Office of the Historian

52. Telegram From the Chargé in Vietnam (Kidder) to the Department of State1

Saigon, March 3, 1955—7 p.m.

3677. … gave Embassy officer copy of recent report … on current French/Vietnamese/Viet Minh/ICC positions toward Geneva Agreements.

. . . . . . .

Summary of main features of report follows:

Start Summary: [Page 105]

1)

ICC Indians, Poles, some Canadians and Viet Minh convinced French cannot ensure observance political clauses of Geneva Agreements. Conviction result of statements by Vietnamese Government and American diplomatic and military missions that they do not recognize (sic) Agreements.

As result Viet Minh no longer feel protected or bound by Agreements and no longer count on elections. Chinese/Russians urging them free selves from Geneva commitments.

2)
Both Viet Minh and Vietnamese permitting ghost facade of Agreements to continue because neither willing assume responsibility for destroying. Urgent measures needed to give new life to treaty.
3)

Because ICC understood situation Desai tried through Ely to obtain from French Government official announcement French would observe political clauses. Fall Mendes government reinforced belief of those who fear French will default on agreement.

ICC is divided between two tendencies:

A)
Indians wish avoid at all costs brutal, premature ruptures of present procedures fearing resumption hostilities or at least failure Indian arbitration.
B)

Poles, and to some extent Canadians, want French officially state whether or not they can guarantee observance of Agreements.

If not, Poles claim ready return Warsaw and Viet Minh will consider selves free of all obligations.

4)

Two factors of present equilibrium are disappearing: control of Haiphong zone, Geneva Agreements and ICC.

Viet Minh will certainly not make any move against south until in possession Haiphong.

National Government’s position toward Agreements is inciting Viet Minh to plan means (infiltration) to control south other than election. Such activity will be more or less rapid depending on international situation. Consequently priority goal of French must be to gain time vitally needed to enable south consolidate political situation and strengthen National Army in order be better equipped to face either 1956 elections, a test of strength, or negotiations for other solution.

5)

Important French officially announce intentions observe all clauses treaty including final declaration. Must try retain authority of ICC.

Vietnam Government must agree play the game at least in appearance and cease repudiating Agreement.

6)
Two suggestions:
A)
That French state at Bangkok intentions fulfill agreements but provide for appeal to SEATO if south attacked (even if by internal revolution) prior elections.
B)
As date for election discussions approaches, that French make new gesture in favor agreements and help organize discussions.

[Page 106]

Finally, everyone must recognize inadvisability of pinpricking ICC. End summary.

Kidder
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/3–335. Top Secret. Repeated for information to Paris.↩