405. Letter From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (Williams) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump)1

My Dear Felix: This is in reply to yours of 24 October2 relating to “declining cordiality.” I’ve been delayed in writing this letter due to influx of visitors, press of business, and my absence from Saigon at Division maneuvers in the Tourane area.

When I speak of declining cordiality I refer to frame of mind of Americans as well as Vietnamese. It is my considered opinion, based on intangibles as contrast to positive proof, that relationships between official American groups in Vietnam have deteriorated during past few months. This opinion is based on the one hand by remarks that have been made in private to me by certain VN General Officers; Mr. Thuan and [name deleted], DOD; and in facial expressions frequently used by the President in private conversations, as contrast to his exact words and on the other hand by statements made by Americans in official meetings. These remarks normally are such as to indicate a high degree of dissatisfaction with results of their business meetings with members of the GVN. If their conversations are such as they report it can only be assumed that they hold their counterparts in very low regard and the conversations with them definitely less than cordial. Such remarks as stated in my presence could only be considered by the VN as belittling and consequently keenly resented. However, I have not noted particularly any strained relations at social or semi-social gatherings.

It has been some time since I’ve heard any thought or plan put forward by GVN that was not severely questioned or actually scathingly attacked. For some time I questioned this procedure and the tone used to describe VN proposals and have attempted to explain in more moderate language what I believed the VN had in mind. This to little or no avail. We have been cautioned that “localitis is the greatest crime in diplomatic field.” This is not too difficult to understand and certainly should be guarded against in diplomatic field or any other. Currently “the thing to do” is to belittle and question. However, I resent a friend of mine being referred to as a SOB (“he is our son-of-a-bitch so we have to put up with him”) or official communications being referred to as “a lot of bull-shit.” If persons must, they can be [Page 863] profane without being vulgar, particularly before a captive audience. Vulgarity is distasteful to me and I do not allow it in my presence among Military under my Command.

As to what you can do, nothing. I’ll continue to do the best I can here on the spot.

The VN do not like to be threatened, talked down to, nor pushed around. Furthermore it is not necessary. They can be influenced to do as we wish by showing sympathetic understanding of their particular problems, close friendly liaison and suggestions or recommendations made, sometimes many times over, in a straight forward man to man way.

I write you of this trend in the strictest confidence and for your eyes alone.3

Kindest personal regards,

S.T. Williams
Lt Gen, USA
  1. Source: Center of Military History, Williams Papers, Personal Correspondence 1955–1957 (31). Confidential; Personal.
  2. In this letter to Williams, Stump had asked the Chief of MAAG to expand on the remarks concerning personal relationships between Vietnamese and U.S. officials made in Williams’ letter to Stump of October 18. (Ibid., Conversations with Diem 16 Sep 57–28 Dec 57) For the letter of October 18, see Document 400.
  3. In a letter to Stump of December 7 Williams detailed a number of incidents which he believed might indicate “the beginning of a change for the bettering of relations between the American and the Vietnamese official groups.” In several of these incidents Williams depicted Ambassador Durbrow urging or ordering restraint in the behavior of members of the Mission. (Center of Military History, Williams Papers, Office Correspondence July–Dec. 1957)