Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

321. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹

Washington, May 1, 1956.

Dear Mr. Secretary: I refer both to your letter to the Secretary dated December 13, 1955,² on the subject of dispatching additional military training personnel to Viet-Nam and to your letter to the Secretary dated January 31, 1956,³ bearing more specifically on the problem of recovering and maintaining MDAP-origin equipment in Viet-Nam.

As you are aware, our two Departments have been studying and discussing these related problems for several months. On February 25, 1956, during these discussions, the Department of State initiated negotiations with other governments principally concerned with a view to obtaining their acquiescence to our joint project of sending a Temporary Equipment Mission to Viet-Nam. These negotiations have now been favorably completed, leaving only the formal approval of the International Control Commission in Viet-Nam still to be obtained. We are now seeking this approval which we hope can be given in time for the first TERM elements to arrive in Saigon on May 9, the date mutually agreed upon for initial arrivals.

Meanwhile, with our concurrence your Department has begun implementation of this project. Accordingly, it may be appropriate for me to elaborate the State Department’s understanding of certain aspects of the TERM operation which are only briefly alluded to in the Joint State/Defense message to Saigon numbered State 3430, dated April 12, 1956,⁴ in which you concurred.

1. It is our understanding that the TERM operation has the double purpose of (a) supervising the recovery (identification, inventory, and accounting control) and outshipment of excess MDAP equipment; and (b) of assisting in the improvement of Vietnamese logistical capabilities.

The TERM operation was originally conceived to implement the decision of the Secretary of State, dated February 3, 1956, to explore with other governments concerned the possibility of sending additional military personnel to Viet-Nam to assist in the recovery of our equipment. It has been understood between our two Departments from the beginning of discussions on that problem that if significant amounts of this equipment are inventoried, much of it, including equipment nominally turned over to the Vietnamese forces, will be shipped out of Vietnam. It is on the basis of this understanding that the Department of State obtained the acquiescence of other governments concerned, the rationale for their acceptance being that the TERM operation will not contribute to the growth of the military potential in the zone south of the 17th parallel.

While it is understood, therefore, that TERM personnel will perform certain functions of training which are inseparable from their tasks of recovering and maintaining United States-origin equipment in Viet-Nam, such functions of training should in no case be allowed to become the single or even the primary duty of TERM (as distinguished from MAAG) personnel. Moreover, a substantial quantity of the equipment recovered in Viet-Nam should be shipped out of the country, so as to implement in good faith the promises made to other governments whose benevolent acquiescence to the operation we have obtained.

2. In regard to the clothing of the military personnel involved, and as indicated in our joint message of April 12, 1956, to Saigon this question is being left to the discretion of Chief MAAG, Chief TERM, and the American Ambassador at Saigon. However, I wish to indicate again our very strong desire that owing to the political and psychological factors involved, civilian clothing be used whenever possible by TERM personnel upon their arrival in and departure from Viet-Nam, as well as during their period of assignment in the country.

3. With respect to administrative support services for TERM, it is our understanding that the appropriate personnel and funds will be provided by the Department of Defense for the full administrative backstopping of the group. In this connection, it has been our view for some time now that steps should be taken to have the MAAG mission administratively supported by military personnel. The Embassy at Saigon has had increasing difficulty over the past several years in performing adequate support services for the MAAG. We feel that since your Department will now establish a complete administrative unit for TERM, it would be appropriate to consider the transfer of all support arrangements for MAAG from the Embassy’s jurisdiction as soon as practicable. I understand that the MAAG mission in Saigon has given considerable thought to this proposition in the last several months and I would like to urge that the appropriate administrative units of our two Departments begin formulating definite plans for such a transfer.

I shall appreciate your views as soon as it is convenient and hope that you will concur in the points expressed above. A copy of this letter is being sent to Mr. Allen Dulles, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, and to the American Ambassador to Saigon.

Sincerely yours,

Robert D. Murphy

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5–MSP/5–156. Secret. Drafted by Kattenburg with the concurrence of SEA and FE. As of April 1, PSA was abolished and replaced by the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (SEA), headed by Young and responsible for Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Malaya, Thailand, and Vietnam, and the Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs (SPA), headed by Bell and responsible for Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Pacific Islands. This letter is printed also in United States–Vietnam Relations. 1945–1967, Book 10, pp. 1057–1059.
2. See footnote 3, Document 287.
3. Document 295.
4. Document 319.