795B.00/9–2954: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State
priority
381. Repeated information Tokyo 252. Tokyo also pass CINCUNC and CAG. Reference Embtels 375, 376 and 377, repeated Tokyo 248, 249 and 250.1
Now that issues are joined it is of utmost urgency and importance that our side be placed before Korean officials and people before ROK Government by its anti-American campaign through misrepresentation, fomenting agitation, et cetera, so misleads public opinion and so blocks access to truth that our efforts prove too late.
Insofar as I am aware there is no difference of opinion among representatives various US agencies Seoul and Tokyo as to character of problem, issues and stakes involved, and position US Government should adopt. What is needed is a decision at highest level in US Government to place our position before the public. Various plans for doing it have been developing, including those communicated recently by CIA. Opinions as to means to be employed may differ, but I reiterate that action is imperative and that time is running out.
There is increasing evidence that there are influential Koreans who would not willingly follow Rhee’s intemperate leadership at the cost of US friendship and support. In Korea we have the dual problem of encouraging this group and of informing the public generally. There is the related and equally urgent problem of publicity within the United States both to inform the American public and to influence Korean opinion. In last connection Rhee himself has proved throughout period of my association with him sensitive to currents of US opinion as expressed in Congress and American publications and considerably influenced thereby. In particular he sets great store by favorable articles in principal American weeklies and dailies and is correspondingly upset by adverse publicity. If he sees that American public opinion is heavily weighted against his current belligerent views and his present campaign, that, in conjunction with firm US Government stand on matters at issue on official level, might be as effective as any other single factor in influencing him toward more reasonable course.
[Page 1891]Last statement is made with reservation that Rhee has so recklessly climbed out to end of insecure limb that return without serious loss dignity and of prestige domestically might be difficult feat for younger albeit less experienced climber. I do not consider however that this should in present circumstances constitute valid reason for capitulating to him or showing him way back to firm ground. In view Rhee’s conduct past six weeks since return from Washington visit I believe our position should be that extricating himself, if that can now be done, is Rhee’s responsibility.
I recognize that above course can perhaps lead to our being faced at early date with new problems and issues of great delicacy, seriousness and urgency, but in my opinion we can not and should not defer them if Rhee is determined to pursue his present reckless course which runs so clearly counter not only to our own interests in Korea and elsewhere but those of Korea itself.
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In telegram 375 from Seoul, Sept. 29, the Embassy reported that it had received an ultimatum, which was carried in the ROK press, from Korean demonstrators (a veterans group) that unless they were given assurances that the United States would terminate redeployment, they would block the U.S. Embassy indefinitely.
Briggs dispatched two notes to the South Korean Foreign Office protesting this ultimatum and the demonstrations (texts in telegram 376, Sept. 29), prepared a press release to the same effect (text in telegram 377, Sept. 29), and asked for Department approval before making public the notes and the press release. (795B.00/9–2954)
According to telegram 238 to Seoul, Sept. 29, that approval was not given. (795.00/9–2954)
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