Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

152. Telegram From Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson to the Department of State¹

Geneva, February 24, 1956—4 p.m.

1547. Four and one half hour meeting this morning.² No progress whatsoever.

Renunciation took familiar lines for three and half hours with discussion becoming very diffuse, Wang reiterating usual lines of foreign versus domestic nature dispute Taiwan area. Also tried hard to sound me out 1) on U.S. willingness hold FonMin meeting as “practicable and feasible means” mentioned in declaration and 2) on linked question whether any flexibility our position re status quo Taiwan. Context this line carried implication they concerned our intent is to regard declaration end in itself in maintaining status quo and relieving US any obligation continue seek “relaxation tensions Taiwan area”.

I replied along lines our firm intent fully carry out all terms declaration and that under last para draft did not exclude any “means” but at same time entirely unwilling agree FonMin meeting only such means. In any event such discussion was premature and ChiCom attempt establish unacceptable condition precedent to declaration.

[Wang] did not meet my reiterated characterization self-defense clause as unilateral reservation by each right self-defense along lines I took at last meeting. He also refused my repeatedly proffered opportunities deny their intent in demanding withdrawal self-defense clause was motivated by desire represent this as renunciation by U.S. its position with respect Taiwan, sticking to line this required them recognize our position there. Characterized our insistence on self-defense clause as raising question whether U.S. really wanted any declaration. Some suggestion they now unwilling include specific reference to Taiwan.³

He led off on implementation with brief statement giving me three more names and I replied with long statement along usual lines stressing not single fact or solid evidence showing any Chinese obstructed in departure from U.S. He again pushed prisoner question implying knowledge “more than hundred” Chinese in U.S. prisons.⁴

Next meeting Thursday March 1.

Departing for Prague Saturday morning, returning Tuesday.

[Johnson]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2–2456. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.
2. Guidance for the meeting was transmitted to Johnson in telegram 1663 to Geneva, February 21, which instructed him to continue to “affirm established US position both on renunciation force and implementation Agreed Announcement”. It stated that no case of an individual claiming obstruction had been brought to U.S. attention by the Indian Embassy or anyone else and that the information given in the one case in which Wang had alleged specific obstruction was so meager that it had not been possible to trace or identify the individual. It noted for Johnson’s information that no Chinese alien in prison had applied for repatriation and that the Department did not wish to open up any hypothetical discussion in this regard, lest it prejudice the release of the imprisoned Americans. (Ibid., 611.93/2–2156)

3. Johnson’s detailed report of the meeting, transmitted in telegram 1554 from Geneva, February 24, reads in part as follows:

   “Wang, turning to prepared statement, said I had repeatedly stated at last meeting that in making declaration it not the intention to dispute or prejudice views of either side nor to abandon either’s position in any our disputes. I had again made statement along that line to effect declaration does not require any side to prejudice its position or to give up its views in regard our disputes. At last meeting I had also stated that my side already had accepted December 1 draft his side as basis for discussion with only two small amendments.

   “Wang said however the two amendments suggested by me actually contained the entire demands of my side without any modification, which requires his side to abandon its position and which my side had insisted upon all along since beginning talks. As his side has long ago categorically stated, that was what his side absolutely can never accept.

   “Wang said in first place, my January 12 draft requires his side to recognize U.S. claim to right individual collective self-defense in Taiwan area. I had stated that U.S. is in Taiwan area purely for self-defense and that presence of U.S. forces on Taiwan allegedly was in accordance with collective self-defense arrangements. In other words, intention my side in including self-defense clause in draft was to require his side to recognize validity of continued U.S. seizure Taiwan and to recognize U.S.–Chiang Kai-shek treaty. How can this be explained as other than demand that their side abandon its position on our dispute?

   “Wang said secondly, my draft announcement proposed and he would quote ‘they will not resort to threat or use force in Taiwan area or elsewhere’. That is attempt to confuse international dispute of China and U.S. with a Chinese internal matter. As his side had long pointed out, it was entirely matter China’s internal affair as to whatever means China used to liberate Taiwan, a matter in which U.S. had no right interfere. I had once and again indicated that declaration between us should not involve any third parties, yet very draft announcement put forward my side precisely tried involve internal matter of China and Chiang Kai-shek clique. How can this be explained as other than demanding his side abandon its position?” (Ibid., 611.93/2–2456)

4. McConaughy told Johnson in letter No. 32, dated February 24, that the Department had asked the Attorney General to find out how many Chinese aliens were in Federal and State penitentiaries, the nature of their offenses, and the length of their terms. He asked Johnson’s reaction to a suggestion by the Secretary that imprisoned Chinese aliens who were deportable under U.S. law and were willing to return to the mainland might be deported. Johnson replied in letter No. 24 to McConaughy, February 28:

   “The quid pro quo for the release of the 13 are not Chinese in United States prisons (they have no real interest other than propaganda in them) but the agreed announcement of the Renunciation of Force and the Foreign Ministers’ meeting. We would get a few more releases if and when agreement is reached on the agreed announcement, particularly if we made some concession that would permit agreement to be reached. We would then probably get the remainder of the 13 if and when they saw agreement in sight on a Foreign Ministers’ meeting. They would probably be willing to make some deal whereby announcement of the completion of the release of the remainder of the 13 would be made prior to the announcement of the Foreign Ministers’ meeting.”

   The letter further commented:

   “As you know, I was very doubtful of the wisdom after our September 10 announcement of belaboring the question of implementation the way we did. Not with any intent of recrimination and only for the purpose of attempting to analyze the present situation, I feel that the belaboring of implementation during that period caused them to search frantically for a counter and finally strike on this issue of Chinese prisoners. However, since we have reached the situation, I see little choice but to continue to pursue our same tactics.… I think it possible that if I were to let up on the 13 he might well let up on the Chinese in United States prisons, but I do not know whether this would be a good idea at this time. It would only be good in the sense that I have always thought that the more we make an issue of the 13 the harder it becomes for them to release them, the more they become convinced that our only interest in the talks is getting the release of all the Americans, and the more valuable they estimate the 13 may be to them in extracting political concessions from us.” (Both ibid., Geneva Talks Files: Lot 72 D 415, Geneva—Correspondence Re US–PRC, 1955–1956)