Office of the Historian

795.00/7–1254

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Drumright) to the Secretary of State1

top secret
[Washington,] July 16, 1954.

Subject:

  • Redeployment from Korea.

Your telegram of June 26 to Seoul, Tokyo, Taipei and Saigon2 concerning redeployment from Korea brought forth considerable comment from, and difference of opinion among, the posts mentioned, General Van Fleet and General Hull. The chief points made are summarized below:

(1)
Redeployment to the United States would be interpreted as a sign of weakness, but deployment from Korea to other places in the Far East could be publicly treated as increasing strategic flexibility of United States forces.
(2)
Publicity should be minimized except as the increased strategic flexibility can be stressed.
(3)
The ROK and other Governments concerned should be informed in advance. Discussions with the ROK should not take place until we are prepared to tell them what we will do to strengthen or increase their defense forces.
(4)
Any plans for redeployment should be considered in the context of our whole Far East policy.
(5)
General Van Fleet recommends redeployment from Japan first, simultaneous announcement of 10 additional native combat divisions each for Japan, Korea and Formosa (these would be reduced-strength or reserve divisions except for two in the ROK), and later movement of two divisions from Korea—one to go to Okinawa and the Philippines and one to Hawaii.
(6)
General Hull recommends redeployment of two divisions from Korea first, with one division going to Okinawa and one to Hawaii, no further withdrawals from Korea or from Japan until United States policy for the whole Far East is determined, and no announcement of, or policy for, 10 additional native combat divisions each for the ROK, Japan and Formosa. Ambassador Allison agrees. General Hull recommends development of additional reduced-strength Korea divisions which he says can be done within presently authorized personnel strength and with available equipment. Additional military support funds of at least $100 million will be required.
(8)
[sic] General Hull has announced the plan to withdraw the First Cavalry Division from Hokkaido to Northern Honshu, thus turning the defense of Hokkaido over to the Japanese forces. He will soon submit a plan for the scheduled withdrawal of United States forces from Japan.
(9)
General Hull reports that since last spring 8 out of 19 Chinese Communist armies have been moved out of North Korea. North Korean forces have been increased from six corps to seven and have gained in effectiveness. The UN forces are stronger than Communist forces and are relatively stronger than they were at the time of the Armistice since ROK forces have been increased by five divisions and “improved tremendously” while United States forces have been reduced by only two divisions.

I suggest that decisions on deployment from Korea should be made in the course of preparations for President Rhee’s visit and that these decisions should be discussed with him along with United States plans for the increase or strengthening of the ROK forces.

  1. According to an attached memorandum by McClurkin to O’Connor, July 16, this memorandum for the Secretary did not reach the Executive Secretariat until Dulles had left for consultations with Congress; therefore, it was sent to Smith who approved it. However, according to a marginal note by McClurkin, who drafted both memoranda, Dulles did see it on July 19, 1954.↩
  2. The reference was to telegram 1043 to Seoul, p. 1815.↩