Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

253. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)¹

Washington, September 2, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Events in Viet-Nam, August 15–September 2

Political:

Diem remains in control, with no powerful organized resistance. The Sects remain fairly quiescent. Diem is now making a tour of Central Viet-Nam where he is being enthusiastically received. The French informed Viet Minh on August 30th that the Diem declaration of August 9th² (which in effect rejected elections and consultations because of lack of freedom in Communist area) constituted Free Viet-Nam’s reply to the Viet Minh letter of July 19th,³ which had requested consultations. The initial Communist reaction to the French statement was that the Diem declaration did not constitute a response to the Viet Minh letter. Eventual Communist reaction is hard to assess; the British predict vigorous, although undefined, Viet Minh retaliation.

Military:

The Government’s campaign against the Sect forces was successful in destroying them as organized forces. They still have the capability to operate as guerrillas, but have been relatively quiet. A series of anti-American incidents in Saigon, of undetermined origin included: The throwing of a grenade at the Ambassador’s residence (no damage); the wrecking of several American cars by small bombs; the destruction of six American cars on the docks while being unloaded; the distribution of anti-American pamphlets. The United Front Organization composed mainly of the Binh Xuyen, with a Communist tie suspected, has taken credit over its radio for this campaign. Two junior French army officers were caught by the Vietnamese police while unsuccessfully attempting to plant charges to blow up a small sidewalk cafe in Saigon patronized by Europeans and Americans. The two French officers are being held in Vietnamese custody pending the investigation. The French have protested strongly, allegedly threatening to cut off gasoline supplies to the Vietnamese army unless the officers are released to French control. Recent reports indicate the French actually did cut off gasoline supplies on August 25th but restored service on August 30th. We are investigating this act, as it may involve United States-supplied gasoline.

The Vietnamese have a delegation in Paris prepared to negotiate an agreement on the French Expeditionary Corps force levels. Viet-Nam has consulted General O’Daniel on this and will propose to the French that the FEC be pared down to 30,000 by October of 1955 (presently about 45,000) and then withdrawn completely by April 1956, except for small security guards on remaining French naval and air bases. Some four hundred French would be assigned to the Vietnamese army training mission, which will remain under United States command. French Navy and Air would phase out completely by the end of 1956, but certain unspecified ground, naval, and air bases might remain as mutually agreed upon. This proposal seems reasonable to us and we think the French will agree to it, particularly in view of their current need for troops in Africa. Major General Williams, whom you met, is scheduled to take over from General O’Daniel in October or November as MAAG Chief.

The Secretary has approved the FE memorandum⁴ which recommends a force level of 150,000 for Viet-Nam instead of the 100,000 originally scheduled. We understand, informally, that the JCS has approved such a level and that ICA is working on the details of financial support.

Economic:

ICA is proposing that our grant aid programs to Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia be altered so that $25 million of the Vietnamese program be in the form of a loan instead of a grant. Similarly, they are proposing $10 million of the Cambodian program and $5 million of the Lao program be loans. We are opposing these moves on the grounds that it is not practicable to impose such loans on their shaky economy.

Summary:

Diem’s continued success is due in large part to the lack of organized opposition to him. He has not, for one reason or another, proceeded to pacify the outlying regions where Viet Minh sympathy, and possibly forces, still remain. He is adamant that he will not deal with the Communists regarding elections and is reinforced in this by the Secretary’s statement of August thirtieth (attached).⁵ The French and British are expected to continue their efforts to influence Diem to adhere to the Geneva agreement. Communist tactics are still unclear, but there is no evidence of their preparation for aggression. No real progress has been made toward the establishment of an assembly.

Diem remains the leading anti-Communist nationalist and is gaining in stature. The greatest danger to Free Viet-Nam lies in the lack of constructive programs for pacification and internal consolidation. Our influence on Diem is probably lessening as he grows in popularity. He remains friendly to the United States but is determined, at the same time, to go his own way.

There are signs of a growing Asian understanding of the problem of Communist aggression in Indochina and the recent establishment of diplomatic relations with the Philippines, and the imminence of such with Korea are noteworthy. ROK is anxious to conclude a bilateral defense treaty with Viet-Nam, but details are still unknown.

During the reconvening of the United Nations in New York on September 27–28, the three Foreign Ministers agreed to hold talks in preparation for the October Geneva meeting. We are preparing position papers for these talks and will have a list of topics for your approval this week.⁶

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/9–255. Secret. Drafted by Hoey.
2. See footnote 5, Document 240.
3. See footnote 3, Document 233.
4. Document 245.

5. The reference is to an answer which Dulles gave at his press conference, August 30, in response to a question as to whether the United States would support Diem’s view that there was no possibility of free elections in the North as long as the Viet Minh were in control there. The statement is not attached to the source text. Dulles answered as follows:

   “We certainly agree that conditions are not ripe for free elections. I have always taken the position, and I think I have taken it publicly, that we see no reason to oppose having elections if there can be produced conditions of genuine freedom. In other words, if you could have conditions in the North so that there would not only be a free choice in the sense of being able to put a ballot of your own selection in the ballot box; but also, conditions where there would not be threats in advance or retaliation afterwards—if you could produce those conditions, then I would feel confident that the non-Communists would win the elections, and it would be very desirable to have elections. Whether or not those conditions can be created, I do not know. They have never yet been created in a Communist-controlled area, and in general the Communists have, as we know, always rejected the establishment of conditions which would enable free elections to be held.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/8–3055)

6. The list is contained in a memorandum from Young to Waddell, September 8. (Ibid., 396.1–NE/9–855). Texts of the briefing papers, BNY D–2/4 to 2/9, all September 17, are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 544.