Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

398. Memorandum From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (Williams) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow)¹

Saigon, October 9, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Situation in South Vietnam

1. This is in reply to your memorandum of 4 October 1957² subject: “Draft Evaluation Paper³ on Situation in South Vietnam”.

2. The importance of the military in Vietnam should be viewed from three primary considerations:

a. First, there has been in the past a serious but today a less serious internal security problem. The pacification of the country is elementary in establishing and maintaining an economically sound and politically stable government. This is one of the basic objectives prescribed in U.S. aid programs. The nullification of adverse elements and a general reorientation of the entire populace toward American democratic ideals are major undertakings the success of which cannot be measured on a short range basis.

b. Second, the military provides a certain deterrent to aggression from outside sources. The wide dispersion of military and para-military units in the more remote and sensitive areas of South Vietnam definitely hinders the movement and activities of Viet Cong organizers and the spread of propaganda. The existence of combat units in being and stationed on likely avenues of approach to key areas within South Vietnam denies the Viet Cong the chance of a quick, easy military victory. This force is essential if aggression should occur in order to buy time to permit other friendly countries to react. Southeast Asia is one of the most vulnerable targets for communist expansion in the world today. Countries surrounding South Vietnam are probably particularly susceptible now and in the foreseeable future because of relatively unstable governments, low economic potential and small, weak military forces. These countries will undoubtedly be subjected to further political and economic subversions and some success may be anticipated. Under these circumstances, South Vietnam’s military forces must be prepared to assume a dominant role as a deterrent to external aggression.

c. Third, the military, by continuously improving internal security and acting as a deterrent to external Communist aggression, certainly advances economic development and provides stability of the regime. One of the primary U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia is to develop in Vietnam a stable government which openly denounces communism and does not accept neutralism as a doctrine. Continued support of the military for the immediate future at its present level is essential if this objective is to attained. Any reduction in U.S. contributions to the military budget and a failure of the VN government to make up the difference would necessitate some adjustment in the force level. However, it appears at this time that even though some reduction in the U.S. contribution to the military budget may be made during CY 1958, in all probability the Vietnamese will not make any reduction in existing force levels during this period regardless of the cost to them.

3. The President undoubtedly wishes to “build up” the armed forces quickly. I think his sincere purpose has been to emphasize to American officials the need for maintaining the forces he now has and increasing their capability to meet the tension arising from internal or external sources or a combination of both and further and additionally to get an increase in troop strength, if possible. It appears to me that the President’s reaction and comment over a possible reduction in the U.S. support in 1958 military budgets stemmed from his desire, as head of state, to maintain the best military posture possible in order to assure continued political and economical development. Further efforts on the part of U.S. agencies to work with him in developing solutions to problems in these fields probably will alleviate such anxiety to a degree.

4. As to the size of the military forces in Vietnam in the foreseeable future, some reduction may be possible and feasible. The timing of adjustments in the VN military structure is currently under study. It appears in light of the existing situation that, for planning purposes, the calendar year 1960 may be a reasonable time period for a possible reduction in forces. This MAAG is presently developing a five year mid-range plan which it is hoped will provide the blue print for interim development of detailed plans.

5. As to the Embassy draft submitted to me for comment on 1 October 1957, I wish to repeat that my impression of the general situation existing in South Vietnam today does not permit me to agree with the evaluation depicted in the proposed dispatch. During my service in South Vietnam, I have experienced many setbacks or delays within short term periods. However, in the perspective of longer periods, there have been many outstanding political, economical and military accomplishments in consonance with U.S. objectives.

6. The receipt in Washington of the prepared dispatch, as being indicative of present conditions in Vietnam, would unquestionably cause alarm and provoke unnecessary concern. The draft paper is too broad and general in many vital areas and tends to reflect opinions rather than facts. The reports which I have seen do not indicate a state of “considerable concern” regarding the internal security, the economic situation or the executive ability of GVN. Accordingly, I do not favor the dispatch of the proposed draft that I have studied.

7. I do agree that our most immediate and essential task here is to continue efforts to influence the President and his regime to make sound decisions on a timely basis and move forward on broad economic, social and military programs.⁴

S.T. Williams

Lt Gen, USA

1. Source: Center of Military History, Williams Papers, Memos to and from Ambassador 1957 (18).
2. In this memorandum Durbrow had asked Williams, “in view of the categoric statements made by Diem indicating that he gives paramount importance to building his armed forces to the possible detriment of beginning to build more solid economic and agricultural foundations,” to give his views on whether “it is absolutely essential to build up the armed forces as quickly as Diem desires, even to the detriment of an economic buildup, and whether you believe it would be necessary to maintain at least 50,000 [150,000?] men under arms for the foreseeable future.” Durbrow also asked Williams to contribute ideas for the recommendations to be made on a draft despatch on the general situation in Vietnam. (ibid.) For the despatch as sent on December 5, see Document 409. Additional information on its preparation is in the despatch itself and in Spector, The Early Years, pp. 304–305.
3. Draft not found.

4. In a letter dated December 9 to Admiral Anderson, General Williams stated that in a written report to Chapman dated November 22, not found, concerning a second draft of the despatch discussed in footnote 2 above, he had commented that there “was little variation in language and subject matter in the two drafts although there was considerable moderation in tone. That the thought continued that the President had failed in this task or was on his way to failure and to that I could not subscribe. That I could not agree that the President must be re-oriented from his Military Policy and the country thus become weakened in that field. Additionally, I suggested that since the Embassy felt so strongly about their paper they might consider sending it as an Embassy paper and not as a ‘Country Team Paper’.”

   Williams continued:

   “At a meeting on about the 26th November we were each handed a new summary sheet and asked to agree to it. I agreed to the summary provided they changed its opening paragraph. It was then modified. I was again asked if I would agree to the entire paper and I declined referring to my written answer of 22 November.

   “On 5th December there was sent to me a covering statement in which my prior non-concurrence was stated and a request that I submit comments on the part that referred to my views at once as Embassy would pouch the paper that day. I replied that my views had been properly stated. (I was happy to note that this covering statement consisted of 2 1/4 pages further toning down the evaluation paper to a degree.)” (Center of Military History, Williams Papers, Office Correspondence July–Dec 1957 (16))