385. Memorandum of a Conversation, En Route to Los Angeles, May 17, 19571
SUBJ
- Doubtful SEATO and American aid in case of armed hostilities in Vietnam
PARTICIPANTS
- President Ngo Dinh Diem
- Ambassador Tran Van Chuong
- Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow
The following are highlights of a long conversation I had on the flight to Los Angeles with Ambassador Tran Van Chuong in which President Ngo Dinh Diem participated except for the beginning of discussion. It is perhaps worthwhile to point out how discussion arose. In going over the Los Angeles speech Chuong was preparing for Diem, Chuong included a statement to the effect that the communists were not deterred or much worried about American possession of A and H bombs. When I disagreed with this statement Chuong outlined at length his basic concepts of any future military operations which might take place in Vietnam. President Diem did not listen to the first part of the discussion, but listened without saying much during the bulk of the discussion.
Chuong’s thesis is that he feared that Vietnam could not count upon the United States to come to its aid militarily under certain circumstances despite U.S. and SEATO commitments. He added that he is convinced that we would not use tactical or other nuclear weapons in the event we did come to their aid. He cited our refusal to use A [Page 821] bombs in Korea and our failure to enter the war in Indo-China with or without the use of A bombs before and after Dien Bien Phu. Chuong added that in conversations with other Asian colleagues in Washington most of them share his fears that the United States probably would not come to the aid of any individual country in case of hostilities unless it were in direct United States interest to do so. Chuong claims this is the reason why many Asian countries have turned to neutralism. He is also quite doubtful whether SEATO would, in all circumstances, come to aid of Vietnam if hostilities should break out. Chuong was very emphatic in saying that he and most of his Asian colleagues in Washington agree that the West lost a great deal of prestige in Asia by the Korean stalemate and the French collapse in Indo-China.
Chuong then outlined in detail the strong temptations facing all Asian countries to embrace neutralism. He argued that most of these countries reasoned that if they did not have to maintain large military forces they could balance their budgets and might, by their neutral attitude, be spared in any future war. He added that such temptations might also appeal to the people of Vietnam, although he gave assurances that Vietnam is different and realized that despite the heavy cost they must maintain as large an Army as they feel necessary to defend themselves and counter attack against any communist thrust. That is why President Diem wants to raise his force goal to 170,000 men.
When Chuong reiterated he did not believe the U.S. would use tactical A weapons in a local war in Vietnam, President Diem disagreed by stating he could envisage certain situations in which U.S. would use tactical A weapons. The President did not agree with Chuong’s contention that a perpetual nuclear stalemate has been reached between the USSR and the U.S. The President believes the U.S. must keep on developing better nuclear weapons in order to keep ahead of the Soviets. If we did not the Soviets might develop a truly overpowering weapon which they might use to conquer the world provided they were certain the U.S. did not have as good a weapon with which to retaliate. Both agreed, however, that it would be most disastrous to use A weapons on Hanoi or other civilian concentrations, because the Vietnamese Government counted on the population in the North to rise up against the communists in the case of hostilities which would make it counter-productive to use A bombs on any populated areas. Both reiterated that they did not believe that American Air or Naval support could be effective in Vietnam, because of the prevalence of heavy cloud cover over most of country throughout the year.
Chuong stated that although Admiral Stump and other American Commanders had given assurances that we would come to the [Page 822] aid of Vietnam in case of difficulty, and he knew that they were most sincere in making these statements, he feared that they would not be permitted, by overall considerations, to carry out these commitments in all circumstances. I reminded him that in the last few weeks the world had seen a very forceful example which should convince everybody that we would come to the assistance of small nations under communist attack. I then referred to the movement of the Sixth Fleet with a reinforced Marine Division to the Eastern Mediterranean in the recent Jordan crisis.2 Chuong and Diem both agreed that this forceful action did, in fact, indicate that we apparently intended to carry out our commitments.
Comments:
The reason I have reported these remarks in some detail is that it is the first time that I have heard Vietnamese, and in this case Diem by his silence apparently concurring, openly question whether we would carry out our commitments. I reported this conversation to Admiral Stump before he talked with President Diem about the situation in Vietnam.