Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

97. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, April 4, 1955—9:06 p.m.

4331. There follows background thinking on Deptel 4309 to Saigon rptd Paris 3506.²

1. Problem is whether central government with authority can develop in Vietnam. Binh Xuyen challenge must be met head on sooner or later and Diem must have freedom of action maintain central authority. Question is one of timing. Does he have sufficient resources and dependable forces on his side now? Would he have more by waiting? But in any event continual temporizing will only serve aggravate critical problem. US Government must know whether there will be government with sufficient authority to support in Vietnam.

2. General policy re Diem does not overlook difficulties and handicaps but is still pinned to inescapable fact no suitable alternative person has yet been proposed or appeared on the scene. In our assessment, any alternate choice or combination, under present circumstances of Binh Xuyen challenge and unsettled sect negotiations, would have far less chance of producing any results with our large-scale support than does present course with all its complex difficulties. Secretary touched on this general point with Couve de Murville Sunday³ who acknowledged French had no alternative.

3. Couve de Murville informed Secretary French Government had sent telegram Sunday to Ely which (a) approved his proposal on Paris meeting and (b) indicated Bao Dai’s recent message to Diem was not intended as “blaming” Diem for shooting incident March 30–31 and that Bao Dai not hostile to retaining Diem. Couve de Murville also informed us French proposition includes (1) “committee or Directoire” representing different spiritual and other elements in Vietnamese life, (2) Government under Diem on enlarged basis of technicians which would not distinguish between new men who have not served under French and former men who have, and (3) sects should be used for well-conceived interests or purposes, given territorial responsibilities for struggle against Viet Minh and resettlement of refugees, and paid appropriately for any useful tasks they may perform.

4. In commenting on Secretary’s points (Deptel 4308 Saigon rptd Paris 3507⁴) Couve de Murville said he did not have latest information on Binh Xuyen. However he thought basic question was proper evaluation of strength of both sides. He preferred to leave aside question of Binh Xuyen and discuss problem of strengthening Diem Government. He said he thought General Ely did not believe that Diem could succeed because Vietnamese of stature and ability might no longer serve with Diem.

5. We realize we and French may take different approaches and have different emphasis because of our different positions in Vietnam. French have less flexible policy and may wish to move cautiously and slowly because they have people, military forces and enterprises in Vietnam which cannot be quickly moved out. On the other hand although our material investment is relatively smaller, we do have a tremendous stake in the future of Vietnam and SEA from viewpoint of our national security and prestige. For some respects, therefore, we can be more flexible than the French.

6. Department becoming concerned over press stories that “wide split” is developing between French and Americans over crisis. Saigon may point out to General Ely and Paris to French authorities that we would deplore such stories. We fully recognize grave and complex problems General Ely and General Collins are facing in Saigon and appreciate great efforts they are making to bring about practicable solution. US and France both are seeking to assist in strengthening of Free Vietnam. Whatever difficulties there may be from time to time on tactics and emphasis, we mean to keep closest touch with French here, Saigon and Paris.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–455. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Young and cleared in draft by Sebald and in substance by Tyler. Repeated for information priority to Paris.
2. Document 93.
3. April 3.
4. Document 94.