Office of the Historian

147. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Deputy Special Assistant for Intelligence (Howe)1

[Washington, April 28, 1955.]

Ken Young reports the following.

Lansdale apparently has not been cut in on the Bao Dai plan. His directives and his reports are therefore in the context of knowing only the “support Diem” policy. He has been more recently reporting the wildfire rumor and speculation which has resulted from reports that the US may be shifting from Diem.

Late yesterday he sent a flood of reports and recommendations2 the gist of which were that the present would be a fatal moment to get rid of Diem, that nobody but the Viet Minh could gain and he recommended that a “country team” be formed in Saigon to evaluate the situation.3 He reported unanimity of view in this regard including [Page 306] Embassy but was ambiguous as to whether he referred to the Diem matter or to the need for a country team.

Receipt of these reports … meant a rapid series of telephone calls last night from Aurell to Roosevelt (acting for Wisner), to Allen Dulles, to Hoover, to the Secretary, to Ken Young. The result was a stay order on Paris4 not to embark on the course of action agreed to late yesterday afternoon.

The gist of the Lansdale reports—apparently carefully evaluating those from pro-Diem sources—are as follows:

1.
Diem has a head of steam up, would resist any Bao Dai effort to remove him, will name tonight a “Cabinet of intellectuals”. (Lansdale indicating that in talking with Diem he had urged broadest possible base for this Cabinet but had an unresponsive reaction from Diem.)
2.
The morale of the National Army is high.
3.
Increasing indication that Binh Xuyen, while the leadership is making threats of strong action, at the functionary level is beginning to show signs of weakening and possible willingness to accommodate the Government.

In terms of policy the immediate decision is whether or not to go ahead with the course of action with respect to France first and thence Vietnam which had been agreed upon. This in the face of Bao Dai on the one hand and [?] quite likely to issue an edict firing Diem and instituting the Bao Dai plan and on the other hand Diem naming a new Cabinet and showing firm resistance to the Binh Xuyen and any move of Bao Dai.

In terms of intelligence it means a clarification of the views of … field, Embassy, Collins/Sturm and Department particularly with respect to (1) this afternoon’s fighting and apparent success of the Army over Binh Xuyen; (2) Binh Xuyen steadfastness; (3) Diem’s steadfastness. (Sturm apparently feels strongly that Diem should and would retire to a monastery whereas … reports, again evaluated by source which is often pro-Diem, indicate increasing vigor of Diem and the present Department policy which looks to a retention of Diem for the time being with a phasing out only when alternatives have been agreed upon even then with Diem holding a high position [sic].5

Fisher Howe
  1. Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, Indochina. Secret.↩
  2. For a summary of two principal recommendations, see Document 145.↩
  3. In a telegram, April 28, 7:51 p.m. Saigon time, secret and priority, Lansdale reported that he had suggested that the country team report its recommendations separately, but that Kidder, the Acting Chief of Mission, was not keen to do so. In a telegram, April 28, 7:46 p.m. Saigon time, secret and operational immediate, Lansdale reported that he had specifically asked Kidder to hold a country team meeting, but that Kidder was unwilling to do so. Lansdale also reported that Frank Meloy, chief of the Embassy’s political section, who was present, accused Lansdale of attempting to use the country team to oppose Collins. (SMM telegrams)↩
  4. Printed as telegram 3837 to Paris, Document 144.↩
  5. The source text does not indicate where the parenthesis should end.↩