386. Memorandum of a Conversation, Honolulu, May 20, 19571

PARTICIPANTS

  • President Ngo Dinh Diem
  • Vietnamese Ambassador to the U.S. Chuong
  • Admiral Felix B. Stump
  • Vice Admiral Anderson
  • Ambassador Durbrow

SUBJECT

  • Summary of Talk Between Admiral Stump and President Ngo Dinh Diem at Honolulu.

President Diem outlined again in some detail his strategic concept to justify the need to increase the Vietnamese forces by 20,000 additional men. Prior to this talk I had informed Admiral Stump of the conversation I had had with Ambassador Chuong, with President [Page 823] Diem participating,2 in which the Ambassador had indicated, among other things, that he was afraid the United States could not, in all circumstances, live up to the commitments given to Vietnam to come to its assistance in case of hostilities, as well as the Ambassador’s conviction that, as in Korea, we would not use A-weapons in the event we should come to Vietnam’s assistance.

After Diem had finished explaining his strategic concept, Admiral Stump, without giving any indication that he had been filled in on Ambassador Chuong’s ideas, informed Diem along the following lines:

The Admiral stated that President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles had declared on several occasions that in case the communists should open hostilities against any free-world country, the United States would use all means at its disposal to stop them, including the use of tactical A-weapons as well as other nuclear weapons if necessary. The Admiral added that we would not in any case hold back as we had in Korea. He added that we would not use nuclear weapons against concentrated civilian centers and that, if we were unable to stop the communists in Vietnam or nearby territories in connection with any hostilities, we would not hesitate to use all weapons at our disposal on such areas as the Canton military complex in order to bring about the defeat of the communists. The Admiral assured his listeners that the United States now has military capabilities which can stop and defeat any communist military thrust. The Admiral added that SEATO powers would also help in such circumstances. Diem again questioned whether the Asian SEATO powers could be very effective in assisting Vietnam in connection with any communist attack. He reiterated without indicating that he wished to be informed about them that the Vietnamese Government was not cognizant of SEATO military plans.

After the meeting in Admiral Stump’s office while we were on the way to a military review, Ambassador Chuong asked the Admiral whether he personally believed that the Vietnamese army should be increased by 20,000 men as Diem has requested. The Admiral replied that this matter would have to be studied but that he personally thought Diem’s request had merit, but added that before any decisions could be taken it would be necessary to know how much money the United States Congress would appropriate for various aid purposes. The Admiral stated he was sure that Diem and Chuong were well aware of the present economy drive in the Congress affecting all matters of aid.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5/6–1157. Secret. Drafted by Durbrow on May 24. Enclosed with covering despatch 383 from Saigon, June 11.
  2. See supra.