Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

320. Memorandum Prepared by the Joint Staff¹

Washington, 13 April 1956.

DEFENSE INFORMATION RELATING TO THE U.S. AID PROGRAM FOR VIETNAM

1. In a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, dated 25 February 1955, subject: “Objectives for the Department of Defense International Security Plan”,² the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted the following major U.S. military objectives for Vietnam:

a. To assist Free Vietnam, as appropriate, to maintain military forces necessary for internal security and capable of providing some resistance to external aggression.

b. Promote eventual participation by Free Vietnam in the Manila Pact (SEATO).

2. From the foregoing military objectives, the following missions for the Vietnamese armed forces have been derived:

a. To assist in the maintenance of internal security.

b. To resist external aggression.

c. To assist in regional defense with other non-Communist countries.

3. The Vietnamese force objectives to achieve a minimum capability to accomplish the above objectives and missions, as previously recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, dated 4 January 1956, subject: “Modification of MDA Programming Guidance for FY 1957”,³ are still valid.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with the assessment of the capability of Vietnamese forces and the report on the current status of existing Vietnamese forces by the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, dated 15 January 1956, subject: “Country Statement on MDAP, Non-NATO Countries.”⁴

5. In view of the sensitive nature of the information quoted or referenced above, it is recommended that the following be used as a basis for the Department of Defense submission on Vietnam:

a. Force objectives: Army, 4 infantry divisions and 4 territorial divisions; Navy, 7 landing ships and 5 patrol craft; Air Force, 5 squadrons.

b. Force missions: As stated in paragraph 2 above.

c. Justification: The Vietnamese force objectives are the optimum forces that the Vietnamese can presently raise and maintain with available U.S. aid. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that these forces are the minimum acceptable for the assigned missions. These force levels are based on U.S. aid available and force requirements and are justified by the inclusion of Vietnam in the “Protocol to the South-east Asia Collective Defense Treaty.”

d. Forces in being:

(1) Army—4 field divisions, 6 light divisions, non-divisional infantry, and supporting units.

(2) Navy—4 Dinaussaut units, each consisting of a support landing ship (large) (LSSL) or infantry landing ship (large) (LSIL) as a ‘mother’ ship with 6 or 7 medium landing craft (LCM) and landing craft vehicle personnel (LCVP); and 1 marine battalion.

(3) Air Force—1 liaison squadron and 1 transport squadron.

e. Effectiveness of Forces in being:

(1) General. All three of the Vietnamese Services lack adequate experienced command and staff officers, and urgently need additional training; they are incapable of autonomous logistic supply and maintenance activities, even assuming adequate supply of necessary material by the U.S. These inadequacies are even more pronounced in the Navy and Air Force than in the Army.

(2) Army. The Vietnamese Army is currently capable of establishing and maintaining internal security against bandit and dissident elements, excluding organized all-out activity by Viet Minh elements acting under centralized direction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This capability does not preclude minor isolated attacks by dissidents and bandits. In event of organized full-scale guerrilla and subversive activity by “planted” Viet Minh elements, control of relatively large undeveloped areas of Free Vietnam would likely pass to the Viet Minh. In event of full scale Viet Minh invasion, Vietnamese army forces would not be capable, at this time, of reacting with sufficient speed and effectiveness to utilize the natural defensive terrain north of Tourane. Assuming logistic support requirements will not allow fast uninterrupted Viet Minh movement southward, the assistance provided by terrain and distance would enable Vietnamese forces to retain general control of the “heartland” area of Free Vietnam south of the line Ban Me Thuot–Nha Trang for the first 60 days of hostilities, provided this “heartland” area did not itself collapse due to internal conditions.

(3) Navy. The Vietnamese Navy has demonstrated a capability to participate effectively in limited amphibious operations and to provide limited surveillance of its coast and waterways. It is incapable of fulfilling a mission of coastal patrol and of providing its own logistic support.

(4) Air Force. The capability of the Vietnamese Air Force to fulfill its mission to provide air support for the Vietnamese Army, including liaison, reconnaissance, and limited ground-fire support and air transportation of personnel and supplies, is very limited. Primary limiting factors are general lack of organization and qualified personnel.

1. Source: JCS Records, CCS 092 (88–22–46) (2). Top Secret. Transmitted to Wilson as an appendix to a brief memorandum from Radford (for the JCS), April 13, explaining that this appendix on Vietnam was in response to a request from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), January 24, for such information.
2. Not printed. (Ibid., CCS 381 U.S. (1–31–50))
3. Not printed. (Ibid., CCS 092 (8–22–46) (2))
4. Not found.