Office of the Historian

257. Telegram From the Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1

Washington, September 27, 1955—5:42 p.m.

1058. Joint State/Defense/ICA/Treasury message. (1) Saigon’s 186,2 (2) Toica 154,3 (3) Department’s 894 to Saigon,4 (4) MG 746 P from Saigon,5 (5) 102223Z from CINCPAC.6

1.
Requested force basis 150,000 (Army Navy Air) plus 10,000 sects by 31 December 1955 and 150,000 total (including sects) by 30 June 1956 approved. Force basis for FY 57 will be reviewed at later [Page 545] date in light of military requirements and over-all U.S. commitments and availability of funds and equipment.
2.
In view large amount U.S. funds requested to support increased force basis and limited funds available total Mutual Security Program, final decision on amount of Defense Support and DFS fund allocations for 31 December 1955 to 30 June 1956 deferred until completion study outlined below.
3.
We are concerned over high proposed cost maintaining Vietnamese forces (average $1843 per uniformed person). We understand general reasons for this figure but believe major renewed effort necessary to achieve further economies wherever possible without hindering attainment over-all objectives. Therefore request Mission proceed immediately to study this subject.
4.
To participate in this study and provide basis our FY 56 and FY 57 program budgeting we plan to send small highly qualified interagency team to Saigon immediate future for period one month. Desire Embassy views whether major obstacles to visit of such team at this time.
5.
Study to include following broad subjects:
(a)
Financial requirements necessary to support force basis and to achieve further economies.
(b)
Basis of the cost figures used by Vietnamese to support total budget request, including accuracy and applicability. This would include pay and allowances, rations, clothing, construction, training, civilian employment, etc.
(c)
Present or future ability Viet-Nam to assume greater amount total defense costs—possibly result of higher taxes, better collections, etc.
6.
Request Mission meantime consider other techniques reducing dollar cost to U.S.
7.
In informing Diem our agreement increased force basis, would you consider appropriate seek commitment on matters in addition to cost reduction armed forces e.g. progress toward agrarian reform, constituent assembly, electoral methods, etc.? You might use this opportunity at least to mention to Diem we would welcome progress these lines without attempting secure formal commitment from him.
Hoover
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/7–1455. Secret. Drafted by Price and cleared in PSA, FE, and S/MSA and in draft with ICA, Treasury, Defense, and OFD. Approved for transmission by Hoover. Repeated for information to CINCPAC.↩
  2. Document 227.↩
  3. Not printed. (Washington National Records Center, FOA Message Files, FRC 57 A 248, Box 104, Vietnam)↩
  4. In this telegram, September 14, the Department informed the Embassy that it approved of a higher force level for Vietnam and that interagency approval was being obtained. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5/9–1455)↩
  5. In this telegram from Chief, MAAG Vietnam to the Commanding General of the U.S. Army in the Pacific (sent for information to Chief of Staff of the Army and CINCPAC), August 10, O’Daniel outlined and discussed the major problems facing MAAG in Vietnam. They included the withdrawal of the FEC, the lack of SEATO force commitment in defense of Vietnam, the dichotomy between the U.S. view of the role of Vietnam’s armed forces as that of providing internal security and the Vietnamese view of their role as that of protecting against aggression from the DRV, problems of demobilization of the VNA, need for U.S. approval of a 150,000 force level, logistical support deficiencies, and the need for qualified civilian personnel within MAAG to release military personnel for training functions. (Department of Defense Files)↩
  6. Document 242.↩