As the year wore on more signs appeared indicating a slowing down of
momentum and a reluctance to take the obviously necessary decisions. It
had been expected that with additional economic aid available for fiscal
year 1957 the Government would move ahead at a fair pace to build up a
more solid economic and social base. Little was accomplished in this
field. Diem made it clear in the
late summer that he was again primarily concerned with security matters.
This concern, as we have reported, was due in part to increased
terrorist acts, undoubtedly encouraged if not perpetrated by communists.
Our concern was increased by more and more reports and rumors of adverse
developments on other fronts. Nevertheless it was difficult to
understand why he continued to delay taking certain steps we strongly
urged and which he had the means to accomplish. We also began hearing
more and more grumblings and expressions of discontent, which seemed to
indicate that Diem was not
increasing his prestige and appeal to the country.
These indications reached sufficient proportions to warrant, in my
opinion, careful study and analysis. Diem himself has indirectly pointed out these problems,
by stating to me and others on several occasions that while everyone in
the United States seems to believe that he has performed a miracle in
the past three years, they also seem to feel that all of Viet Nam’s
basic problems have been solved. He has pled with me to try to correct
this erroneous impression since there are many problems ahead which may
be more difficult than those in the past. It was for these reasons that
I suggested to the Country Team that we work up a critical and I hope
objective evaluation of the situation in Viet Nam today.
The attached paper is the result. While more emphasis is given to the
unsolved problems, in an attempt to take the pulse of the country at
this time, the paper should not be interpreted to mean that everything
is coming apart and nothing constructive can be done. The basic thought
I had in mind in asking for this analysis is that it is better to take a
rather cold blooded look at the situation
[Page 871]
here in order better to know and foresee the
problems ahead than to hope for the best based on past performance.
Since the first draft was written several weeks ago increasing evidence
has come to hand which seems to point to a concerted, stepped-up
communist campaign to try to throw the regime off balance by terrorism
and intimidation. Nevertheless, it is the consensus of most of the
Country Team that Diem would be
in a better position to bolster security if he paid more attention to
questions other than security matters. If he takes some of the steps
within his power to take, he should be able to increase his prestige and
make a larger segment of the population loyal to him and his regime. By
not doing this, he seems to be risking unpopularity with the people,
which may play into communist hands. It is for these reasons that we
recommend in the paper that we continue to press him to take what appear
to us to be necessary steps for the good of his regime.
It is hoped that the frank discussions we had with him in connection with
the aid levels of FY 1958, in which we
urged him to work closer with us in getting several economic projects
started, will cause him to move forward on the economic front.
While the other members of the Country Team concur in the substance and
conclusions of the attached paper, General
Williams, Chief MAAG,
does not subscribe to the inference in the paper as he reads it that
President Diem is failing in his
task or is on his way to failure. General
Williams believes that the present military posture of
Viet Nam is not too strong and that any weakening in that field would
jeopardize the mission of the Armed Forces. For this reason he does not
believe that President Diem
should be re-oriented from his present military policy. While I agree,
as made clear in the paper, that under present circumstances we cannot
reduce the military costs, I believe Diem can, with the resources at his disposal, move ahead
simultaneously on other fronts. General
Williams has been in Viet Nam for over two years, knows
President Diem well and has his
confidence. Furthermore General
Williams and his fellow officers work very closely and
harmoniously with the members of the Vietnamese Armed Forces and have
confidence in them. Therefore, the attached paper should be read with
the firm opinion of General
Williams in mind.
In other words, the paper has been prepared to invite comment and
criticism in the hope that all may arrive at a clearer understanding of
the situation in Viet Nam and the problems ahead.3
Because of the basically critical tone of the paper it has been
classified secret. It is requested that its distribution be limited on a
“need-to-know” basis to the Department of State and Defense, the ICA and CIA.
[Enclosure]
EVALUATION OF SITUATION IN VIET NAM: DECEMBER 1957
Summary
Certain problems now discernible have given us a warning which, if
disregarded, might lead to a deteriorating situation in Viet Nam
within a few years.
Diem achieved notable
successes in the first two years of his regime and remains the only
man of stature so far in evidence to guide this country. He has
unified free Viet Nam, brought it relative security and stability,
and firmly maintains a pro-West, anti-communist position.
In the last year, however, Diem has avoided making decisions required to build
the economic and social foundations necessary to secure Viet Nam’s
future independence and strength. He has made it clear that he would
give first priority to the build-up of his armed forces regardless
of the country’s requirements for economic and social development.
Events abroad which increase the danger of communist infiltration
and subversion, and which threaten Viet Nam with possible isolation
in this area have contributed to his concern and to his
determination to strengthen his armed forces.
Certain characteristics of Diem—his suspiciousness and authoritarianism—have
also reduced the Government’s limited administrative capabilities.
He assumes responsibility for the smallest details of Government and
grants his Ministers little real authority.
At the same time, discontent is felt in different segments of the
population for varied reasons. The base of the regime’s popular
support
[Page 873]
remains narrow.
The regime might overcome such discontent and finally win over the
loyalty of a majority of Vietnamese both in the North and South if
it could show its ability to give the country stronger protection
and create sound economic and social bases for progress. Progress,
which is demanded in Viet Nam as throughout Asia, is perhaps the
touchstone of the regime’s enduring viability. Yet precisely because
Diem is now
procrastinating in making decisions affecting fundamental problems
of his country’s development, the lag between the people’s
expectations and the Government’s ability to show results will
grow.
We consider it therefore of importance that we bring strong pressure
on the President to reach certain decisions basically in the
economic and social fields which have been before him for some
months but on which he has not acted. He has resented this and may
resent it more, but in ours and his long range interests we must do
our utmost to cause him to move forward in these fields.
The purpose of this evaluation of the present situation in Viet Nam
is to examine the elements giving rise to some concern regarding
certain developments in Viet Nam, to provide the Department and
interested agencies salient background and to set forth conclusions
and recommend certain broad courses of action. We feel that a frank
discussion of the solution as we see it may be helpful to all
concerned.
Elements of Strength
Although this despatch emphasizes our concern regarding certain
trends, we should set forth the existing elements of undoubted
strength in the situation in Viet Nam, in order to give this
presentation proper balance. These are outlined below.
Diem remains the unqualified
leader of Viet Nam and the only man of stature so far in evidence to
preside over his country’s destiny. He is a man of unimpeachable
honesty and real courage. None of the so-called opposition leaders,
such as Dr. Phan Quang Dan of the Democratic Bloc, have yet proven
to have the quality of statesmen. Neither is there another strong
personality now discernible in the Government or among the senior
officers of the Armed Forces. Diem furthermore has undoubtedly led South Viet Nam,
with considerable economic aid and political support from the U.S.,
to a unity that few observers could have expected in the bleak days
of July 1954. He has given the country a much needed stability—an
essential condition for any future development—which has already
permitted the repairing of much of the physical destruction of the
period of military operations and a return to more nearly normal
peace-time activities.
With the support and guidance of MAAG, the army has made great progress. It was the
instrument that permitted Diem to pacify
[Page 874]
the country and is now considered able to
fulfill the mission of maintaining internal security. It has also
reached a degree of combat-worthiness which provides a certain
deterrent to external aggression. This force insures the stability
of the regime and thus provides a basic condition for Viet Nam’s
economic and social development.
During the past year Viet Nam has made commendable progress in
improving its public finances. An Executive budget was prepared for
presentation to an extraordinary meeting of the National Assembly.
After a study by appropriate committees of the Assembly and debate
it was voted, along with a substantial increase in taxes recommended
by the Ministry of Finance on the advice of USOM. Administration of the budget was also improved,
with the result that certain hidden deficits arising during 1955 and
1956 from expenditures of provincial and regional authorities were
eliminated. Throughout this year Government revenues have exceeded
expenditures. During the same period payments into the counterpart
fund exceeded counterpart disbursements. These are the principal
sources of the deflation which has replaced inflation in the
Vietnamese economy during the past year. In the face of the fact
that throughout the world, not excluding many other countries which
benefit substantially from American aid, inflation remains a threat
to political stability and an obstacle to economic development,
eliminating inflation in Viet Nam during the past year has been no
small accomplishment.
Finally, Diem is committed to
an anti-communist policy and recognizes that he owes his survival to
the free world with which he wishes to remain associated. His
position on this subject has been shown in various ways. In the last
two months, for instance, he has undertaken to call publicly on his
fellow Asians to revive their ancient cultures and to combat the
imported atheistic materialist teachings of communism. He has made
this a central theme of his speeches both domestically and abroad—in
Thailand, in Korea and in India. Thus, South Viet Nam is one Asian
country that has clearly staked its future to an anti-communist,
pro-West policy.
Our First Concern
However, after attaining notable, if not miraculous, successes in the
political and internal security fields during the first two years of
his regime, he has, for all practical purposes, lost much of the
past year by failing to decide on steps he should take to build up
the economic foundations of his country. In the last few weeks he
has stated quite categorically that the building of these
foundations is definitely secondary to the further build-up of
strong and effective security and military forces and to the
successful establishment of settlements of loyal citizens near the
Cambodian frontier and in the High Plateau. This decision shows, in
our opinion, a lack of full perception
[Page 875]
of the inter-relationship between military
security and economic progress in safeguarding this country’s long
range future. It is this lack of understanding and the somewhat
distorted approach that results from it, that arouses our primary
concern.
The possibility of substantial reductions of U.S. aid in the future
has also caused Diem to
hesitate further to take steps outside the purely security field. It
may also cause him to take decisions whose wisdom we doubt, or which
may not be in our best interests. We believe that a decision to
allocate aid and other revenue to military forces without taking
into account, at this particular juncture in Viet Nam’s development,
the requirements of long-range economic progress would be ignoring
the need to counteract present sources of discontent and meet future
internal stresses of the regime.
President’s Shortcomings
The Government’s administrative incapacity adds to the difficulties
we have in carrying forward our programs. Administrative incapacity,
while natural in a new country, is in part a consequence of the
President’s character. He overrides most of his Ministers, reduces
their authority and assumes personal responsibility for the smallest
details of government. He is inclined to be suspicious of others; he
lacks an understanding of basic economic principles; and seems
absorbed in pet ideas and schemes which detract from work on other
urgent questions. For example, he has become absorbed, with
considerable reason, with Viet Minh
infiltration across his frontier with Cambodia and Laos. He believes
this problem can be solved basically by the creation of settlements
in the frontier areas and the construction of roads particularly in
the highlands. Meanwhile, there are left pending such fundamental
questions as seeing through the program of agrarian reform, laying
the foundations for industrial development, monetary reform,
building up an administrative and technical base needed if only to
implement our aid programs.
Diem has not won too much
enthusiasm or whole-hearted backing of his people. He is admired and
respected for his honesty of purposes and devotion to the national
cause, but criticized for what many consider to be his lack of
understanding of the country’s aspirations. While he honestly
advocates democracy and probably equally honestly considers himself
a democrat, basically he remains a mandarin with the autocratic
attitude of “I know best,” a good trait at the present stage of
development of a new country, provided it does not lead to a
sterilizing inflexibility. This characteristic, together with his
family’s unpopularity and his Ministers’ awe of him, has brought him
to a growing solitude, where many problems become theoretical and
lose to a certain extent their practical realities.
[Page 876]
Diem’s personal shortcomings
outside the politico-military field were obvious during the earlier
phase of this government’s existence. Now, however, they constitute
a particular barrier to further sound development and hamper
day-to-day working relationships with Vietnamese officials. This
factor must be taken into account in planning our activities here
and assessing their effectiveness.
Complications Abroad
While Diem hesitates and
delays on these internal problems, disturbing events abroad cause
him, with reason, additional concern. Events in each of the
countries of Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Burma, all
contribute to Diem’s
concern.
The events in Thailand in particular may also affect the attitudes of
many thinking Vietnamese. From here it appears that the elections of
December may well bring about an Assembly and perhaps a Government
in which left wingers carry a large influence. Such a development
might eventually lead the Thai Government to reconsider its formerly
close links with the U.S. and adopt policies more favorable to
Communist China. If Thailand adopted a softer policy toward
communism and Laos comes under effective Pathet Lao control, and
while Malaya’s position remains undefined, Viet Nam would be left as
possibly the only firm pro-West anti-communist nation on Mainland
SEA. The realization by thinking people in this
country of being in such an exposed position may well tend to
strengthen much of the existing discontent in Viet Nam. As indicated
above, recent developments in Laos have also added to the
apprehensions of Vietnamese Government officials, who fear
stepped-up communist activities along the entire western border and
a more or less complete isolation of Viet Nam in this part of the
world.
Sources of Discontent
There is as yet no serious reason for concern for the stability of
the regime. However, there is a growing underlying discontent. It
exists in various groups and arises from several causes. The
principal sources of discontent appear to be: an original economic
and social dislocation ensuing from war and the problems brought
about by the assumption of independence; failure to fulfill the
sometimes unrealistic demand for progress; persistent and increasing
lack of security in many areas over the past six months,
particularly in the South and Southwest; a lack of vitality in the
political parties; Diem’s
resentment at even mild opposition; the regime’s rigidity and
certain lack of tolerance which alienates a large proportion of the
intellectuals; and the ineffective bureaucracy, which has dampened
enthusiasm for the regime, particularly among the youth.
[Page 877]
Finally, from time to time there are manifestations of some
resentment, as must inevitably arise, that Viet Nam is so completely
dependent on foreign aid. While most of these sources of discontent
are all inherent in any new regime taking over from repressive
colonialism, Diem appears to
ignore them a bit too readily for the long-range growth of this
country.
Political Parties
The President speaks freely of carrying out a revolution in Viet Nam
by which he means a basic reshaping of institutions and traditions
to create a democratic, nationalist society which will guard the
individual’s dignity and rights as its highest values. Earlier in
his march toward power, Diem
created political and other organisms to carry out this
“revolution,” i.e., the National Revolutionary Movement, the League
of Revolutionary Civil Servants, etc. However, since approximately
October 1956, when the constitution was proclaimed, the President
and those around him have apparently lost interest in these
mechanisms which they have allowed to drift into the hands of
second-rate leaders and which have consequently lost much of their
original appeal. In the meantime, through the semi-covert Workers’
Party and other instruments directed largely by the President’s
brother and political advisor, Ngo Dinh
Nhu, almost all political, social welfare,
journalistic, cultural, and other public activities have been
brought under substantial control of a covert nature.4 Aside from the various religious organizations
and such innocuous international groups as the Boy Scouts and the
Red Cross, almost all public organizations and means of public
expression in Viet Nam are
[Page 878]
dominated or covertly manipulated by the regime. This fact is
generally known to the educated public and generally resented.
Mr. and Mrs. Ngo Dinh Nhu
As a result of this resentment and the gossip engendered by Nhu’s covert activities, Mr.
Nhu and his wife have
been increasingly built up into legendary eminences grises to whom
are attributed insatiable greed for power and wealth and
unscrupulous connivance to achieve them. The larger part of these
rumors is believed by the Embassy to be the product of overheated
and resentful imaginations. However, this unhealthy situation
contributes to the general disgruntlement, and together with the
apparent lack of interest by the President in his own political
parties, is perhaps responsible for a considerable part of the
weakening of support for the regime among the so-called elite
groups.
Narrow Base of Genuine
Support
Reflecting the President’s own suspiciousness and somewhat narrow
point of view, the regime employs generally only those whose support
meets very restrictive and personal criteria of loyalty. Therefore,
the services of many able persons are lost. Furthermore, many
intellectuals, professionals and particularly those students
remaining abroad, also are unwilling to serve the regime. Those who
do take part in the work of the Government are frequently
discontented and discouraged. Many high officials do little to hide
their resentment of Diem’s
somewhat autocratic attitude. Part of the difficulty of these groups
lies in the fact that in many instances there is little scope for
their abilities outside the Government.
Business Community
The regime is also somewhat distrustful of the business community.
There is a tendency to consider businessmen, in accordance with
ancient Vietnamese social values, as belonging to one of the lower
classes of society. Such an attitude in the Government hardly breeds
confidence. Likewise, in general, the regime distrusts the
foreigners’ influence on the economy. It has sought, for
understandable reasons, to bring the Chinese community under its
control and has generally discouraged French interests from
investing in Viet Nam. Examples of the latter are found in specific
cases, where construction of a glass factory, a sugar refinery and
the expansion of certain rubber plantations were in question. The
result has been a loss to the economy and the discouragement of
forces which might have promoted its progress, without, in the
meantime, being able to find other forces which could effectively
take steps to make progress in the economic field.
[Page 879]
Peasants
It is difficult to gauge the mood of the peasantry and dangerous to
generalize in view of the wide difference between Central and South
Viet Nam. Nevertheless, there undoubtedly remain areas, particularly
in the West and South, where peasants still, basically through
ignorance, fear or persuasion, support enemies of the central
government. In these areas the Viet Minh were
active during the war and created zones of insecurity where
landlords could not go. Because the communists were the stronger,
the peasants went along with them and because the landlords could
not enforce their rights, the peasants ceased paying rents on their
lands. Although the Government has succeeded in reestablishing its
authority in most areas, there are certain areas which are out of
reach and where Viet Minh agents and dissident
elements can and do continue to carry on their activities. By habit
and by a basic desire of being left in peace and avoiding trouble,
the peasantry has generally not sought to oppose the rebel elements
but have gone, or have been forced to go, along with them where the
Government has not been clearly master. At the moment, however, the
GVN military forces are in the
process of conducting a fairly large-scale anti-dissident sweep in
the Delta region which may help to increase the standing and
prestige of the Government in that area.
Control of Travel Abroad
The problem of travel abroad of Vietnamese illustrates the
complications arising from Diem’s outlook. Viet Nam needs trained personnel.
There are numerous Vietnamese abroad, mostly in France, who have
completed their studies but who show great reluctance in returning
to Viet Nam. This reluctance no doubt stems in part from the fact
that a trained person can obtain greater economic advantages in the
developed countries than in Viet Nam. There is also the fact that
travel by Vietnamese out of Viet Nam is tightly controlled by the
President himself. He has recently been most reluctant to permit
many young Vietnamese civilians to go abroad to study, even with
scholarships or training grants. (This does not apply to military
personnel going to study in the U.S.) He fears that those who study
in France, for example, will become contaminated by the communists
or become French agents. This policy hinders the training of
Vietnamese in fields not offered in this country. It also
discourages Vietnamese abroad from returning to Viet Nam even for a
visit, to see how things are going and perhaps settle here again,
because they fear they will not be allowed the choice of leaving
again. This is an example of the “stifling atmosphere” of which
certain intellectuals in Viet Nam complain.
[Page 880]
Very recently, however, after considerable pressure from the Embassy,
there appears to have been a certain relaxation in granting
permission to go abroad, as Diem has authorized the departure of a number of
USOM-sponsored trainees.
Expression of Discontent
An indication of the educated classes’ discontent was the popularity
of the opposition newspaper Thoi Luan. It had
no particular intrinsic merit, but it did criticize the Government,
albeit carefully. And it was therefore read. One of the issues over
which government and opposition tilted lances was the sentences
imposed on the leaders of the Binh Xuyen sect. The word amnesty was
not used; yet, this was the issue. Relatively improved internal
security and consolidation of the authority of the regime have not
resulted in any appreciable political reconciliation with
non-communist opponents. Jails and camps are reportedly still filled
with hundreds of Diem’s
opponents. It has come to my attention that Diem’s personal advisors urged him
to make a gesture in his Independence Day speech calling, in effect,
for such a reconciliation and urging all disaffected groups to rally
to the Government. Diem did
not take this advice.
Asia’s Stirring
Perhaps a more aggravating phenomenon than all these causes, is the
stirring felt thoughout Viet Nam as throughout Asia—the demand of
the people to make up for time lost and catch up with the West in
material power and development. There will continue to be an
inevitable lag between expectations and actual accomplishments which
will serve to feed all other causes of discontent. This lag,
furthermore, will be greater and more keenly felt if Diem’s administration continues to
prove needlessly slow in making decisions which will enable the
economy to develop and which will give the people a sense of
progress.
Consequences of
Discontent
The causes of discontent mentioned above are at work among important
segments of people. Unless there is appreciable progress in the near
future, the dissatisfaction may manifest itself by a growing
disbelief that Western aid can solve Asian problems; greater
opposition to the present regime; increased receptivity to
blandishments from the North (about which Diem seems to be more and more
sensitive); strengthening the belief, already held by some, in the
myth of Asia for Asians (and within this myth the Chinese Communists
are considered first of all Asians), and a consequent penchant
toward neutralism despite the orientation of the regime itself. The
President’s brother, Nhu,
stated recently that there is a growing desire for
[Page 881]
neutralism among some intellectuals.
They apparently believe that Diem has counted too much on American aid and
support, and fear it may be suddenly cut off in the not too distant
future.
Diem’s Commitment to an Anti-Communist
Policy
While growing discontent might bring demands from some intellectuals
and other groups for dissociating Viet Nam from too close bonds with
the West and for some accommodations with the communist world, I
believe Diem’s regime would
be unable to accommodate itself with such a trend, since he seems so
firmly committed to anti-communism. He could be more Asiatic and
less pro-West, but his position, we believe, is based on
anti-communist policies. This means he has less flexibility for
political maneuvering than most SEA countries. Such
rigidity might further widen the gulf between the government and the
people and create an unstable situation. This could conceivably in
the long run cause his downfall.
Diem’s Reaction
Diem realizes the existence of
discontent although perhaps not the full extent or nature of it.
While until recently he had given himself five years to achieve
substantial results to satisfy the demand of his people for
progress, he now considers that he must show some results within a
more limited time. (He has mentioned a year and a half to three
years.) He is worried about the reduction of American aid and the
consequent limitations on the scope of his actions. He is seriously
worried with considerable reason by the possibilities of Viet
Minh infiltration through Laos and Cambodia
and has plugged for full U.S. support of a 60,000-man Self-Defense
Corps and at times of a 170,000-man Army, even to the detriment of
creating a firmer economic base—(although in part this may have been
a play to forestall too deep cuts in our 1958 aid program). He is
worried concerning the possible failure of his settlements program
in the High Plateau which he thought up himself and has pushed
through in a fairly heavy-handed manner without much regard to the
ability of his administrators or the resources at their disposal.
(Such a failure would constitute a serious blow to his pride since
it would be his first and would leave the problem of the security of
the highlands unsolved.) He also feels under pressure from the Viet
Minh, Indians, and even from segments of
the population in South Viet Nam to expand within the next two years
communications between North and South Viet Nam. These seem to be
the reasons why he feels pressed to get his house in order primarily
from a military-security point of view, so that he can, at long
last, be in a position to prevent large-scale and effective
communist infiltration and control any situation which may develop
when he is obliged to open up greater intercourse between North and
[Page 882]
South. Because of the
pressure to permit some exchange of divided families, his brother
Nhu has told me they are
considering a limited and controlled exchange of persons in the near
future. There are also signs which may indicate that he wants his
military-security forces built up in order to control any possible
development of strong dissident elements other than communists.
U.S. Relations with Diem
Ambassador Reinhardt and I
have been fortunate to have been here when Diem, through his astute
understanding of the problems of Viet Nam and, to a large extent, of
those of Southeast Asia as well, has made remarkable progress to the
definite benefit of the Free World. We have had little need, up to
now, to bring much pressure on him or “cross” him in regard to his
policies. It appears probable, however, that more pressure may
become necessary in the future. On some important issues, despite
our advice to the contrary, he has proven to be right, a fact which
tends to make him even more sure of himself. Therefore, he will not
take direct advice easily.
We have, with good reason, encouraged him to assume a more important
role as a Free World leader in Asia. He likes the role. As a matter
of fact, he has given indications that the real or organized
enthusiasm shown him on his visits may have gone to his head. He is
beginning to look upon himself a bit too pointedly as the great hope
of Southeast Asia. He has a sound perception of communist tactics
and their effect in Asian countries, and enjoys his role of trying
to explain them to Asians. However, in the process which absorbs
much of his time, he apparently finds another excuse to postpone
some essential decisions regarding his own country.
It is interesting to recall his earnest advice about Syngman Rhee to the effect that he
is isolated by his advisors from the real facts of the internal
situation in Korea, and that we should therefore pass the word along
to friendly Ambassadors to see Rhee more often and talk to him frankly about
internal developments. Diem
faces the same problem but apparently does not realize it. Mr.
Barrows, General Williams and I have had
too often to persuade him to do or not do certain things, although
we already had the concurrence of one of his Ministers in our
suggested action. Since the Ministers do not always have the courage
to tell him, we perhaps may have to do this to a greater extent in
the future.
Proposed Courses of
Action
To deal with these fundamental problems effectively and protect our
interests, it would seem important in broad outline that:
- 1.
- On the internal front, we persuade the GVN to arrive at a number of
decisions which have already been before them for some
[Page 883]
time and for many
of which U.S. aid money is already available, so that the
economic and social development of the country can be given
an effective impulse forward and carry with it the hopes of
the people, rather than let him follow too blindly his
current trend of placing more and more emphasis on building
his military-security strength. This is perhaps our most
essential task. Yet it must be recognized that outside
influence will not be conclusive and may not be too
effective. While we have so far not been too successful in
influencing Diem,
nevertheless, we have found by experience that, on
occasions. Diem will
take up, as his own, ideas which we had planted earlier and,
in certain specific cases (the Cai San project, Saigon–Bien
Hoa highway, the construction of Route 21 instead of 19,
etc.), he has acceded to our viewpoint. The GVN will continue to make its
own decisions but we need to seek constantly for ways to
make our influence more effective, even at the possible risk
of temporarily antagonizing Diem to a certain extent. We shall,
therefore, from time to time suggest for the Department’s
consideration certain specific courses of action to be
followed in our relations with Diem. For instance, at present, we are
considering courses to deal with such pending questions as:
the Civil Guard; the effectiveness of the Self-Defense
Corps; the settlements program; the Medical Center; and
various industrial projects.
- 2.
-
On the external front, as we see it, stabilization and
progress within Viet Nam itself is perhaps the most
important contribution this country can make toward
encouraging other countries in this area to protect
their independence, resist communist blandishments and
perhaps eventually pursue a Western-oriented policy. The
mere creation of a strong military force will not of
itself, as he now seems to feel, contribute to the ends
we desire—namely, a fairly stable government friendly to
the Free World and eventually economically
independent.
Generally, we should encourage Viet Nam to pursue its
policy of strengthening its position through active
participation in international meetings and
organizations—such as the Colombo Plan—through the
maintenance and development of cordial relations with
countries in the Free World and through broad exchanges
with these countries.
Specifically, we should continue to seek to improve
relations between Viet Nam and her immediate neighbors,
Cambodia and Laos (provided Laos does not fall under
Pathet Lao control). If we are successful in erecting a
strong and progressive Viet Nam, this country can act
with greater confidence toward the other two weaker
states and eventually perhaps serve as the anchor state
in the sub-peninsula, countering the drift of the area
toward Communist China.
- 3.
- In sum, our most immediate and essential task here is, I
believe, to continue to strive to influence Diem and his regime to make
[Page 884]
sound
decisions as soon as possible and move forward on a balanced
broad economic, social and military program so that
disillusionment with the regime may be minimized, hope in
the future engendered, and Viet Nam retained as a positive
example in Asia that a free, independent Asian nation,
firmly allied to the West and opposed to communism, can
succeed and prosper. In view, however, of current leftist
trends in Thailand, Laos and Cambodia it may be more
difficult to attain these desirable ends as soon as we hope.
It may be necessary, because of increased communist threats
and subversion to go along, to a greater extent than
otherwise would be the case, with Diem’s desire to strengthen
his military-security posture, provided he does not neglect
almost entirely necessary economic and social
developments.
In view of Diem’s reaction to
the cut in aid levels for 1958 and the stepped up communist threat
internally and externally, our most immediate task would appear to
be to bring fairly strong pressure on him to take immediate
decisions on those economic projects already waiting implementation.
In our presentation of the aid levels for 1958, we stressed most
firmly the urgent need to do just this. Diem and the others present agreed to work more
closely with USOM to implement
approved projects. If it is clear after careful study that the
GVN cannot carry from its own
resources the suggested increased contribution to the military
budget, it would appear that we should try to make up for the loss
in economic assistance by a PL 480 contribution and assist the
GVN to work up acceptable
projects for Development Loan funds. If this can be achieved part of
the time lost during the past year in the economic field can be made
up and a start made in building the economic infrastructure of the
country. Under present circumstances of increased communist
subversion and economic threat, there does not appear to be any
possibility, at this time, to reduce the cost of the
military-security forces. However, with the means already available
and those foreseeable, we must use every means to start the creation
of a solid economic base.
