Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

116. Telegram From the Special Representative in Vietnam (Collins) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, April 12, 1955—7 p.m.

4487. For the Secretary from Collins. Department telegram 4466.² Following answers will refer to paragraphs reference telegram.

1. Reference 2a. We cannot say when decision by U.S. would be required. However, present tenuous truce may explode at any moment into open hostilities and as time passes we may unavoidably be placed in position where withdrawal our support from Diem may become even more difficult. Therefore, I believe decision by U.S. should be made as early as possible.

2. Reference 2b. Difficult to estimate time required for first six steps, but we estimate minimum of 10 days.

3. Reference 2c. Fully in accord that U.S. should definitely establish as prior condition assumption of control of National Police by central government. Timing of assumption of this control was discussed in paragraph 1 Part I my telegram 4448.³ Much as I would prefer, from purely personal standpoint, to have Diem assume control National Police before his relief as Prime Minister, it would be better to have new government assume credit as well as responsiblity for this essential change. With respect to other assurances, French should be required to agree in general with the programs referred to in paragraphs 4 and 8, Part I my telegram 4448. In addition, it should be understood between ourselves and French that Binh Xuyen must not be given control of or participation in Interior Ministry and that under no circumstances must General Hinh be permitted return Viet Nam in near future in any capacity.

4. Reference 2d. We doubt advisability of waiting to initiate steps outlined my telegram 4448 until conclusion of Bandung Conference. Admittedly there will be strong chance of leaks, but it would be difficult to prolong present uncertain truce until Bandung Conference is over. Diem has never publicly accepted truce of 15 days proposed by Bao Dai. Truce Ely and I arranged expires today, April 12. Diem has not yet definitely decided to attend Bandung, though ordinance announcing Diem as chairman has just been published; this does not necessarily mean he will go. If he should go and word of his possible relief should leak out while he is there, such a leak might not be wholly disadvantageous. Diem is widely referred to in Asia as an American protege. If he were relieved during Bandung Conference, this would tend to indicate we had not taken upon ourselves responsibility for determining who should be Prime Minister of Vietnam. This same factor would make it difficult for Diem at Bandung to use his relief for his own propaganda advantage.

5. Reference 2e. As indicated above, I feel that action should be initiated with minimum delay. I think that we could obtain agreement from French and Bao Dai to successive steps outlined my 4448, and have a new government in office prior to May 15, date scheduled for election of Provisional Assembly. I believe it would be essential that this be accomplished before that date in order that new government can supervise elections. One of fears expressed to me recently by Quat was that Diem would try to pack new Assembly with his adherents to exclusion of any opposing parties. Moreover, opportunity should not be afforded this new and untried Assembly to participate in details of formation of new government. It might be added that the ordinance creating the Provisional Assembly precludes that body from taking any responsibility for the creation of the government itself.

6. Reference 2f. We feel once a decision has been made in Washington, the French should be advised simultaneously in Washington, Paris and Saigon. This should be done with full recognition of fact that there probably will be leaks from one or more quarters. When and if Diem is advised by Bao Dai that he is relieved as Prime Minister, this will come as a tremendous shock to Diem. Leaks might prepare him for the shock and have additional advantages of giving Ely and me opportunity of trying to persuade Diem not to sabotage new government if he should be disposed to do so. American public opinion also would need some preliminary preparation. Care would have to be taken, however, to insure that if leaks did occur, the initiative for the projected change is properly attributed to the Vietnamese and not to either France or the U.S. (See Paris telegram 4396.⁴) I am sure Department will give consideration to preliminary background explanations to press and appropriate members of Congress.

7. Reference 3a. We are quite convinced Diem would not accept any position in new government other than Prime Minister. Post as Chairman of High Council should be offered him by Bao Dai, but I doubt that he would accept it. If Diem should decide to refuse this post, there would be clear public relations advantages, if Bao Dai could announce that this post had been offered to Diem. With reference to utilizing Provisional Assembly to tide over change of government, we feel strongly that we cannot wait that long.

8. Reference 3b. As indicated above, we are fully in accord that throughout whatever successive steps are taken to make conversion, great care must be taken that changes are attributed to Vietnamese and not to either France or U.S. This may be difficult to achieve, but every effort should be made to that end.

9. I have not informed Ely of my recommendations. He has asked my reaction to his withdrawal of support of Diem. I have replied that I had reported his views Washington where I knew they were being carefully considered, but regretted I could make no comment at this time.

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Collins

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1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–1255. Top Secret; Niact.
2. Supra.
3. Document 108.
4. In this telegram, April 9, the Embassy reported the results of a discussion with Nguyen De, Bao Dai’s Chief of the Imperial Cabinet. Speaking for Bao Dai, Nguyen De gave Embassy officials a long indictment of Diem’s actions and suggested that a “supreme council” or “council of elders”, functioning under Bao Dai’s overall direction as chief of state, should replace Diem as the functioning executive of Vietnam. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–955) For an extract from this telegram, see United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 10, pp. 910–911.