevitably will undermine GRC patience and our influence; in conjunction with some other serious emergency it could have gravest results at unexpected moment. Presumably less hazardous to initiate any necessary modification of US China policy in quiet period than await some crisis, perhaps precipitated by enemy, to force such change.⁷

Rankin

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6–456. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Sent to the Department with an instruction to pass to CINCPAC.
2. Telegram 730 to Taipei, May 31, repeated telegram 2066 to Geneva, May 29. Telegram 2066 outlined and discussed the Department’s plans concerning the possible release of Chinese imprisoned in the United States. (The file copy of telegram 730, which shows only an instruction to repeat telegram 2066, is ibid., 611.93/5–3156. A copy of telegram 2066 is ibid., 611.93/5–2556.)
3. Telegram 731 to Taipei, May 31, informed the Embassy that an aide-mémoire concerning the U.S. decision on the Chinese criminals had been delivered to the Indian Embassy, and that the Chinese and British Embassies had also been informed. (Ibid., 611.93/5–3156)
4. In telegram 1928 from Geneva, May 25, Ambassador Johnson conveyed his suggestions concerning the proposals being considered in the Department to deal with the question of the Chinese prisoners. (Ibid., 611.93/5–2556)
5. See footnote 3, Document 180.
6. Not printed. (Department of State, S/PRS Files: Lot 77 D 11)
7. The Department responded in telegram 741 to Taipei, June 6, drafted by McConaughy, approved by Robertson, cleared by the Legal Adviser, and, in substance, by the Secretary. Telegram 741 begins: “Department believes your 1080 manifests degree perturbation at Chinese prisoner decision which is not warranted by circumstances.” Taking up the Chinese objections, the Department noted that the Indian Embassy would not act on behalf of the People’s Republic of China, but would merely help to confirm the wishes of those prisoners wishing to return to China without intimidation or undue influence. The Republic of China had regularly resisted the deportation of Chinese to Taiwan, but the Chinese Embassy had been given a list of the criminals involved and would have access to them. The United States continued to recognize the Republic of China as the sole protector of the rights of Chinese aliens in the United States, including criminals. And the Department had not given any publicity to the prisoner decision. But the Department had an obligation to “leave no stone unturned” in the effort to obtain the release of the 13 remaining Americans imprisoned in China, and did not feel that the release of 34 essentially undesirable aliens was an undue price to pay toward that end. (Ibid., Central Files, 611.93/6–456)