Office of the Historian

324. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald) to the Secretary of State1

Washington, May 10, 1956.

SUBJECT

  • Results of the London Co-Chairmen Talks on Viet-Nam.
1.
At the conclusion of their meetings on Vietnam, the co-chairmen sent out three important messages which, in effect, will serve as supplements to the Geneva agreements on Viet-Nam. Messages went to: (1) the Vietnamese and Viet Minh Governments; (2) the International Control Commission (ICC); and (3) the French Government. All three messages stress: (a) the need fully to implement the Geneva Agreements, including the political provisions, (b) the hope of the Co-Chairmen that the ICC will continue to supervise the armistice in Viet-Nam on the basis of the Geneva Agreements, and (c) the belief of the Co-Chairmen that present difficulties, including some very vexing legal problems, can be resolved in practice through the cooperation of both Vietnamese Governments with the ICC in the implementation of the Geneva Agreements.
2.
In their message to the Republic of Viet-Nam and to the Viet Minh (Tab A)2 the Co-Chairmen express their concern that consultations for elections have not yet begun although both sides have accepted the principle of reunification by free elections. They strongly urge both governments to make every effort to implement the Geneva Agreements and invite them to transmit to the Co-Chairmen as soon as possible, jointly or separately, their views on the time required for the opening of electoral consultations and the holding of elections. The Co-Chairmen state that they will continue to consult about the situation in Viet-Nam and if necessary will discuss measures to insure the fulfillment of the Geneva Agreements including the proposal to convene a new Geneva conference.
3.
In their message to the ICC (Tab B),3 the Co-Chairmen stress the importance of maintaining the cease-fire under continued supervision of the ICC pending the holding of elections for reunification in Viet-Nam. If the commission encounters obstacles or difficulties that cannot be resolved on the spot, it is so to inform the Co-Chairmen who may then consider measures to facilitate the work of the commission.
4.
In their message to the French Government (Tab C),4 the Co-Chairmen state their belief that the continued good offices of the French Government (as liaison with the ICC and with the Joint Armistice Commission) could be very valuable while present difficulties are being resolved, and invite the French Government to discuss this question with the Vietnamese authorities. The Co-Chairmen ask that until some new arrangement is put into effect the French Government preserve the status quo (by continuing its present liaison functions with ICC and JAC).

Comments

1.
As a result of these messages, the Soviet Union and UK as Geneva Co-Chairmen emerge as the institutionalized arbiters of the implementation of the Geneva Agreements in Viet-Nam.
2.
Viewed from the vantage point of mid-1954, the West can be considered to have gained a considerable diplomatic victory in that more time has been gained to strengthen South Viet-Nam, the armistice is being preserved, and no elections will be held in 1956. At the same time, no date has been set for such elections or for the opening of electoral consultations between the two zones.
3.
Similarly, from the vantage point of the UK, engaged in a relatively difficult negotiation with the Soviets, the outcome of the talks is favorable in that the immediate danger of a new Geneva conference has been averted.
4.
However, from the vantage point of the Vietnamese Government and of our more recent hopes as to the future in Viet-Nam, the messages have several unfortunate aspects.
(a)
Though they suggest that present difficulties can be resolved in practice, they do not mention the April 6 Vietnamese declaration of cooperation with the armistice and with the ICC,5 and they continue to stress the implementation of the old Geneva Agreements to which Viet-Nam refuses to be bound;
(b)
The Commission is under a stronger mandate now than it was before to see to the implementation of the Geneva political provisions (elections);
(c)
The stress on the elections and the request to transmit to the Co-Chairmen an estimate of the time required in this regard will probably prove highly unpalatable to the Vietnamese Government;
(d)
The Vietnamese are unlikely to agree for long to a continuing; liaison role by the French with the ICC and the Joint Armistice Commission and are equally unlikely ever to accept legal succession to French obligations under the Geneva Agreements.
5.
From the standpoint of Communist intentions, the Co-Chairmen talks reveal that, while the Russians are probably not anxious to see a crisis precipitated in Viet-Nam over the Geneva Agreements, they nonetheless are by no means abandoning their support of the Chinese Communists and the Viet Minh in regard to Viet-Nam. Nor are the British yet sanguine enough about South Viet-Nam to risk a possible major explosion in bargaining hard with the Russians on the issue.
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/5–1056. Secret. Drafted by Kattenburg with concurrences from Kocher and Young. A marginal note on the source text indicates that the Secretary saw this memorandum.↩
  2. For text, see Cameron, Viet-Nam Crisis, vol. I, pp. 432–433.↩
  3. For text, see ibid., pp. 434–435.↩
  4. For text, see ibid., pp. 435–436.↩
  5. See Document 318.↩