Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

318. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, April 4, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Problem of Vietnamese Armistice Declaration

1. The Vietnamese Government on April 3 delivered to the British Ambassador in Saigon a letter addressed to the UK Foreign Secretary containing the text of the Vietnamese policy statement on the question of armistice responsibilities on which the Vietnamese, in consultation with the British and ourselves, had been working for several weeks. A copy of the Vietnamese letter to the British is attached for your information (Tab A).²

2. Our Ambassador and the British Ambassador consider the Vietnamese text the maximum obtainable and have consequently given it their full support. The text is being transmitted in the form of a Vietnamese answer to a warning message of the Geneva co-Chairmen on the subject of armistice responsibilities which was transmitted to the Geneva powers and the supervisory powers in Viet-Nam on December 21, 1955.³ The British will probably circulate the text to the Geneva powers and the supervisory powers as soon as possible.

3. The Soviets have now formally responded to the March 9 British suggestion to the Soviets that in place of holding a new Geneva conference at this time, the Geneva co-Chairmen meet in London during the visit of the Soviet leaders in mid-April.⁴ The Soviet answer stresses the need for full implementation of the Geneva Agreements, including nation-wide elections, and suggests advantage be taken of Gromyko’s presence in London to hold an earlier meeting of the co-Chairmen with a view to expediting an early convocation of a meeting of the Geneva powers.

4. The British may tell the Soviets that they are agreeable to an early meeting, perhaps in the second week in April. They are relying upon the text of the Vietnamese policy statement to make the best possible case in talking to Gromyko.

5. The British Foreign Office has not yet informed us of its attitude: a) on the merits of the Vietnamese statement, and b) on a later convocation of a new Geneva conference if the Soviets insist on such a meeting.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–456. Secret. Drafted by Kattenburg and cleared with PSA and WE.
2. For text of this letter, April 3, which was not attached to the source text, see Cameron, Viet-Nam Crisis, vol. I, pp. 425–426. On April 6, the Republic of Vietnam made public a declaration in terms almost identical to this letter of April 3.
3. For text of this message, actually dated December 20, see ibid., pp. 414–415.
4. For a report of these meetings of the Geneva cochairmen, see Document 324.