Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

Eisenhower Library, James C. Hagerty papers

Hagerty Diary, July 27, 1954

[Extracts]

[Washington, undated.]

. . . . . . .

In at the White House at 7:15 A.M. The President called me up to his bedroom at 7:30. He said that he wanted me to stay with him throughout the morning so that he would have a record of any conversations that took place. He asked me also to sit in on the Korean–American talks with the same thing in mind.

The President told me that he was having considerable difficulty with Rhee: “I feel sorry for the old man. He wants to get his country unified, but we cannot permit him to start a war to do it. The consequences would be too awful. But he is a stubborn old fellow, and I don’t know whether we’ll be able to hold him in line indefinitely.”

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The American-Korean talks were held in the Cabinet Room at 10:00 A.M. with the following present:¹

From our side

• The President
• The Secretary of State
• American Ambassador to Korea Ellis O. Briggs
• Secretary Wilson
• Admiral Radford
• Harold Stassen
• General John E. Hull, Commander in Chief, Far East Command
• Everett Drumright, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
• C. Tyler Wood, Economic Coordinator of Korea, FOA
• Robert J. G. McClurkin, Deputy Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State
• Admiral Davis²

From the Korean Side

• H. E. Syngman Rhee, President of the Republic of Korea Admiral Sohn Won Il, Defense Minister
• H. E. Dr. You Chan Yang, the Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to the United States
• H. E. Paik Tu-Chin, Economic Coordinator
• (Miss Crystal Crone, Secretary to Ambassador Yang)

The President sat in his customary seat in the Cabinet Room with Dulles on his right hand and Wilson on his left. Other members of the American Delegation sat on that side of the table.

President Rhee sat in the Vice President’s chair with his Ambassador on his right and his Economic Coordinator on his left. The Defense Minister sat next to the Ambassador.

At the start of the meeting the President asked Secretary Dulles to open the meeting with a short statement. Dulles did so, saying that one of the purposes of these talks, in addition to the pleasure and honor we had in welcoming President Rhee to this country, was naturally to talk over matters of mutual concern, particularly with reference to the statement of understanding that he had had with President Rhee in Seoul. At that time (April) he and President Rhee had mapped out a program to cover the situation for a few months. At that time it was also agreed that if the political conference did not come to any agreements regarding Korea, both sides had agreed that it would be necessary to sit down and talk again. That was the reason for this meeting.

The Secretary said that the United States and Korea had many problems to talk about—political, military and economic. He said that there had always been a feeling of understanding and cooperation between the two countries but that he felt it was necessary to have these talks now on the highest level; namely, between the Heads of the two countries.

On the political side, the Secretary said that the unification of Korea had always been the long range objective of the United States and that he thought this subject would again come up at the United Nations Assembly.

As far as the military problem is concerned, it evolved around the question of maintaining strong Korean forces. Such maintenance, however, was placing considerable economic strain on the Korean Government and that Government was faced with the dangers of inflation and black market operations.

As far as the economic situation in general was concerned, the United States and the Republic of Korea were vitally concerned about a long range build-up of the economic strength of Korea so that the Republic could become a self-sustaining economic unit.

The Secretary said that everybody realized that the burden of maintaining strong Korean forces was a very serious one for the Korean people but that this was understood fully by the United States and that working groups from both countries were constantly keeping this problem under study.

In response, President Rhee, talking in a low tone which was very difficult to follow although his English was very good (with a very heavy accent, however) said that he welcomed the opportunity to be here in Washington to talk over these problems. Since our discussions at Seoul his government had agreed to try everything they could to arrive at concrete solutions, but now that Geneva was at an end he wanted to know where the United States stood. As far as Geneva was concerned, Rhee said that naturally he had expected some results but that these had not happened and that was the reason he was here for these talks. He said that Secretary Dulles in his opening remarks had suggested ways and means of continuing efforts toward the successful conclusion of Korean problems and that while he realized that these talks would not be able to settle every problem, he hoped that at least they would present some understanding of the problems of Korea.

The President then asked President Rhee if Rhee wanted to have his people or our people talk in regard to any specific proposal. Do you want to have your Defense Minister or your military advisor discuss any problems? the President asked.

Rhee said that he would like first to discuss the question of unification of his country. He would like to know formally what the next step is you want us to take. He would like to have it settled in some definite way. I don’t believe the United Nations will suggest any further conference but there must be some way, Mr. President, in which we can cooperate with our great ally, the United States. This is a very important moment in our history. It is a very important moment for us to know what we can do. President Rhee said that he was sure that the soldiers of the United Nations who were presently in his country did not want to stay there forever and that the people of their own land were tired of having their boys remain there on the front lines without doing anything. He said that his nation might propose to start some positive action at the front so that the United Nations forces would not have to remain there for a long time.

The President interrupted to say that on the question of Korean unification he regretted very much indeed that there was no immediate solution. He said that the same tragic situation is being borne by other nations; for example, Germany, Austria and now Indochina. Any deliberate resort to war is completely barred in our calculations. We want to free Austria. We want to see Germany unified. We want to see your country unified, but I must tell you, Mr. President, that no one in this world will get America to go to war over these problems. So if we exclude war, then there should be no plan which we would not be willing to listen to and consider—even subversion of the peoples like they have done in some of the countries they have taken over. Let’s subvert them to our side. But I want to point out one thing very clearly. We cannot undertake any engagement that involves deliberate intention of going to war with Iron Curtain countries. We are willing to talk over anything that seems reasonable.

President Rhee in response said that we have to know where the United States stands. Never mind Austria and Germany. We have to know where our great ally, the United States, the champion of democracy, stands in relation to the attempts of Communist Russia and the Communists of China to take over our country and to keep it divided. If the United States will take a definite stand in the defense of itself and of free nations, we are willing to go to any extent to unify our country. But we have found out to our disappointment that the peace policy in the United States is growing stronger. If we know definitely that the United States will not fight any aggressor in the defense of freedom, then we will have to make up our mind. We cannot allow our enemies to come down from the north and destroy us. In the end China went down to the Communists because the United States was not willing to stand for the free nations regardless of the risk. Instead the peaceful policy resulted in China going Communist.

President Rhee said that the situation in Korea was not as bad as China, to which he had just referred, but that Korea could not hang for an indefinite period of time through years of talking. Where are we going? That’s our problem. We would like to know what we can expect from the United States. Naturally, we are more than grateful for the help of our great ally, but what we are going to have to know from now on is what stand the United States will take and what we must do. If I may be permitted a few words more, we know and all Asia knows that four years ago Soviet Russia made a decision to conquer all of the world and to destroy materialistic, capitalistic America. All of their advertisements, all their propaganda all over the world is geared to that end. People may say that England, France and Italy are presently free. But that is not so. They are afraid. Now they have won in Indochina, Viet Nam is partitioned. Pretty soon Thailand will be gone and South America will come next. Still, how can you say that still we must sit still and let the Communists conquer and conquer and conquer. If we still believe that people amount to anything, we must never be afraid. If we are afraid, democracy will be conquered. Your efforts to save the world at peace will suddenly end. I am not talking for the salvation of Korea. That means nothing in the long run unless the rest of the world can remain democratic, free and united. We are holding to that little spot in Korea to create courage among anti-Communist nations to oppose Communism. That is what rightly or wrongly we have been working for—to encourage the free world to combat Communism. If we have had illusions on that score we would like to be disillusioned right now.

Secretary Dulles replied by saying that he felt a great deal of sympathy with President Rhee’s analysis of the world situation and the world’s problems. He said that he agreed with President Rhee that the final objective of hostile Communist strategy is the destruction or enslavement of the United States. He said also that he agreed with President Rhee that it was dangerous to have a gradual encirclement (to use the Russian phrase) of the United States. He pointed out that Stalin had said that this plan of Soviet encirclement of the United States was one of the more obvious plans of Communist strategy and that as Stalin said, we would be encircled so much that we would bow in terror to the Soviets because the peril would be so great. We are not blind to this peril but one has to face the reality that any deliberate starting of a war in order to correct present injustices would involve the world and consequences so great that it would be unthinkable. The starting of such a war would create world opinion against the United States that could easily turn the tide against the free world. If we fight to unite Korea, should we not also fight to unite Germany, Austria, the Baltic States and Indochina. If we start a global war, we would unleash such terrible weapons—weapons that have never been used before—that it would destroy civilization. You say you cannot see any alternative to war. I cannot think that human beings must conclude that there is no alternative to war. It is far better for human beings to be persistent in the right, for persistence in the right eventually brings results that cannot be seen in advance. When you, Mr. President, started to free your country from Japan, you could not foresee the developments that would bring independence to Korea. A lot of things are going to happen that we can’t see now. Who knows what is going on in the recesses of the Kremlin? When we got inside Nazism at the conclusion of the last war, we found how terrible it was. We found it was on the verge of collapse. To assume now that the only conclusion is war is quite unjustified. The American people will not accept war to correct evils that exist like those in your country, but it is important to stand for the right, to work for the right, to not be afraid. I can’t tell you how Korea can be united anymore than you could foresee twenty-five years ago how Korea could be free. But Korea was free. It is up to us to keep pressures on. The other side will crack. I don’t think it is necessary for me to say that a Korea condemned to partition and [in] perpetuity is something we would not like to see. Mr. President, you as a devoted Christian, must agree with me that there are things that happen for the right that cannot be foreseen at the present time but they will happen without resort to a terrible worldwide global atomic war.

President Rhee said that he was not here particularly to demand more military aid. We are here like one family. We are here to see how we can agree on some plan, to agree to work out together our problems. I do not wish to embarrass you, Mr. President, or anyone. I know that you want to solve the Korean problems by peaceful means. Of that I am aware. There are two opinions on this problem. One that says we must stand still and do it peacefully. The other that says we should stand for war. Our desire is to have a heart-to-heart conference as two friends and two best allies. We will tell you frankly, Mr. President, of our hopes and where we stand. We are not asking for you to decide right away but if we are mistaken, we want to have it corrected. We have been patient so far. Our people in the north were crying for us to help them. We heard their crying but we kept quiet. We did not act. Now we no more can hear that crying. Their children have been sent to Manchuria. Many of our people in the north have been slain. We want to know how we can save these people in the north. This doesn’t mean that we are asking the United States only to send more troops and more weapons. That is not our idea. Suppose we sit tight. Can we keep the Communists from coming down from the north? What are we to do? What are all people who love freedom, who love peace, to do? The moment the Chinese turned to Communism they became our enemies; they became your enemies. Our question now is where will the United States stand. You are the hope of the world. The one world question today is whether the United States—the leader nation—will tell the free nations that if they stand up for their freedom against Communism, the United States will help them. There will be no more talk; there will be no more appeasement. We will all stand and work together. That is what the world is crying for today. That is the way we can unite for freedom. Our people have fought and sacrificed side by side with your people’s sons. Our people and your people’s sons have laid down their lives in my country. They died believing that in doing so they were making this world safe for democracy. We must think of tomorrow. The young men of America must think of tomorrow. This is a solemn moment and I beg you, Mr. President, to think of it seriously. Think of the future. Let us know what you will do and where your country will stand before I go away.

The President said: Mr. President, you are asking us to think seriously about these matters. I assure you we think about them all the time, in every meeting that we have—in our Cabinet meetings, in our meetings of the National Security Council, in the meetings with our leaders of Congress. What you are in effect suggesting is that there can be no peace in the world until the head of the Communist octopus is destroyed. That means that Russia is destroyed. That raises the question of how to marshal our great power, how to marshal it to deliberately go to war. The free nations have never gone to war deliberately—they cannot. Surprise is important in war, but the free nations have a handicap because they cannot act as dictator nations. They cannot take advantage of this surprise. Mr. President, one thing is worse than winning any war—that’s losing it. There is no disposition in America at any time to belittle the Republic of Korea but when you say that we should deliberately plunge into war, let me tell you that if war comes, it will be horrible. Atomic war will destroy civilization. It will destroy our cities. There will be millions of people dead. War today is unthinkable with the weapons which we have at our command. If the Kremlin and Washington ever lock up in a war, the results are too horrible to contemplate. I can’t even imagine them. But we must keep strong. We must try to repulse aggression by united action. We couldn’t go into Indochina because we would be supporting the French. We can’t be imperialists and the Asians didn’t want us to go in. I assure you that we think about these things continuously and as seriously as you do. The kind of war that I am talking about, if carried out, would not save democracy. Civilization would be ruined, and those nations and persons that survived would have to have strong dictators over them just to feed the people who were left. That is why we are opposed to war.

President Rhee then said: Suppose we had a plan that would not risk world war but would provide the unification of Korea. We have certain ideas on this subject. We would like to keep it a secret but we have in our heads certain things that we can do to unify Korea. If you would help me to do these things, I would be very glad to show and talk about these plans with anyone you would designate.

The President said: I would like you to give to our people every single plan you have for unification. You must not assume that because we are opposed to global war we are lacking in sympathy for you and your country. We will listen to every feasible plan—any plan just so long as it is fair and just, decent and right, and has a chance of success.

That concluded the preliminary remarks and Secretary Dulles then asked President Rhee if he would like to discuss briefly now the question of the ROK armed forces.

President Rhee said he would and continued: We have been for an increase in our forces. To the north of us our enemies have been digging, have been increasing their air fields and their air force, yet our hands have been tied. It is necessary for us, therefore, to have a stronger force to keep our enemies from breaking through our lines. Let me repeat what I have said before. The United Nations forces in my country are uncertain why they are now there. The English and the French troops see that their governments’ stands are uncertain. They don’t know where their governments stand, and consequently their soldiers’ morale is weakened. This influences the soldiers of other nations. I have no heart to ask the UN forces to stay in my country against their wishes and fight for us. Unless we are going to stay together, to line up together, there is no reason for them being there. That is another reason why we must know the policy of the United States.

Specifically, we need more divisions, more air and more sea forces. Let me tell you why. In 1948 General Roberts came to see me. I told him at that time that we needed more tanks and 200,000 more trained soldiers. I was told at that time that such a demand was outrageous, that the Korean economy could not stand it. I was told that tanks in Asia were no good. I was told that the Reds would never come down south—but in 1950 they came south. So, that being our experience, we need and want larger forces. The Chinese have a million men to the north of us in addition to the North Korean army. If we want successfully to defend our lines, we must have a sufficient number of trained troops. We have started our National Guard system and have 1,600,000 men trained. We need to keep up the genius, the training and the organization of fighting men which you showed us how to get.

At this point Secretary Dulles suggested that it would be a good idea if the military advisors to President Rhee met with Secretary Wilson and his advisors. He said that he did not think that these discussions would need to involve the President or himself in their initial stages, but he thought it was the best thing to do at the present time. The President added that he thought economic discussions³ should go on simultaneously with these military talks. Dulles agreed to this as did President Rhee and Dulles added that there were two aspects of the economic talks—(1) Economic reconstruction of the country and (2) the Korean budget which was part and parcel of the military problem.

With that, the talks adjourned.

After the talks were over, Secetary Dulles and I went into the President’s office with him.

The President said that he could not see how President Rhee could say that he wanted only to start a little war in Korea and could not recognize the danger of it rapidly spreading into an all-out global war. Dulles said that he had heard the same theme that Rhee had stressed today in his conversations with Rhee on other occasions.

My own personal observation from listening to President Rhee talk is considerably mixed. I feel sorry for him and his country but, of course, we cannot permit the danger of war and Rhee’s actions, if taken, would very likely start one. Rhee is a zealous patriot who has worked all his life for Korean independence, who has been jailed, beaten and tortured in that fight but who closes his eyes to the practical realities of the situation. I don’t know whether he realizes that his Korean armies could not stand up for more than two or three weeks against the Chinese Communists, but I am sure that his advisers do, although they are deathly afraid of arguing with him on this subject. You have to admire his patriotism and his steadfast determination to bring about the unification of his country, but we cannot permit him to involve the United States in a war with Asia. It is a tough and somewhat tragic position to be in—but that’s the way it is.

When Rhee left the Cabinet Room he was, of course, interviewed by reporters and he told them that there could be no peaceful unification of Korea. Of course, the newsmen asked me for comment on the meeting, and I merely told them that there had been a preliminary exchange of views; that technical discussions would be held that afternoon between the experts of both countries; and that Secretary Dulles and President Rhee would meet with their advisers at the State Department tomorrow. I said that President Eisenhower would meet again with President Rhee at the conclusion of the talks Thursday afternoon⁴ or probably Friday morning and that I expected that a statement would be issued when the talks were finished.

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1. A copy of these minutes is also located in the Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file. Summary minutes prepared by members of the Department of State are located in Secretary of State’s Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199 and Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 346.
2. Adm. Arthur C. Davis, USN, Director of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.
3. A complete record of these U.S.-ROK economic talks, which continued until Sept. 14, is located in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 346.
4. July 29.