Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

371. Memorandum for the Record, by the Assistant Secretary of the United States Army General Staff (Roberts)¹

Washington, April 16, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Report of Chief of Staff’s Trip to the Far East Southeast Asia, and Pacific Areas, 16 March–12 April 1957

. . . . . . .

X. Vietnam

A. Briefing, MAAG Vietnam Staff, 1420–1450 Hours, 29 March 1957.

This briefing consisted of a review of the mission, organization, over all problems and their status with respect to MAAG Vietnam. Major points developed in the briefing were:

1. There are four principal areas in which MAAG Vietnam operations are different from other MAAGs:

a. The international ceiling which is imposed upon the number of U.S. military personnal which may be used as advisors to Vietnam (this by terms of the Geneva Accords) is not predicated upon any sound basis.

b. Whereas other MAAGs are engaged in bringing MDAP matériel into a country, MAAG Vietnam has the additional responsibility of out-shipping MDAP.

c. While other MAAGs are associated with countries building up to reach a certain force goal, MAAG Vietnam is operating in an aftermath of the Indochina War and the Vietnamese are in the process of reducing a force goal.

d. The combined training mission assigned since 28 April 1956, the date of dissolution of the French High Command. The French are no longer associated with the training of Vietnamese Army troop units. This function is assigned to MAAG Vietnam. However, the French are associated with training Navy and Air Force Vietnamese units.

2. Fortunately, the Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM), arrived to assume its function at the peak of equipment deliveries scheduled for the Vietnamese Army. TERM has declared excesses for outshipment in amount of $132 million. $100 million worth of equipment has actually been out-shipped and $13.4 million has been disposed of locally.

3. A 150,000 man force goal has been approved for the Vietnamese Armed Forces. This is contrasted against the recommended force basis of 170,000 men suggested by MAAG, Vietnam. Present training of this 150,000 force basis is aimed at internal security with the development of a capability of limited initial resistance against aggression. The Army will be composed of three-year volunteers and two-year conscripts. In order to get in within the 150,000 force basis, the MAAG proposes to recommend reduction in the number of territorial regiments proposed in the force structure from 13 to 7.

4. Vietnam, for defense, is divided into regions. Division forces are stationed in each of the four principal regions. All decisions regaring the Armed Forces are made personally by President Diem and control is closely centralized. The defenses are predicated upon a delaying action falling back on the defenses of Saigon. General Williams is seeking to correct this defensive concept which stems basically from the French. He hopes to develop a revised concept based upon the employment of mobile reinforcements and fighting the divisions as units rather than the parceled out “Beau Jests [Beau Geste]” pattern of fighting now visualized.

5. MAAG Advisors are located at the following levels: DOD, ARVN General Staff, U.S. HQ, Military Regional HQ, Field Divisions, Light Divisions, Territorial Regiments, Military Schools, Training Centers and logistical installations.

6. The Geneva Accords preclude the introduction of new equipment and replacement of that presently there except on a piece-for-piece basis. Though the U.S. is not a signatory to these Accords, and there is no requirement to abide by them, we have so far. The first real test of what we must do will come with equipment to be provided under the FY 57 program. New equipment is included in this program, which may not be introduced under a strict interpretation of the Accords.

7. There has been a significant increase in school training. 437 spaces were requested for FY 56 as contrasted with 1247 requested in FY 57.

8. Training is interrupted by operations against sects, requirements for reorganization and regrouping, inadequacy of training facilities and the necessity for construction of temporary housing.

9. Internal security forces presently number 23,000. 27,000 are authorized. These are organized into units to provide local security. It is hoped that once the internal security forces have developed an organization, is properly commanded and trained, this force can relieve the Vietnamese Army of internal security commissions now being performed by the regular forces. They will need some equipment principally rifles and the like. Ammunition will be a problem as there are no war reserves built up in Vietnam. General Williams believes that the internal security force should be supported to the extent of being provided with small weapons. 27 Advisors from Michigan State University are in Vietnam working on this organization. General Williams is not sure as to just what they are doing. He seemed to feel that they were getting into his field.

10. President Diem has recently undertaken a project of resettlement in the plateau area. This is handled on a land-grant basis by giving ex-soldiers and ex-members of the internal security force parcels of land for resettlement homesites. Approximately 45,000 people have been so settled. General Williams feels that this is particularly advantageous as a buffer against communist infiltration.

11. In referring to the organization of the Vietnamese Light Division, General Taylor felt that the structure seemed grossly out of balance. He observed that the subordinate units would not be capable of independent operations. He suggested that General Williams have a look at the battle group type of organization proposed for the new Airborne Division. General Williams replied that he was looking this organization over carefully but that he had not discussed it with the Vietnamese because of the conflict which would be presented with his efforts to get them to think in terms of division units rather than small separate units. He wants to get them away from the separate battalion type fighting. General Taylor said he agreed with General Williams’ approach.

12. In response to a question from General Taylor as to whether or not the defense of Vietnam had been war-gamed, General Williams replied in the negative. The Vietnamese have not yet arrived at that stage in defensive planning.

13. General Taylor then inquired as to the length of service required in the Vietnamese Army. He was told that the length of service is three years. The Vietnamese have not yet developed what could be considered as a hard core nucleus in the Vietnamese Army because of the turnover which has been characterized in the past. General Williams thought that the long-term prospects of developing such were excellent. In response to a question from General Taylor regarding the situation along the 17th parallel, General Williams told him that the situation there is completely unlike that of the demilitarized zone in Korea. Most of the Viet-Minh forces are concentrated in the Hanoi area with civilian police patrols manning the border. It is not too difficult to secure passage from North to South Vietnam. Infiltrators and line crossers are introduced in this manner.

14. In regard to the problem of the language barrier among the Vietnamese students attending CONUS schools, General Taylor was told that special translators are provided for courses at these schools. Meanwhile, the Vietnamese are concentrating on English language training in their military schools.

B. General Taylor called upon President Diem, the U.S. Ambassador, the Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese Army and visited the Vietnamese Army Basic Training Center and Logistical installations. He conferred with General Festing,² CG British Forces, Far East, and talked to the officers of MAAG Vietnam from 1030–1100 hours, 30 March.

C. Major points of discussion between General Taylor and President Diem, 29 March.

• 1. Present:
  • President Diem
  • General Taylor
  • Mr. Anderson (American Chargé d’Affaires)³
  • Lt General Williams (Chief of MAAG, Vietnam)
• 2. President Diem made a point that the U.S. supported ceiling for the Vietnamese forces should be increased from 150,000 to 160,000 in order to increase elements of the Armed forces, such as the Navy, which he considers to be under manned. In support of his views, he pointed out the discrepancy in size of forces between Free Vietnam and North Vietnam and mentioned that he had recently read that the Chinese were furnishing 200 gun boats to the Viet Minh Naval Forces.
• 3. He made a point for increased local procurement in Vietnam by the U.S. Forces as a means of building up Vietnamese industry.
• 4. He discussed the disagreement with USOM on the priority of road building within Vietnam. President Diem supported by General Williams considers that the strategic road running from east to west and making junction with the Coastal Road No. 1 should be given priority. USOM, on the other hand, felt that first priority should be for Road No. 1 running north and south along the coast.
• 5. He reviewed the politico-military situation in Laos and Cambodia. He expressed in this review grave reservations concerning the communist threat in these countries and the threats which communist infiltration presented to the security of Vietnam.
• 6. President Diem is not satisfied with the French Mission in Vietnam. He said he contemplated ending this mission at the end of the present course at the General Staff College which will take place in April. There are approximately 200 French personnel in this Mission.

• 7. He spoke of the activities of the International Control Commission and said that there was some talk among the Indian and Canadian members of the ICC that it may be withdrawn in July of this year. He said that recently the Commission had decided to move to Saigon from its former location in Hanoi. President Diem pointed out that the ICC posts along the Vietnamese-Chinese Border were completely inadequate to contol such a long stretch of territory and added that the communist members of the Commission bring up frequent fictitious complaints in order to visit areas in Vietnam.

  . . . . . . .

E.B. Roberts
Lt Colonel, GS

1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T–23–71. Top Secret. Extract. The omitted portions comprise reports on Taylor’s trip to the western United States and 11 other countries of Asia.
2. General Sir Francis Festing.
3. Daniel V. Anderson’s permanent title was Counselor of Embassy.