154. Telegram From Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson to the Department of State1
1571. 1. At three hour 25 min meeting this morning no progress whatever, even some retrogression Wang’s part.2
2. Essence of his position this morning was if we insist on specific mention Taiwan in declaration must be coupled with agreement on Foreign Ministers’ meeting as set forth their October 27 draft.3 If we not willing now agree Foreign Ministers’ meeting only acceptable form declaration is their December 1 draft.4 “Ambiguous” U.S. attitude on Foreign Ministers conference and insistence on U.S. amendments to December 1 draft show U.S. purpose is to “procrastinate” Foreign Ministers conference in order maintain status quo “its seizure Taiwan and interference in liberation offshore islands”. Four successive [Page 318] times during meeting he carefully coupled “liberation” with offshore islands and not with Taiwan as formerly.
3. U.S. insistence on both amendments to December 1 draft is for purpose obstructing issuance declaration.
4. After my reiteration our position he said there was “no point in continuing this sort of discussion” and that PRC was “considering” issuance of public statement. I regretted and deplored their again going to public as indication real lack desire on their part make progress and asked for reconsideration, but expressed willingness let public judge side preventing agreement on meaningful declaration. Could get no indication when and where statement will be made but presume if made will follow same pattern as previously that is, issuance by Peiping with copies made available here.
5. Implementation took familiar lines with my including points contained para 1 Deptel 1693.5
6. Next meeting Thursday March 8.
7. Am going Prague tomorrow morning, returning here Tuesday.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3–156. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution.↩
- In telegram 1574 from Geneva, March 1, Johnson began his comments on the meeting by observing that “Wang no longer making even any pretense of meeting or responding to my arguments”. He continued: “My analysis their actual present position is that they willing ‘renounce force’ with specific reference Taiwan if we agree Foreign Ministers meeting but they would not consider any such renunciation valid beyond point Foreign Ministers had met and failed achieve peaceful settlement on substantially their terms of ‘problem of reduction tensions Taiwan area.’ It possible they would consider even such a limited renunciation not applicable offshore islands. I do not consider this necessarily implies any immediate intention attack off shores but only that they not willing even in this limited sense bind themselves with respect to them.” Johnson concluded that the possibility of agreement on a declaration on American terms seemed very remote. (Ibid.) In letter No. 33, March 2, McConaughy noted that he had discussed the possibility of a stalemate in the Geneva talks with Secretary Dulles on March 1. “No particular decision was made except to hold firm on the position we have clearly staked out. We believe it is a good and eminently defensible position. If Wang should precipitate a break, we believe we can more than hold our own in a public exchange.” (Ibid., Geneva Talks Files: Lot 72 D 415, Geneva—Correspondence Re US–PRC, 1955–1956)↩
- See footnote 2, Document 85.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 110.↩
- Paragraph 1 of telegram 1693 to Geneva for Johnson, February 28, contained the Department’s guidance for the March 1 meeting. Johnson was instructed to stress the time lapse since the release of the last American allowed to leave China, and to contrast that lapse with the steady flow of voluntary departures of Chinese from the United States, bound for the Chinese mainland. Johnson was further instructed to note that the Chinese failure to fulfill their obligations under the Agreed Announcement must be construed as evidence that they did not expect to achieve anything constructive on other topics. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2–2856)↩