Office of the Historian

107. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State1

Taipei, November 29, 1955—5 p.m.

500. Department’s 313.2 Re penultimate paragraph reference telegram I trust Taipei’s 4263 was received as sent specifying joint US-Peiping agreement to renounce force as being particularly undesirable from GRC standpoint; also that further conditions were noted before reference was made to likelihood of Red takeover. Re last three sentences of same paragraph Department’s telegram see detailed report of Secretary Dulles’ March 3 conversation with President Chiang.4

Above comments not intended minimize gravity of situation but to make certain is straight.

In its natural and proper influence on foreign policy American public opinion may over-emphasize short term considerations as in present case. Intense diplomatic activity involving GRC in fall of 1954, again in late winter and more recently appears to have been prompted in considerable degree by belief large scale Red attack on offshore islands was imminent. Such belief has not been supported by any significant amount of responsible military or diplomatic intelligence of which we are aware and may therefore be ascribed, at least in part, to influence of American public opinion basing itself chiefly on press and radio. More recently impression seems to have gained ground that “tension in Formosa Strait” has lessened, whereas no significant change has occurred; attention simply has been diverted to Middle East for time being.

Preoccupation with possibility of new and early Communist aggression, and with chance of GRC (or ROK) creating incident at any time which might precipitate hostilities, carries with it peril that longer term and graver dangers may receive insufficient attention. Perhaps Reds plan it for us that way. While not excluding possibility of near term accident (presumably desired by neither GRC or Reds), [Page 189] or neglecting preparations for such event, it seems more important to prepare for more probable and more serious if more distant developments. It is therefore gratifying to receive further confirmation of Department’s support for Kung Kuan airbase project. This and similar substantial steps to deter new aggression, and to facilitate winning limited war if one should come, will be most convincing evidence to Reds that US means business and most likely persuade them to alter timetable to our advantage. By “limited war” is meant kind of hostilities for which US should be prepared in this area on plausible assumption each side hesitates initiate atomic warfare.

Meanwhile any political steps affecting Free China, even indirectly, should be considered in terms of their possible influence on already declining trend of GRC morale as Communist power in East Asia grows apace.

Rankin
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/11–2955. Secret. Received at 10:02 a.m. Repeated for information to Hong Kong and to Geneva for Johnson; passed to CINCPAC by the Department at the Embassy’s request.↩
  2. Supra.↩
  3. See footnote 3, supra.↩

  4. Reference is apparently to the record of conversation prepared by Chiang’s secretary, Sampson C. Shen; see vol. ii, Document 138, footnote 3. According to Shen’s record, Chiang’s comments to Dulles included the following:

    “As regards a ceasefire in the Taiwan Straits, now that the Sino-U.S. treaty has come into force, I can assure you that we would refrain from provoking the Chinese Communists. If the Communists do not attack us, neither would we attack them. However, we would never accept a ceasefire even if we have to lose Taiwan. We stand firm in this decision.”

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