Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

795B.5 MSP/10–2254: Telegram

¹

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Seoul, October 22, 1954—8 p.m.

474. Repeated information Tokyo 314. Reference my immediately preceding telegram.² After approximately two hours unfruitful discussion hwan-dollar controversy I observed that although solution of that problem is urgent it is merely part of much larger panorama of economic matters as set forth in minute of understanding delivered September 27.³ Inflation is with us because of diverse factors which it is proposed handle through basic understandings set forth in minute. Furthermore I reminded President that unless and until basic understanding reached US position is that we are not committed to any particular military and economic aid program. Hull and Wood supported these observations whereupon Pyun handed me ROK redraft together with various supporting documents (texts following telegrams⁴).

Since cursory examination redraft indicated changes are of such magnitude as apparently constitute rejection US proposals, I asked Rhee whether document submitted this morning covered new ground or whether it contained suggestions already made by ROK negotiators in Washington. Paek Tu-chin after some prodding finally admitted in effect that ROK redraft reiterated Korean positions considered during Washington negotiations. Hull, Wood and I then declared we had no authority to accept any revisions of negotiated instrument presented September 27. We, therefore, limited ourselves to stating ROK redraft would be communicated to Washington and that President Rhee would be informed of reply.

As Department will observe, redraft once more seeks impose ROK views on practically every point at issue, including proposal that US agree to support unification of Korea “even by force”. With respect implementation economic program Hull and Wood indicated this morning (in connection hwan-dollar discussion) that appendix A paragraph I totally unacceptable. Memorandum accompanying ROK redraft (second succeeding telegram) appears to seek to commit US to practically every unacceptable proposition which has been raised by ROK during past several years, plus suggestion (paragraph 13) that “new UNC economic coordinator for Korea” be appointed.

Embassy recommends that Rhee be informed at earliest possible date, preferably in writing, that his counter-proposals are unacceptable. It is not believed that lengthy or contentious communication would be desirable but that our message should be brief and uncompromising, thus leaving Rhee in no doubt as to our attitude.

With respect to Wood, I propose when delivering foregoing communication to Rhee to make oral statement along line Deptel 282, October 20.⁵

Briggs

1. The following file number was also printed on the source text: 611.95B/10–2254.
2. The reference was to telegram 473 from Seoul, Oct. 22, in which Briggs reported that a meeting among Generals Hull and Taylor, Wood, himself, and Rhee and his advisers failed to produced a solution to the hwan-dollar controversy. (895B.131/10–2254)
3. For text, see telegram DA 967743 to Hull, Sept. 15, p. 1875.
4. Telegram 475, infra, and telegram 476, p. 1902.

5. In telegram 282 to Seoul, the Embassy was informed that:

   “If Rhee expresses his intention declare Wood persona non grata he should be informed Wood enjoys full confidence US, he is true friend Korea, US believes his knowledge and competence have been of mutual benefit US and ROK, and in your judgment such step would be viewed by US as matter utmost gravity affecting fundamentally mutual trust and cooperation without which aid program cannot succeed. Hope therefore Rhee will reconsider. If he persists he should be informed you obviously have no alternative except communicate this information your Government and you will inform him when reactions your Government known.” (795B./10–1954)