Office of the Historian

175. Telegram From the Secretary of State to Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson in Geneva1

Washington, May 15, 1956—6:55 p.m.

1994. 1. Communist May 11 counterproposal2 represents sharp retrogression from their December 1 counterproposal3 and is entirely unacceptable for following reasons among others:

a.
It contains no reservation of right of self-defense.
b.
Paragraph 1 amounts to recognition of sovereignty and territorial integrity of Communist China.
c.
It is not an agreement to renounce force, but an agreement to settle disputes without using force.
d.
It is limited to disputes in Taiwan area.
e.
It is limited to renunciation of use of force against each other, and does not renounce use of force by Communists against GRC.
f.
It apparently places two months’ limit on ambassadors talks, requires holding of Foreign Ministers’ conference, and may limit effect of announcement to two months.

2. Our analysis is that Communist proposal is by all odds shrewdest and most dangerous move to date. In effect it would amount to our recognition Communist sovereignty and territorial integrity, leave Communists free to attack GRC whenever they wished with US barred from use of force to assist defense and would obligate us to agree within two months to hold Foreign Ministers’ conference.

3. Tactics in handling this proposal should be directed toward indicating that draft unacceptable and long step backward from their December 1 draft. You should try and lead back to our April 19 second revision4 as basis for discussion, pointing out that it covers all legitimate requirements of situation, preserving rights of two sides, renouncing use of force, and providing for discussions to settle outstanding differences. Every effort must be made to prevent Wang’s proposal from being used as basis for discussion.

4. We should be careful that while rejecting Communist proposal we do so in such a way as not to furnish grounds for break, and your manner of use of material in first paragraph should be dictated by this requirement. We think best tactic if possible is to get back to discussion US April 19 revision and why no grounds exist for Communists’ refusal accept.

5. From discussion last meetings it would appear that Wang has taken position all prisoners both US and Chinese are covered by Agreed Announcement, but that Communists are not living up to their agreement because US not releasing Chinese prisoners. Attempt to get Wang to reiterate this position. FYI We have ascertained that only 42 Chinese aliens in all US prisons, and while we have no final word as yet, it may be possible in relatively short time to make arrangements for deportation of Chinese prisoners if release US prisoners can be thereby obtained or facilitated. End FYI.

6. You should again call for release of US prisoners and Communist implementation Agreed Announcement pointing out their failure thus far has made it difficult to make further progress in talks.

Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5–1556. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Phleger, approved by Robertson, cleared by Clough and Sebald and in draft by Dulles.↩
  2. See footnote 2, supra.↩
  3. See footnote 4, Document 110.↩
  4. See footnote 2, Document 171.↩