Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

181. Telegram From the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris¹

Washington, May 9, 1955—6:47 p.m.

Tosec 10. For Young. Dulte 9 repeated Saigon 717.²

1. Believe Saigon in best position comment on risk to French Nationals if FEC withdrawn quickly. However, from Washington viewpoint we note following basic factors of problem: a) Seems doubtful FEC could be completely evacuated in less than several months at earliest. b) Presume Government Viet-Nam, if majority FEC withdrawn at French volition rather than ostensibly at demand of Vietnamese, might be able agree smaller FEC retain functions such as patrolling demarcation line, occupation Tourane and perhaps other bases and participation with U.S. in training of National Army. However we recognize this might not be politically acceptable to France. If on other hand, FEC appeared be expelled as result nationalist sentiments, then presumably exceedingly difficult for Diem or moderate elements to accept continuation limited FEC presence outlined above. Paradoxically, French initiative in offering withdraw FEC might result in Vietnamese request of continuation some elements, whereas if initiative seized by Vietnamese in demanding withdrawal under terms of Geneva Accord, likely such withdrawal would have to be complete. c) In general reduction or withdrawal FEC would have politically desirable effects local situation Viet-Nam, since it would remove last vestige colonial issue.

2. Regarding Faure’s comments, we note he refers to Diem’s request that French should go. We unable identify any such request by Diem although aware Revolutionary Committee first resolution which appears to have been dropped.³ Saigon’s clarifications helpful.

3. Department’s comments on Faure’s question as to U.S. response if French were to retire entirely from Indochina and call back the FEC as soon as possible as follows: If French withdrew FEC, U.S. can obviously not assume responsibility for protection French nationals and property. French Government must have foreseen such eventuality when they agreed at Geneva withdraw FEC at unilateral request Viet-Nam Government.

4. Washington view is that French not bluffing and may very well take this opportunity to withdraw FEC.

5. In general we believe a) France may well withdraw major elements FEC at own volition, or that in any case; b) Vietnamese sooner or later will request withdrawal FEC; c) Withdrawal or reduction of FEC is not without positive political value in Viet-Nam and possibly to France although we recognize such might diminish whatever deterrent value FEC presence against Communist aggression constitutes; d) We believe from political viewpoint preferable to France and Free World if French should negotiate with Diem regarding at least limited withdrawal, which might result in retention limited FEC functions noted paragraph 1b. above rather than complete withdrawal at Vietnamese request.

6. JCS has sent military appreciation in separate message.⁴

Hoover

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/5–855. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Hoey and cleared by Murphy, Sebald, Tyler, Stelle, and Hoover as well as Aurell of the CIA. Sent also to Saigon.
2. See footnote 2, supra.
3. According to telegram 4987 from Saigon, May 1, the General Assembly of Democratic Revolutionary Forces—as opposed to the Revolutionary Committee—Circulated three resolutions. In the first the Assembly charged the French with instigating the Binh Xuyen “rebellion” and called for withdrawal of the FEC. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/5–155)
4. Document 179.