Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

142. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 31, 1956, 10:30 a.m.–12:30 p.m.¹

ETW MC–3

Washington, January 31, 1956, 10:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• US
• The Secretary
• Under Secretary Hoover
• Ambassador Aldrich
• Mr. Prochnow
• Mr. MacArthur
• Mr. Merchant
• Mr. Robertson
• Mr. McCardle
• Mr. Bowie
• Mr. Young
• Mr. McConaughy
• Mr. Goodkind
• Mr. Cottman
• UK
• Foreign Secretary Lloyd
• Ambassador Makins
• Sir Harold Caccia
• Sir Leslie Rowan
• Sir Hubert Graves
• Mr. Coulson

[Here follows a list of subjects discussed and a record of discussion concerning Southeast Asia.]

China

The Secretary said that the military position was important, especially in the Formosa area. He recalled that the Geneva talks with the Chinese Communists had been going on since August 1. The discussions were not in a healthy state at the moment. The US had hoped to get its imprisoned nationals out of Communist China. These Americans are held on political charges. Weeks had been consumed in debating whether the repatriation arrangement would cover Americans held for these alleged offenses. The Agreed Announcement which was finally issued at Geneva made it clear that all Americans were covered. The Announcement contains no qualification as to the right of all Americans in China to repatriation. We were discussing a list of 19 imprisoned Americans at the time of the Announcement. Only six have been released since then. None have been released for some time. The Chinese Communists have gone back to their original position, that the declaration should not apply to prisoners.

The Chinese Communists want to talk about the trade embargo and their proposal for a higher level meeting. The US has said that it does not wish to talk about other subjects under the menace of force and has asked for a renunciation of force declaration. The Chinese Communists have indicated they were willing to make a declaration renouncing force in international affairs as defined by them, but not in regard to Formosa issues, in as much as they consider Formosa a domestic question. Each side has put forward a draft and a counter draft, none of which is acceptable to the other side. It seems that we are pretty near the end of the road, with each side holding firmly to its present position.

The Secretary remarked that of course it could be alleged by the Chinese Communists that Formosa is a domestic affair. The same contention could be made as to other divided countries such as Korea, Indochina, and Germany. This view is not realistic, since everyone knows that as a practical affair conflict between the contending sides in these divided countries would lead to war, and so the issues are international in scope.

The next Geneva meeting is scheduled for February 4. It seems likely that Chou En-lai’s speech of January 30 in Peiping² has some bearing on the Geneva talks. In that speech he openly threatened the use of force. We do not know whether he means it.

The Secretary observed that Wang Ping-nan in the course of the talks at Geneva has never separated the off-shore islands from Formosa. There has never been any distinction between these Communist objectives. The US does not recognize any distinction in the Communist claims either. But it is interesting to observe that the Chinese Communists would not modify their demand for Formosa even if the Nationalists could be induced to abandon Quemoy and Matsu.

The Secretary observed that the artillery duels between the offshore islands and the mainland have been intensified in the last few weeks. However, the U.S. Watch Committee which is closely following daily developments in the area, feels that preparations are not yet in place for an offensive against the off-shore islands. Not even a limited offensive is expected immediately.

Mr. Lloyd asked if the Chinese Nationalists have strengthened their positions on the off-shore islands?

The Secretary said there was a reinforcement about a year ago but he was not aware of any marked recent increase.

Mr. Robertson thought there had been some slight increase. Mr. Robertson mentioned the Communist effort to build a causeway from the mainland to Tateng, and Chinese Nationalist artillery fire to interfere with this construction.

Foreign Secretary Lloyd asked if the US considered the Chinese Nationalist position on the off-shore islands defensible.

The Secretary said that the Nationalist forces were strongly entrenched and quite a military effort would be necessary to dislodge them. The greatest difficulty lay in the field of resupply. The anchorages were vulnerable to artillery and air bombardment.

Showing Mr. Lloyd a map, the Secretary said the military situation was complicated by the fact that small islands were included in both the Matsu and the Quemoy complexes. Artillery emplaced on the small islands could threaten either the larger islands or the mainland. He thought the questions as to whether an assault on the islands could succeed and whether such assaults would be directly related to the security of Formosa were open ones.

Foreign Secretary Lloyd said that Prime Minister Eden was very worried over the military situation in the area. It was not a question of the intrinsic value of the islands but of the possibility that hostilities originating there might spread.

The Secretary said the situation there did not seem as warm as it was a year ago, but it was probably just as warm as it was 5 or 6 months ago. The US intelligence estimate was that a large-scale attack on the outlying islands within the next few months was doubtful, but it was never possible to be sure about these things. The opportunities for the Chinese Communists to improve their international position by maintaining a peaceful posture for the time being might make them indisposed to gamble on a military effort in the Formosa area. The Chinese Communists hoped to get into the UN. They were trying to exploit neutralist sentiment. They were engaged in a lot of schemes which they attached importance to. All this would be jeopardized by a military adventure. So the US political estimate coincided with that of the military. An early attack is not considered probable.

The Secretary said that he knew the British were thinking along the lines of the desirability of inducing the Chinese Nationalists to withdraw from the off-shore islands. He did not think this was a practicable thing to do. Relinquishment of the islands would undoubtedly have a very bad effect on the morale of the Chinese on Formosa. It was the considered judgment of the Chinese Government that the security of Formosa would be undermined by withdrawal from the off-shore islands. The US could not dissent from this finding. In any event, the US could not force the Nationalists to abandon the off-shore islands. The US had investigated the possibility of prevailing on the Chinese Nationalists to lower their estimate of the importance of the off-shore islands. The result had been negative. There could be no possibility of changing the Chinese Nationalist position as to the off-shore islands without drastic action. Drastic action would have consequences more dangerous than a continuation of the present situation. It was out of the question.

Foreign Secretary Lloyd said the British presumed that if the Nationalist forces on the off-shore islands were destroyed the situation would be worse for them than if they voluntarily withdrew from the islands now.

The Secretary said this could not be taken as certain. The Chinese Government felt that it was better to put up a good fight and lose than to give up voluntarily. It is not certain that the Chinese Nationalists would lose. The US position in the event of a Chinese Communist attack was not decided. Under the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Joint Resolution of last January it would be left to the judgment of the President. The President would consider the problem in the context of the security of Formosa. So far the Chinese Communists have never disassociated the seizure of the off-shore islands from the seizure of Formosa. They have always lumped the two together.

The Secretary showed Mr. Lloyd on a map the progress of the Chinese Communist airfield buildup in the Fukien area opposite Formosa. He mentioned that seven new fields will be completed by April 1. Several of the fields are nearly prepared for use but are not actually operational yet. They can be occupied on short notice.

Ambassador Makins asked if there were 7 jet airfields altogether.

Mr. Robertson said there were 10 altogether, constructed or in the course of construction.

The Secretary mentioned the railroad being built to the Fukien coast. The rail line to Amoy was expected to be usable by the end of this year. Another rail extension to Foochow was scheduled for completion somewhat later.

Mr. Robertson mentioned the bad effect which any withdrawal in the face of Chinese Communist threats would have on the overseas Chinese. It would tend inevitably to throw them into the Peiping orbit.

Foreign Secretary Lloyd said that he knew Mr. Eden wanted to talk further on this subject. He thought perhaps the subject might be left until then.

Chinese Representation in the UN

Foreign Secretary Lloyd said that he knew that the United States had difficulties at home in regard to the China trade embargo issue. He said that his Government also had difficulties at home on this question and on the issue of Chinese representation in the UN. Each year it becomes a little more difficult for the Government to defend the “moratorium” arrangement³ than the year before. He did not think “the end of the world” would come as a result of this difficulty but he wanted the Secretary to know that the question was not an easy one for the United Kingdom. It “weakened the alliance a bit” on the British side. British acceptance of the moratorium idea was widely considered “not reasonable” in the UK. The Government was asked why it did not come out and take a stand on this clear-cut issue, rather than postpone its consideration year after year. The Government reply was “Why put added strain on the alliance by taking a position opposed to that of the U.S.?” This reply had sufficed so far but the justification became more difficult each year.

The Secretary said admission of Communist China to the UN would certainly put more strain on the UN. He said that the President would like to speak to the Prime Minister on that subject. The President felt strongly on the issue. The President feared that it would not be practicable to maintain UN headquarters in the U.S. if Communist China were admitted to the UN under present circumstances. Admission of Communist China would create a serious problem for the U.S. The U.S. would hope very much to continue the moratorium arrangement until there was a real reason to change it. The business of keeping the arrangement on a calendar year basis did not seem very satisfactory to the U.S., although apparently the UK preferred that formula.

The Secretary said he wished the two Governments could get together on China policy. This was the only area where a difference of any real substance existed, although there might be some limited divergence in the Middle East.

The Secretary said the problem of holding the insular positions around the great Eurasian land mass held by the Communists was difficult but the U.S. Government felt strongly that it had to be solved. It was important not only for the U.S. but for all countries. The retention of the positions in the Western Pacific was basic for the U.S. If we lost the chain of positions in the Western Pacific stretching from the Aleutians to Australia and New Zealand, it would be almost as bad as if we lost the Atlantic positions. From a physical defense standpoint it would be about equally disastrous. We would have to fall back to the continental U.S., possibly being able to keep the Hawaiian Islands. The western rim of the Pacific was extremely vital to the U.S. from a defense standpoint. It was very hard to hold these peripheral positions against the great mass of Communist China. This referred to both the land mass and the mass of people. Furthermore, the Chinese mainland traditionally exerts a great influence on the entire Western Pacific area. There is additionally a large and active Chinese population throughout this area. Often the Chinese population in Southeast Asian countries constitutes a decisive balance. If the Chinese communities swing over to Communist China and become loyal to the Chinese Communist regime—and this would be likely to happen if the U.S. and other countries accept the Chinese Communists as the only Government of all China—all our difficulties in trying to hold the area would be greatly multiplied. The situation would be simple if Communist China was not hostile to everything the U.S. believes in. Unfortunately that hostility does exist.

The Secretary recalled that some people argued that if you accept the Communist regime on the mainland, it would be possible to wean it away from the Soviet Union. This was risky advice. The U.S. must avoid enhancement of the power position of the Chinese Communist regime in the absence of a break between Moscow and Peiping. Even if it is conceded that an eventual cleavage between Peiping and Moscow may occur, action now based on this assumption would enable the Chinese Communists during the intermediate period before the break to take over the entire Western position in Asia and the Far East. So long as this strong hostility exists on the part of Communist China—so long as the impact of violent revolution on the mainland is undiminished (and there does seem to be more violence in the Chinese Communist revolution than in the Soviet revolution today)—the only course that will protect U.S. vital interests (and perhaps British vital interests, too) is to refrain from taking any action which would strengthen the Chinese Communist regime.

The Secretary said that some seem to think this position unreasonable. He thought it was highly reasonable. He wished that the Foreign Secretary could share that view. The Secretary considered the issue almost as vital for the UK as for the U.S., even though the British home islands were not washed by the waters of the Pacific. He recalled that the British had to consider Australia, New Zealand, Malaya and Singapore, all of which were in a [the] critical area he was talking about.

Foreign Secretary Lloyd said it seemed to his Government that from a long term standpoint present policies toward Communist China tended to cement Communist China and the USSR. His Government felt there were fundamental natural differences between Russia and China. If we stopped our interference, nature would reassert itself. Major differences would develop between the two principal Communist powers. Mr. Lloyd said that he agreed as to the dangerous effects on the overseas Chinese of any concessions to Communist China. The question was where and how to strike a balance between the opposing considerations.

The Secretary said he would agree that if you took a look down the long vistas of time, eventual differences between Moscow and Peiping could be anticipated. The Foreign Secretary was right from that standpoint. But these natural rivalries might take 100 years to assert themselves. A caller had recently remarked to him that 100 years from now the U.S. and Russia would be allied against China.

The Foreign Secretary said at least he and the Secretary presumably wouldn’t have to worry about the question at that time.

The Secretary said that on the basis of history and tradition, differences some day would probably emerge. It was a problem of timing. A policy not only had to be right, it had to be right at the right time. The question of gains for Communist China in the intermediate period was one of great gravity for the U.S. There would be no profit for the non-Communist world if differences emerged between the Soviet Union and Communist China after our vital interests have already been impaired. For this reason any weakness of the Western position was fraught with danger. Maybe the Moscow-Peiping alliance would some day fall apart. But would it happen quickly enough? The Secretary recalled that in World War II, it was freely predicted that the Axis partners would split, should they win. But the Allies did not stop fighting on that account.

The necessity for curbing Communist China has a bearing on the UN membership question and also on the trade control question, although as to the latter, the psychological factors were perhaps more important than the commercial ones. The commercial considerations were of course not without importance. As he saw it, the problem was, “How are we going to hold these detached insular positions at least until the evolution of Chinese Communist internal policy makes the regime no longer hostile and no longer to be feared?” Only by holding the strongest possible moral barriers against the Chinese Communists would it be possible to maintain a defensive position against them.

[Here follows discussion concerning the question of trade controls scheduled for inclusion in the economic defense compilation in a forthcoming volume.]

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 648. Secret. Prepared in the Department of State. The source text, dated February 7, bears no indication of the drafter. It and the memorandum infra are among a series of memoranda of conversations which took place during Prime Minister Eden’s visit to Washington, January 31–February 3.

   The participants listed below who have not been previously identified include: Herbert V. Prochnow, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs; J. Stewart Cottman of the Executive Secretariat; Sir Leslie Rowan, Second Secretary of the Treasury; and apparently Sir John Coulson, British Minister at Washington.

2. Reference is to Premier Rockefeller’s political report before the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. His remarks concerning Taiwan read in part as follows:

   “In the past year, our Government has pointed out over and over again that apart from liberating Taiwan by means of war, there exists also the possibility of liberating Taiwan by peaceful means. Thus, the people of our country, both on the mainland and in Taiwan, have a common patriotic duty, that is, to strive for the liberation of Taiwan by peaceful means, besides actively preparing for its liberation by means of war if necessary.”

   The text of the speech is printed as a supplement to People’s China, February 16, 1956.

3. Pursuant to an informal agreement reached in June 1951, the United States and the United Kingdom supported proposals to postpone consideration of Chinese representation whenever that question had been raised in the United Nations and specialized agency bodies.