Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

112. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 6, 1955¹

Washington, December 6, 1955

SUBJECT

• Chinese Communist Capabilities for Attack on Off-shore Islands and Taiwan.

PARTICIPANTS

• General Yu Ta-Wei, Chinese Minister of National Defense
• General Ho Shai-lai, Chinese Representative, UN Military Staff Committee, N.Y.
• Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
• Mr. Sebald, Deputy Assistant Secretary, FE
• Mr. McConaughy, Director, CA

General Yu Ta-Wei after exchanging warm personal greetings with Mr. Robertson as an old friend, said that he was in the U.S. primarily for medical treatment. One side of his face was still paralyzed as a result of the operation for removal of a tumor, and he had not been feeling at all well. He was going to Columbia University Hospital in New York for further diagnosis. He expected to have treatments after that and would be in the U.S. until about mid-January. He would be available from time to time during the next several weeks for consultation in Washington. He said that General Ho would remain in New York and would be able to represent him after January 15.

General Yu asked Mr. Robertson to bring him up to date on anything he should be informed of. He said that Mr. Robertson was esteemed by the Chinese Government as a friend of China second to none, and his views were held in highest regard.

Mr. Robertson gave General Yu a brief résumé of the course of the Johnson–Wang Ambassadorial talks at Geneva, stressing that (1) no “deal” was being engineered; (2) no matters involving the rights and interests of the Government of China would be discussed; (3) no degree of diplomatic recognition of Communist China was intended or implied; (4) U.S. opposition to admission of Communist China to the UN remained firm; (5) only U.S. objectives in the talks were to obtain the release of U.S. nationals and to obtain Chinese Communist commitment to the principle of the renunciation of force, a principle to which the U.S. was already committed and which it was always willing to reaffirm. He cited the flagrant refusal of the Chinese Communists to carry out their commitment under the Agreed Announcement on the return of civilians.

Mr. Robertson also referred to our concern that the international position of the Chinese Government might be gravely prejudiced if the Chinese Government carried out its apparent intention to block the 18-nation membership proposal about to come before the UN Security Council.² He assured General Yu that the U.S. was also opposed to the admission of the Communist satellites, but it was unwilling to invoke the veto power to block the will of the majority of UN members on a membership question.

General Yu expressed appreciation for what Mr. Robertson had told him. His field was military rather than diplomatic. He wanted to give Mr. Robertson the substance of a briefing which he had given the JCS on Nov. 30³ concerning the development of Chinese Communist military capabilities in the Foochow-Amoy-Swatow area. He said that as a graduate in logic from Harvard, he consistently avoided, predictions about Chinese Communist intentions, concerning which no one could be certain. However, much was known about the increase in Chinese Communist military capabilities in South China, and certain conclusions could reasonably be drawn from the rapid growth of these capabilities.

He produced a series of aerial photographs of the City of Amoy and various new airfields under construction in Fukien Province. He pointed out indications of concentrated military preparations in the area just behind the harbor in Amoy. He said that the new airfields going up are not mere landing strips, but are designed as fully equipped operational fields capable of handling jet bombers and fighters. He said that tremendous effort and economic sacrifice were demanded for the construction of these new military facilities in South China. The Chinese Communists were foregoing the use of these resources in West China (Kansu) and in North China where the resources were badly needed for the furtherance of the Communist industrial development plans. He felt that this heavy sacrifice would not be made without a good reason. The Chinese Communists obviously had something in mind in devoting so much of their resources to this South China military build-up. It was not for nothing. Both he and Mr. Robertson knew Chou En-lai well. They could both speculate as to just what the Communists had in mind. It might be just a bluff designed to intimidate, but it could also be more than a bluff. It was necessary to base one’s estimates on the assumption that capabilities developed at such cost were intended for use and would not be wasted.

General Yu said that new Communist airfields within striking distance of the off-shore islands and Taiwan now under construction and within sight of completion totaled 10. He said the Communist schedule calls for completion of new airfields at the rate of one a month.

General Yu then produced a photograph of an unexploded Communist shell which he had picked up on Quemoy. He said the type and markings indicated clearly that it was of Russian manufacture. There was no question about Soviet support and supply of the Chinese Communist military machine.

Mr. Robertson said we had assumed this right along; there was nothing surprising about this information.

General Yu said that 6-inch Soviet guns are being emplaced within artillery range of the Quemoys. The Communists are building a bridge or causeway from Amoy to Tateng which will enable them to step up their artillery pressure on the Quemoys.

General Yu said he anticipated a major attack on the off-shore islands might come next June. He felt that the logical Communist course would be to subject Quemoy and Matsu to heavy aerial bombing, using the newly built fields which are within easy range. General Yu said that in such event he felt it would be imperative for the Chinese Government to reply by knocking out the airfields from which the attacks were launched. He said, “I cannot allow my boys defending the islands to be killed without taking measures to protect them”. He said that if air raids on the off-shore islands were initiated by the Communists, the U.S. would receive a formal request for its concurrence in retaliatory air attacks on the Chinese Communist bases involved.

He remarked that the Chinese Government did not consider any U.S. concurrence to be required for attacks against Communist positions on Tateng or any other off-shore location since the obligation to seek U.S. concurrence applied only to attacks against the Mainland.

He realized it was up to the U.S. alone to determine what it would do when Quemoy and Matsu came under attack. He was well aware that the off-shore islands were not protected by the Mutual Defense Treaty, and there was no U.S. obligation. However it was his own personal view that the wisest course would be for the President, using the authority granted him by the Joint Resolution of January 1955, to find that the off-shore islands were an area “related to the defense of Taiwan” and to announce that the U.S. would assist as necessary in repelling a Communist attack on the islands. He felt that an advance announcement by the U.S. to this effect would prevent a Communist attack, and would “stabilize the situation in the entire Far East”. Actually this would be the most prudent course for the U.S. Otherwise the Communists would be encouraged to attack and the U.S. might be unable to control the situation. He felt that once his Government was compelled to respond to air attacks on Quemoy and Matsu, “the hostilities would probably spread”. The Communists would no doubt feel compelled to reply to the Chinese Government counter attacks by striking at the air bases on Taiwan, and no one could predict where the chain reactions would stop. He hoped that the U.S. would associate itself with the denial of Quemoy and Matsu to the Communists since this would be the soundest preventive against the dangerous contingency he had outlined. General Yu regretted that Mr. Robertson had only 15 minutes for the briefing and said he would hope to continue and expand it after his return from the hospital.

Mr. Robertson said that the disturbing facts concerning the rapid Chinese Communist military build up were already known to him. He had discussed the matter with Admiral Radford just the day before. He agreed as to the threatening implications inherent in the Communist build up, mentioning in this connection the construction now under way of a railroad to Amoy. Mr. Robertson stressed that the off-shore islands had not and could not have been included in the Mutual Defense Treaty because there was no finding that the off-shore islands are essential to the security of the U.S. Only the President could exercise the authority and make the determination set forth in the Joint Resolution of Congress.

Mr. Robertson recalled that the positions of the two governments had been more or less reversed as to the off-shore islands. Back in 1952 and 1953, the Chinese Government had not shown much interest in improving the defenses of the off-shore islands, whereas the U.S. Government had encouraged the Chinese Government to build up these defenses and had assisted it to do so. Now we are doubtful as to the strategic essentiality of the off-shore islands, while the Chinese Government is determined to hold the remaining ones at all costs. Although we had advised the Chinese Government to evacuate the Tachens last January, since we considered them to be of no strategic importance and not defensible because of the great distance from Taiwan, we had respected the desire of the Chinese Government to hold Quemoy and Matsu, and the Ambassadorial conversations at Geneva were intended to restrain the Chinese Communists from starting any military action which might jeopardize the off-shore islands. Hence we felt the talks were in the interest of the Chinese Government as well as our own. Mr. Robertson said he hoped to see General Yu again when he returned to Washington.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/12–655. Secret. Drafted by McConaughy.
2. Reference is to a widely-supported proposal to admit 18 nations to U.N. membership as a “package”, an arrangement which was threatened by the ROC Government’s declared intention of vetoing the admission of the Mongolian People’s Republic. The concern expressed by Robertson was conveyed in messages from President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles to President Chiang as well in conversations; documentation on this subject is scheduled for publication in the U.N. membership compilation in a forthcoming volume. When the proposal came before the Security Council on December 13, the Republic of China vetoed the admission of Mongolia, and the Soviet Union vetoed the remaining non-Communist countries on the list. A compromise proposal to admit 16 countries, not including Mongolia and Japan, was accepted the following day.

3. A conversation on that date between Defense Minister Yu and Admiral Radford is recorded in a memorandum of conversation by Heading. A copy was sent to Robertson with a covering letter of December 9 from Hedding which states that it contained the highlights of Yu’s subsequent briefing of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It reads in part as follows:

   “He [Yu] stated that he considered next year, 1956, to be a decisive one, that he needed this year for the training of the Chinese Armed Forces. Further, he felt that ’56 may well be a decisive one from the point of view of the possibility of Communist attack against off-shore islands, particularly Quemoy. He feels that the ten new fields which the Chinese Communists are building will be completed around the middle of next year, and at this time they should have the capability of launching an invasion of Quemoy.

   “He felt that only by reducing or deterring the possibility of this invasion will it be possible to stabilize the situation in this area. He feels that it is a common objective to stabilize the situation, and particularly so for the Chinese Nationalists in order that they may have this time for training of their armed forces. He further feels that only by building up the defenses of Quemoy and making them strong will it be possible to deter an invasion by the Chinese Communists.” (Department of State, Central Files, 033.9311/12–955)