Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

795.00/8–154: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Hull) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

secret
priority

Tokyo, August 1, 1954—11:59 a.m.

C 69173. (Army Message) From CINCFE to DA, JCS, General Hull, and Secretary State. The following message received from General Taylor as his KCG 7–38 of 31 July is forwarded for your information.

“General Magruder to forward following message to appropriate addressee. Embassay Seoul requests DA pass to State.

“Accompanied by Chargé d’Affaires Strom, I called on Prime Minister Pyun at 0900 this date and discussed with him the Won Yung Duk press release of 30 July threatening ROK action against NNSC.²

“We explained our visit as a call to receive from Pyun an explanation of meaning of this press release and evaluation of weight to be assigned to it. He talked at length of dissatisfaction of his government over indefinite prolongation of armistice and in particular over presence of Communist inspection teams in South Korea. However, he expressed hope that clashes could be avoided and that the current efforts to obtain voluntary withdrawal of the Swiss and Swedes would succeed. He stated several times that he felt that the ROK Government should and would take no unilateral action without acquiescence of US or at least without exhausting all efforts to coordinate with US.

“It was pointed out to him that the Won Yung Duk release would have adverse effect on Rhee’s mission in US and would tend to create tensions here which might lead to serious incidents. I described way in which Poles and Czechs are escorted by armed UN MP and emphasized danger of armed clashes if the Korean authorities undertook to molest teams. He countered by charging the Poles and Czechs with espionage, saying that he hopes to prove they are spies by presentation of evidence which his people sure collect. He indicated that when this evidence assembled his government will demand the removal of the individual involved in accordance with normal diplomatic practices.

“There was discussion of efforts being made to persuade Swiss and Swedes voluntarily to withdraw from NNSC. Pyun said that his government would certainly await outcome of these efforts before considering more drastic action. I emphasized that even if these efforts failed, our two govenments should continue to work in concert and not consider going separate ways. To my expression of concern over the known irresponsibility of General Won Yung Duk, Pyun made the point that Won Yung Duk is not under him but is responsible only to the President.

“As we broke up, I again emphasized the seriousness of interference with the NNSC teams as constituting a unilateral breach of the armistice of the Korean Government.

“We agreed to no press release at this time other than to state in response to queries that the call had been made during which there was an amicable discussion of the Won Yung Duk release. Mr. Strom has seen this cable and concurs with it. My comment on this matter follows by separate cable.³ Signed Taylor.”

1. General Hull, CINCFE and CINCUNC, was in Washington to take part in the discussions between Presidents Rhee and Eisenhower and their respective advisers. This message, which was unsigned, was originally from General Taylor and was transmitted to Washington for the JCS, Hull, and Dulles by General Magruder of CINCFE.
2. On July 30, Provost Marshal, General Won Yong Duk, issued a press release threatening ROK action against the NNSC unless its Polish and Czech members left South Korea immediately.
3. The reference was to telegram C 69172 from Taylor, Aug. 1, not printed, in which the Commander of the Eighth Army noted that Won Yong Duk’s action was the opening gun of a campaign to oust the NNSC from South Korea. (795.00/8–154)