After some further thought I’ve decided to send you the very brief notes
on the subject, made by my interpreter, at a meeting held with the
President on the 13th. This so that you could get a more detailed
picture. Having decided to do this it occurred to me to include some
additional paragraphs for your general background information.
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Not only are these other
subjects of interest but will give you an idea of the wide field covered
in these conferences which are often rather long.
Paragraphs 1 and 2, omitted, are of purely local concern and in reading
would only take up your valuable time.
[Attachment]
Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President of the Republic
of Vietnam (Diem) and the
Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam
(Williams), Saigon,
October 13, 19573
The President received General
Williams and General Myers at Independence Palace at
1500 hours. Lieutenant Colonel Usera and Lt
Colonel Foster served as
interpreters.
. . . . . . .
10. Friction With Michigan State
University:—
The President remarked that he had had some friction with MSU due to their insistence on hiring
Vietnamese personnel without clearing these with the VN government. MSU had pointed out that their contract permitted them
to hire anyone they pleased.
The President complained that many of those hired were Dai Viet who were not politically
sound and that he had asked MSU to
get clearances from the government prior to hiring personnel. The
last time, Dr. Fishel had
told the President he had cleared certain individuals through the
Sûreté and he had explained to Dr. Fishel that Sûreté had no dossiers on people from
the North and could not give proper political clearances—only the
Secretary to the Presidency—Mr. Chau—could do this.
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The President stated that many of the employees of MSU are Dai Viet who are insolent even towards high
government officials and recently MSU had difficulty in getting certain documents from
the Ministries because the Ministries were not willing to have
sensitive material handled by native employees of MSU whom they considered politically
suspect.
The President complained that MSU
failed to understand his concept for the Garde Civile. They wanted
to form the Garde Civile as a rural police force whereas he wanted a
para-military force under the Ministry of Defense but used by the
Ministry of Interior during peace-time. The President said he wanted
a force similar to the Civil Guard used in Europe and other areas
with excellent results. He envisaged a small percentage of the Garde
Civile to be used as rural police with mobile units armed with
regular weapons, including mortars, and signal equipment, which
could be moved quickly to trouble spots and be capable of acting
against riots or strikes in population centers including the
capability of running railways or public utilities in case of need.
In war time the Garde Civile would take over the defense of rear
areas allowing the Battle Corps to be fully available for front line
service.
In order to achieve such a force, the President felt he had to
replace the inefficient cadres presently commanding the Garde Civile
and replace them with Army Officers as soon as he had a surplus of
these latter. MSU was against this
and saw no need for ex-army officers in the units. He, on the other
hand, wanted officers for the Garde Civile who had finished Dalat
and had an additional year of training in law and police
methods.
The President complained that MSU and
USOM seemed to think that the
same organizations could be used in Vietnam as the ones being used
in Michigan and this was not valid reasoning. With all the piracy
and terrorism in areas of Vietnam, this was not peace but war.
The President stated he had prepared a letter which he was presenting
to USOM on the Garde Civile.
General Williams
suggested that the President call in Mr. Barrows and explain the military situation to him in
detail before he presented the letter. That a letter of necessity
had to be short and his concepts should be explained in detail and
direct to Mr. Barrows and not
thru a third party.
11. USIS:—
The President mentioned the fact that USIS also failed to obtain
clearances for personnel they chose to go to US schools. General Williams said he
understood that all Vietnamese Civilians chosen for schools were
presented to a board of VN civilians
for approval. The President said that this board was composed of
professors and others
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who
checked on the educational and professional eligibility of the
prospective students but who could not judge their political
background or reliability. USIS had been told that only the
Secretary to the Presidency could give official political clearance
and authorize the necessary visas but USIS had declared that “their
budget was their own, not subject even to the control of the
Ambassador, and they would use these funds to send whomever they
pleased”.
The President mentioned that, recently, USIS had sent to some
government agency a list of spaces for training in the US and the
Vietnamese working in USIS had taken advantage of their prior
knowledge of the spaces to advise and urge friends and relatives to
apply for the training. He felt that this was improper and that
VN government itself should be
apprised of such opportunities so as to give wider distribution and
opportunity to all Vietnamese to attend such training in the US. He
felt that, in any event, political clearance had to be through the
Secretary of the Presidency and not through extraneous agencies.
During this discussion of USIS the President made a most unusual
remark. He picked up a tea cup from the table and said “if they want
to take this cup or any property to the U.S. that is alright but if
they want to take a Vietnamese Citizen, a human being, then they
have to have proper permission. If they want slaves, then let them
go to Africa for them” or words to that effect.
