Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

795.00/12–2254: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea¹

secret

Washington, December 23, 1954—5:33 p.m.

403. Your 708² repeated Tokyo 494. FYI clear implication Bern-Stockholm communications also available you Swiss and Swedes unlikely take action any kind on NNSC until Hammarskjold mission³ has chance yield results. Believe any action endangering or seriously embarrassing Hammarskjold mission must be avoided. Realize difficulties situation posed by ROK but see no alternative this time other than continued efforts dissuade ROK from creating incident by attempting expel Czechs and Poles. View Rhee attitude toward Hammarskjold mission believe inadvisable use this as argument. End FYI.

Request you see Rhee emphasizing we continuing make efforts persuade Swiss and Swedes take action leading solution problem and they actively considering question. Statements such as Won’s can only delay and possibly preclude such action as Swiss and Swedes extremely sensitive to and reluctant act under pressures as is any Government. Hope ROK will refrain from future statements such as Won’s and give tripartite approach chance succeed. Fact UNC has acted isolate Czechs and Poles with view preventing espionage activities ought make situation bearable short while longer. Finally, repeat warning UNC has responsibility protect NNSC personnel and intends do so.

Dulles

1. This telegram, drafted by Jones and cleared by McClurkin, Elizabeth Brown, Ward Allen, and with Defense, was repeated to Bern as telegram 829, Stockholm as telegram 485, and Tokyo as telegram 1262 with instructions to pass to CINCUNC.

2. This telegram, Dec. 22, read as follows:

   “Department’s attention invited General Won Yong-tok’s latest statement on Communist members NNSC transmitted TWX dated 220830Z. Statement, while setting no specific date, contains declaration ‘we have come to conclusion that situation of repeated advice and warnings has come to end’. Won then emphasizes that direct and immediate remedial action should be taken and concludes that remedial steps are ROK responsibility.” (795.00/12–2254)

3. Hammarskjold was in Peking Jan. 5–10, 1955, primarily to negotiate the release of U.S. airmen and UN personnel held captive in China. For documentation relating to the planning of this trip, see volume xiv.