53. Telegram From the Chargé in Vietnam (Kidder) to the Department of State1
3695. At request of Hoa Hao General Soai we went to see him this morning, March 4, at his Saigon residence. As we arrived [omission in text] political counselor, was just leaving and there was general atmosphere bustle and scurry of minor functionaries. Hoa Hao Minister of National Economy Luong Trong Tuong was present during conversation with Soai.
General Soai reminded us of continuing difficulties he had been having with Ngo Dinh Diem government and of grave distrust with which he continued to regard Diem’s intentions toward Hoa Hao in general and Soai in particular. Soai said that following his complaint to us regarding attempt of government to “whittle down” number of Soai’s troops which were to be integrated into national army government had altered its position and had assured him it would take full 3,000 men previously agreed to from Soai’s forces. Not one piaster had yet been received from government, however, and Soai was unable pay his men. He said he had positive proof Diem had already paid 18 million piasters to Cao Dai and was making “heavy expenditures” in central Vietnam but continued give no answer to repeated Hoa Hao requests for advance of even partial payment for forces. Soai said if troops remained unpaid they could be expected to resort to banditry and acts of force to obtain money.
He wanted us to know, therefore, that he had tried his best to reach understanding with government but because of Diem’s attitude he could no longer be responsible for what would happen.
It appeared clear to us from nature of Soai’s complaints and rather perfunctory manner in which they were made that he regarded this conversation not so much as appeal to Americans to intervene in his favor with government but as fulfillment his previous promise to inform us before he took any drastic action. We, therefore, inquired [Page 107] as to just what these events might be for which he was seeking to disclaim responsibility.
Soai, although evasive at first, eventually hit on heart of matter by saying he had come to firm decision there must be change of government and inquired if Americans would support a new government headed by “a southerner.” We told him categorically that there could be no question of US support for another government in Vietnam at this time. It was firm and determined US policy to support Ngo Dinh Diem and his government and US policy in this regard was firmer than ever. We must tell him bluntly that if there were efforts to overthrow Diem government by force, US support would be on side of Diem. We hoped, therefore, that all elements Vietnamese nationalists could and would reconcile their differences peacefully.
Soai replied that only conditions under which he would consider remaining in Diem government and support it would be: (1) Diem must change his “work methods”; (2) “certain Cabinet posts” must be changed; and (3) certain members Diem’s personal entourage must be eliminated.
Soai said his decision was firm and that he was leaving immediately after conversation for his territory in south. He wanted us to know he was grateful for American aid to Vietnam and that “no matter what happened he would still regard the Americans as friends.”
Comment: In light of information which Fishel has given us that conspirators against government, notably Hoa Hao, Binh Xuyen and former president Huu, had decided on March 2 to “take action” against government, we believe that conversation was Soai’s way of living up to his commitment not to take action without telling us. With the constant alarums and excursions which take place on the political scene here it is difficult to determine how much credence to place in the “irrevocable decisions” taken by many of the participants. We believe, however, that the Hoa Hao pot is coming to a boil and it is entirely possible that there may be some disorders. This is an opinion apparently shared by Diem as we understand he has recently, without consulting national army General Staff or Commander First Military District, moved two companies Vietnamese national army troops from Phan Thiet into Palace grounds thus tripling defense forces of Palace. These two companies are from forces which revolted in favor of Diem during Hinh–Diem conflict and are equipped with five armoured cars and two scout cars. Diem, according to Fishel, has also instructed recently rallied Cao Dai General Trinh Minh The to place his forces around Saigon in such a manner as to bracket Binh Xuyen forces between national army troops in Saigon and The’s men outside the city.
[Page 108]Diem has brought about this tense situation by applying pressure to Hoa Hao. Whether or not he is in sufficiently strong position to continue this pressure without causing explosion we will probably learn within brief period of time.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/3–455. Secret. Repeated to Paris and to Manila for Collins who was attending the Far East Chiefs of Mission meeting, March 2–5.↩