795B.5 MSP/11–1654: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State
priority
572. Repeated information Tokyo 395. Tokyo pass CINCUNC and CAG. President Rhee’s new-found willingness accept minute of understanding should not be interpreted as wholehearted agreement with provisions he has hitherto opposed, or that our difficulties in that regard likely evaporate once documents initialed. His decision concerning minute chiefly attributable to following factors:
- 1.
- Firm US stand, which finally convinced Rhee nothing further obtainable at moment by additional argument, procrastination or haggling;
- 2.
- Exigencies of ROK domestic political situation. Rhee recognizes public altercation with US has undermined his position, precisely at time when he is bending his efforts push constitutional amendments (including third-term provision) down unenthusiastic legislative throat. To enhance prospect of winning amendment issue Rhee needs not only to repair relations with US but also to represent solution—that is termination minute of understanding question—as ROK victory. Stage has already been set locally for this.
- 3.
- Concern re possible adverse developments at UNGA during discussion Korean item, which, if US-ROK impasse continued, might, in Rhee’s view, lead US to support position certain other UN allies rather than ROK. Rhee’s ordering of Pyun to New York indicates importance he places on problem.
If foregoing analysis correct, we shall probably now witness determined drive to obtain early favorable action from Assembly on constitutional amendments. In this context it would not be our advantage to tolerate ROK misrepresentation, should that occur, of US/ROK understandings regarding aid program. Accordingly last night, when Embassy queried by INS correspondent re Pyun’s press conference, I authorized statement attributable Embassy spokesman in sense that Embassy had no comment except to point out that American proposals establishing terms of reference for aid program have been before ROK Government since September 27.
My doubts concerning genuineness Rhee’s acceptance of minute of understanding are based on experiences in dealing with him over past two years, fortified as recently as last evening when in conversation with Economic Coordinator Wood at dinner for visiting Congressmen, Rhee returned to his 180 to 1 exchange rate thesis as if this were matter to be settled to his satisfaction in immediate future. This morning Paik Tu-chin is reported to have told press that all points of difference with US are now settled except hwan-dollar matter. These observations made by Rhee and Paik Tu-chin notwithstanding fact that yesterday [Page 1921] Minister Finance wrote General Hull letter which while declining give desired assurances about further advances of hwan to military, finally accepted repayment for June–July–August advances at 254 to 1, and subsequent advances at 310 to 1 (rates, hitherto rejected, based on February 1953 agreement). Rhee did not refer in conversation with Wood to this letter, but implication is that when new exchange arrangement pursuant minute becomes effective and sale dollars through Bank of Korea inaugurated, bidders may be under pressure.
If matters develop in this direction we can minimize possibility of future difficulties in measure in which our forthcoming positions continue firm and explicit.
- 1.
- Our public announcement of conclusion negotiations re minute should be comprehensive and unambiguous. If satisfactory joint statement unobtainable, Department should consider issuing separate statement and also making suitable background information available. (See Embtel 568,1 repeated Tokyo 390.)
- 2.
- Once minute in effect, we should tolerate no chipping away of provisions. Any attempt of that character should be met promptly and decisively, first time it occurs. Otherwise likely be progressively impaired and program eventually rendered unworkable.
In short, while I do not minimize importance of having obtained for first time acceptable terms of reference for aid and related programs and while it would be far more comfortable to assume our ROK problems are about to be solved, it is more realistic (and more in accord with past experience) to await ROK performance and be prepared deal promptly and firmly with any deviations.
- Not printed. (795B.5 MSP/11–1654)↩