370. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sprague) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)1
Dear Mr. Robertson: Recent developments have brought about a new urgency in resolving the problem of the ceiling on U.S. military personnel in Viet-Nam. You will remember that by interdepartmental [Page 781] agreement early in 1956 there was established a ceiling of 692, which includes 342 for the MAAG and 350 for TERM, the Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission.
Two facets of the problem now point to the necessity of doing away with the MAAG ceiling and permitting the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to augment MAAG Viet-Nam with the additional personnel necessary to accomplish the mission there.
The first aspect is that raised in the telegram from the Embassy in Saigon to the Department of State, 2772, of 12 March 1957, which points out that the International Control Commission is becoming increasingly more restive in respect to TERM and recommends consideration of several courses of action.2 The Department of Defense concurred in the April 9 Department of State telegram to Saigon3 which stated that a solution of the problem along the lines of incorporating TERM into an increased MAAG was under study and that the Department of State would discuss the problem with the Canadians, British, French, and Indians. This telegram was the result of a conference on March 20 of staff representatives of the two departments in which Ambassador Durbrow participated.
The second aspect of the problem is the necessity for taking over the training of the Vietnamese Navy and Air Force. It will be remembered that TERM was created for a dual purpose, to provide a logistical organization to resolve the problems of excess property in Indochina and logistical training in Viet-Nam, and to free the MAAG from other duties so that its personnel could concentrate on the training of the Vietnamese Army. The withdrawal of the French Army training personnel required this increased emphasis on training. In the telegram from Chief, MAAG Viet-Nam 5607 of 4 April,4 we have been informed that President Ngo Dinh Diem told the Chief, MAAG that agreement had been reached with the French Ambassador for the withdrawal of the French Air Force and Navy training missions upon the completion of the present courses of instruction. The first completion is scheduled for this month, and additional U.S. military personnel will be required to pick up the training [Page 782] from the French. CINCPAC has requested in his 062352Z of 6 April5 that additional personnel over and above the present ceiling reach Viet-Nam in June of this year.
Other aspects of the problem of the ceiling include a request from President Diem for additional Army instructors at the Viet-Nam military academy, a proposal by CINCPAC to transfer underway training of the Vietnamese Navy from Subie Bay to Viet-Nam, and the current difficulty in operating MAAG and TERM efficiently within their present ceilings.
An increase in MAAG strength to achieve a rapid improvement in the effectiveness of Vietnamese forces to compensate for the withdrawal of French forces is considered a matter of urgency. While the French have withdrawn approximately 190,000 regular troops from Viet-Nam since the Geneva Agreement was signed the Viet Minh have continuously reorganized and re-equipped their forces during the same period so as to increase their regular combat strength from six to eighteen divisions. These forces have a capability of conducting combat operations at Corps level. The Vietnamese Army consists of ten divisions which are in the early stages of training at regimental and division level. The current military situation requires that the Vietnamese armed forces expeditiously attain a satisfactory level of combat effectiveness.
In view of the forthcoming visit of President Diem to Washington on May 8th, 9th, and 10th and of the impending training crises for the Vietnamese Navy and Air Force I recommend that steps be taken as a matter of urgency to secure the necessary international concurrences in the abolition of the ceiling on MAAG Viet-Nam. I feel it might be desirable to have this problem resolved, if possible, prior to the arrival of President Diem in Washington so that he could be informed at that time of our plans to assist him in the training of his Navy and Air Force.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5–MSP/4–1557. Secret. Printed also in United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 10, pp. 1098–1099.↩
- The four recommendations of possible courses of action in this telegram were: 1) continuation of exchange-of-letters exercise conceding nothing, making no commitments, and hedging on details and assurances; 2) gradual withdrawal of TERM; 3) general compliance with ICC demands and controls on TERM; and 4) abolishment of TERM and corresponding increase in MAAG Vietnam or creation of new permanent mission to perform TERM’s functions. The Embassy recommended the third of these courses for the “immediate future, with serious consideration” of the second and fourth options “as eventual alternatives. It increasingly difficult and embarassing to maintain indefinitely a mission, mainly engaged in training, under guise of a temporary mission solely concerned with recovery and out-shipment equipment.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751.5–MSP/3–1257)↩
- The reference is to telegram 2630 to Saigon, April 9, not printed. (ibid.)↩
- Not printed. (Center of Military History, Williams Papers, TWXs 1957 (14))↩
- Not printed. (ibid.)↩