145. Editorial Note
In a telegram of April 28, 8:48 a.m. Saigon time, Edward G. Lansdale, as head of the Saigon Military Mission (SMM), sent to Washington a telegram in which he argued than the Diem government represented a better chance for success than any non-Viet Minh government it would be possible to form in South Vietnam. [Page 302] Failure to support Diem would cause great damage to American prestige and would doom any successor government to Diem’s to failure. The only winners would be the Viet Minh. According to the cable, new facts arising from the fighting in Saigon warranted calling a country-team meeting, and Lansdale asked for such a meeting.
In response, Washington sent a telegram, April 27, 9:49 p.m., asking for the background to Lansdale’s conclusion by 8 a.m. Washington time April 28 for use at the National Security Council meeting of that date. The 13-hour difference between Washington and Saigon accounts for the receipt of Lansdale’s initial telegram in local time the day before it was sent.
As requested the Saigon Military Mission sent a fuller exposition of its estimate of the present situation in South Vietnam in another telegram on April 28, 8:44 p.m. Saigon time. The Mission stated that Diem was playing for time and awaiting Ambassador Collins’ return to Saigon. Establishment of anew sûreté, reshuffling the cabinet, and calling for elections was not, in the Saigon Military Mission’s view, a solution to the basic security problem posed by the Binh Xuyen or the question of French support for Diem. Diem’s present strategy was to allow support for the Binh Xuyen to erode and eventually collapse rather than risk an all-out military confrontation with the Binh Xuyen or a political solution with Bay Vien. While this policy conformed with the desires of Ely and Collins, Lansdale and the Saigon Military Mission did not believe it would succeed, but rather would cause continued deterioration of Diem’s position.
The reasons for this pessimistic estimate were twofold: the new cabinet would be no more effective than the old and the tensions, which were building up in Saigon because of Diem’s lack of initiative and forthright action, were sure to increase. According to Lansdale, Diem’s basic problem was that he was not in control; he was out-gunned by Ely and the French Expeditionary Corps. As a result, anti-French feelings in Saigon–Cholon and throughout Vietnam were reaching serious proportions. If Bao Dai replaced Diem, the mission foresaw the probability of serious anti-French outbreaks. Under these conditions it was unlikely that any other nationalist candidate could carry out the programs necessary for success in Vietnam.
The Saigon Military Mission outlined in this estimate three possible alternatives. Under the first, Bao Dai bending to heavy French pressure would replace Diem with a candidate more acceptable to Paris. The result would be disastrous. Under the second alternative, Diem would be forced to maintain his position as leader of Vietnamese nationalist elements by adopting an openly anti-French posture and/or sending the Vietnamese National Army against the Binh Xuyen. The third possibility had nationalist elements in Vietnam undertaking sporadic and uncontrolled action—probably violent—against [Page 303] the Binh Xuyen and/or French civilian and military personnel.
The Saigon Military Mission added that if Diem were ousted from office, he planned to stay in Vietnam to head a political party to contest elections for the provisional assembly. The mission observed that if Diem became openly anti-French—as no doubt he would if forced out of power by Bao Dai and the French—he would be a powerful political factor because of his political support in central Vietnam and among northern refugees. Under this alternative, the future political climate of Vietnam would be anti-French and permeated by the Viet Minh.
Lansdale concluded with a restatement of the recommendations in his initial telegram of April 28: no nationalist aspirant for power in Vietnam had as much to offer as Diem and no pro-French leader could succeed against the Viet Minh. Any successor government to Diem’s acceptable to the French would be unable to carry out the reforms essential to deny Vietnam to the Communists. As a result, United States prestige in Vietnam would seriously decrease and the United States could not be a major factor in supporting such a government, which, lacking popular support, would be forced to depend heavily upon the French. (SMM telegrams)