Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

139. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State¹

Taipei, January 26, 1956—8 p.m.

685. Embassy telegram 643.² Foreign Minister today handed me Chinese counter-proposals for status of forces agreement. These appear to be complete redraft of US proposals delivered August 2, 1955³ and have received extensive attention from Justice Ministry. Only portion virtually unchanged is accompanying “military agreement” although Chinese have added to this a request for transfer to GRC of highly classified electronics equipment upon termination of agreement.

GRC repeated [replaced?] US proposals for exclusive jurisdiction with NATO type formula insuring that Chinese courts retain right to try all cases involving offenses recognizable by Chinese law. Stringent claims provisions also added, while liberal portions of provisions for customs and tax exemptions, APO, vehicle licensing and other privileges presently enjoyed by MAAG personnel have been removed or strictly limited.

Soon as extra copies Chinese draft obtainable will forward Department and DOD.⁴ Meanwhile Embassy planning detailed examination Chinese drafts in coordination MAAG TDC and 13 ATF representatives and preparation joint comments for Washington consideration.

Chinese appear to have gone much further in rewriting agreements than even Embassy anticipated. Would seem they are using this as vehicle to vent annoyance over numerous misunderstandings and disagreements with US military on administrative matters which have occurred in proportion to increase of US forces here, and to demonstrate that seeming laxity and magnanimity of Ministry National Defense in dealings with US forces does not permeate GRC structure and must terminate. Provisions of GRC counter-proposals at first glance seem so far from current US policies that agreement almost impossible. They may be assumed to represent extreme Chinese bargaining position, but we should be prepared for long difficult negotiations before our divergent positions reconciled.⁵

Rankin

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/1–2656. Secret. Passed to the Department of Defense and to CINCPAC by the Department at the Embassy’s request.
2. Telegram 643 from Taipei, January 16, transmitted the text of a message which Rankin had sent to Admiral Stump on December 13 in reply to a message from Stump, which apparently expressed concern at the lack of progress in the negotiation of a status of forces agreement and suggested a compromise solution to the problem of jurisdiction. Rankin’s message to Stump stated that he had been pressing Foreign Minister Yeh for a reply to the U.S. proposals of August 2 (see footnote 6, vol. ii, Document 275). He noted that the question of jurisdiction was a very delicate one for the Chinese, since the Legislative Yuan was very sensitive to anything suggestive of extraterritoriality, but commented that they might be willing to accept a compromise. The Embassy had several alternative formulas but was unwilling to present them until the Chinese were ready to negotiate in earnest. Telegram 643 concluded with Rankin’s comment that he thought the Chinese would welcome a compromise solution to the existing situation, “which I cannot call impasse, as alternatives have not yet even been explored, but which is still on dead center.” (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/1–1656; unnumbered message from Taipei to CINCPAC, December 13; ibid., 793.5/12–1355)
3. Transmitted with despatch 458 from Taipei, February 10. (Ibid., 793.5/2–1056)
4. Transmitted with despatch 458 from Taipei, February 10. (Ibid.)
5. Negotiations continued intermittently during the next 15 months, with the question of jurisdiction remaining the major obstacle to agreement. In instruction A–114 to Taipei, November 3, a joint State-Defense message, the Embassy was instructed to propose a compromise solution, under which the jurisdictional clause would be substantially as proposed by the Chinese but the Chinese Government would declare, either in an exchange of notes or in a written statement of intent, which might be classified, its intention to waive jurisdiction in all cases except security offenses. (Ibid., 793.5/8–1755) Telegram 1071 from Taipei, April 24, 1957, reported that in an informal negotiating session that day, the Chinese had rejected the proposal for an exchange of notes limiting Chinese jurisdiction to security offenses and had agreed to present a written counterproposal as soon as possible. (Ibid., 793.5/4–2457) No further negotiations took place prior to the end of 1957. Documentation concerning negotiations is ibid., 793.5 and 711.56393; related documentation is ibid., FE Files: Lot 59 D 19.